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openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
Dr. Stephen Henson fe0e302dff PR: 2628 
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve

Fix for ECC keys and DTLS.
2011-10-27 13:01:33 +00:00

1561 lines
40 KiB
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/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
/*
* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
return(DTLSv1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method)
int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
unsigned long alg_k;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
int listen;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
listen = s->d1->listen;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->d1->listen = listen;
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
if (listen)
{
memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
}
/* If we're just listening, stop here */
if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
ret = 2;
s->d1->listen = 0;
/* Set expected sequence numbers
* to continue the handshake.
*/
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
goto end;
}
break;
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
s->renegotiate = 2;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
* have not asked for it :-) */
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
*/
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified */
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_md5,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
#if 0
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
#endif
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
/* next message is server hello */
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
/* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
* requests for it */
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int msg_len;
unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
{
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
msg_len = p - msg;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int sl;
unsigned long l,Time;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
* session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
* old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
*/
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
/* put the cipher */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
return -1;
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int al,i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4],kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
n=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
{
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if(rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0]=rsa->n;
r[1]=rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
{
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(dh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
{
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0]=dh->p;
r[1]=dh->g;
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
{
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
}
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
* keys over named (not generic) curves. For
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key.
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
if (encodedlen == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
* In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
{
/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
n+=2+nr[i];
}
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
== NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
}
else
{
pkey=NULL;
kn=0;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
s2n(nr[i],p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
p+=nr[i];
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
* [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
*p = 0;
p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
{
/* copy PSK identity hint */
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at
* &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
* at the end. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(u,p);
n+=u+2;
}
else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
}
else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
/* let's do ECDSA */
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
}
else
#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned int msg_len;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
s2n(nl,p);
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
l2n3(n,d);
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
/* XXX: what to do about this? */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
#endif
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
return(-1);
}
int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long l;
X509 *x;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
if (x == NULL)
{
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
}
l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
{
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
int len, slen;
unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
/* get session encoding length */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
* too long
*/
if (slen > 0xFF00)
return -1;
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
return -1;
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
if (!senc)
return -1;
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
* from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
p += len;
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
p += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
/* Ticket length */
p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num= len;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
s->init_off=0;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
/* XDTLS: set message header ? */
msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#endif
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