3548 lines
116 KiB
C
3548 lines
116 KiB
C
/* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include "statem_locl.h"
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#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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# include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
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PACKET *cipher_suites,
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STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
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int sslv2format, int *al);
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/*
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* server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
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* state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
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* message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
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* is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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*
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* Valid return values are:
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* 1: Success (transition allowed)
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* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
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*/
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int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
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{
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OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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switch(st->hand_state) {
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case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
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/*
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* If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
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* 1) We didn't request a Certificate
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* OR
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* 2) If we did request one then
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* a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
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* AND
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* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
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* list if we requested a certificate)
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*/
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
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&& (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
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|| (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
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(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
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&& (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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return 1;
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} else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
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/*
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* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
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* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
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* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
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* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
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* the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
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* set.
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*/
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if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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/*
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* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
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* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
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* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
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* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
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*/
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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#endif
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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}
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#endif
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break;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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#endif
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case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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/* No valid transition found */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
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*
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* Valid return values are:
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* 1: Yes
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* 0: No
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*/
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static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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{
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unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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/*
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* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH, fortezza or RSA but we have a
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* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
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* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
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* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
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* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
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* key exchange.
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*/
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if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
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|| (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
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|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
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&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
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|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
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&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
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[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
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8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
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)
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)
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)
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/*
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* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
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* provided
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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/* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
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|| ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
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&& s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
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/* For other PSK always send SKE */
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|| (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
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|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
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#endif
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) {
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
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*
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* Valid return values are:
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* 1: Yes
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* 0: No
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*/
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static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
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{
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if (
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/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
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s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
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/*
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* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
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* during re-negotiation:
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*/
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&& ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
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!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
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/*
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* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
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* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
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* RFC 2246):
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*/
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&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
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/*
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* ... except when the application insists on
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* verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
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* this for SSL 3)
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*/
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|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
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/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
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/*
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* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
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* are omitted
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*/
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
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* when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
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*/
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WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
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{
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OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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switch(st->hand_state) {
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case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
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return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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case TLS_ST_OK:
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/* We must be trying to renegotiate */
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
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&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
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st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
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else
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
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if (s->hit) {
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if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
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else
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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} else {
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/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
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/* normal PSK or SRP */
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if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
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(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
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} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
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} else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
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} else {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
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}
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}
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
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if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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}
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/* Fall through */
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case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
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if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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}
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/* Fall through */
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case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
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if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
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return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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}
|
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/* Fall through */
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|
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case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
}
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
|
|
* the server to the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
|
|
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
|
|
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
|
|
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
|
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
|
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
|
|
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
|
|
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No pre work to be done */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
|
* server to the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
|
|
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
/*
|
|
* The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
|
|
* treat like it was the first packet
|
|
*/
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
|
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
|
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
|
|
* SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
|
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No post work to be done */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
|
|
*
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
* 1: Success
|
|
* 0: Error
|
|
*/
|
|
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
|
return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
return tls_construct_server_done(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
|
else
|
|
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
return tls_construct_finished(s,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
|
|
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
|
* reading. Excludes the message header.
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
return s->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
|
* from the client
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
|
|
BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
|
|
/* Are we renegotiating? */
|
|
&& s->renegotiate
|
|
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
|
|
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
|
|
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
|
|
* login name
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
|
|
unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
unsigned char cookie_len)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int msg_len;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
|
|
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
|
|
memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
|
|
p += cookie_len;
|
|
msg_len = p - buf;
|
|
|
|
return msg_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int len;
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
|
|
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
|
|
s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
|
|
|
|
dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
|
|
len);
|
|
len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = len;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
unsigned int j, complen = 0;
|
|
unsigned long id;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
|
|
int protverr = 1;
|
|
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
|
|
PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
|
|
int is_v2_record;
|
|
|
|
is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
|
|
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
|
|
/* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
|
|
if (is_v2_record) {
|
|
unsigned int version;
|
|
unsigned int mt;
|
|
/*-
|
|
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
|
|
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
|
|
* record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
|
|
* the rest right through. Its format is:
|
|
* Byte Content
|
|
* 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
|
|
* 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
|
|
* 3-4 version
|
|
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
|
|
* 7-8 session_id_length
|
|
* 9-10 challenge_length
|
|
* ... ...
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|
|
|| mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
|
|
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
|
|
* in the first place
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
|
|
/* No protocol version supplied! */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (version == 0x0002) {
|
|
/* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
|
|
/* SSLv3/TLS */
|
|
s->client_version = version;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* No idea what protocol this is */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
|
|
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
|
|
*/
|
|
if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
|
|
if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
|
|
protverr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
switch(s->client_version) {
|
|
default:
|
|
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
|
|
if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
|
|
s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
|
|
protverr = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Deliberately fall through */
|
|
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
|
|
if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
|
|
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
|
|
protverr = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Deliberately fall through */
|
|
case TLS1_VERSION:
|
|
if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
|
|
s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
|
|
protverr = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Deliberately fall through */
|
|
case SSL3_VERSION:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
|
|
if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
|
|
s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
|
|
protverr = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->client_version <= s->version
|
|
|| s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
|
|
* negotiation comes later.
|
|
*/
|
|
protverr = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (protverr) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
|
|
* number
|
|
*/
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
}
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
|
|
if (is_v2_record) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
|
|
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
|
|
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
|
|
PACKET challenge;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
|
|
/* No extensions. */
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Load the client random */
|
|
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
|
|
challenge_len;
|
|
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
|
|
s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
|
|
challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&compression);
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Regular ClientHello. */
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
|
|
* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
|
|
* So check cookie length...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Could be empty. */
|
|
extensions = *pkt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
|
|
* TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
|
|
*
|
|
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
|
|
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
|
|
* ignore resumption requests with flag
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
|
|
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
|
|
* this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
|
|
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
|
|
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
|
|
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
|
|
* ignored.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_v2_record ||
|
|
(s->new_session &&
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
|
|
* version.
|
|
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
|
|
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
|
|
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
|
|
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
|
|
* will abort the handshake with an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
|
|
/* previous session */
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
} else if (i == -1) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* i == 0 */
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
|
|
}
|
|
/* default verification */
|
|
} else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
|
|
/* Select version to use */
|
|
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
|
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
|
|
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
|
|
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
|
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
|
|
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
|
|
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
|
|
is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
|
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (c->id == id) {
|
|
j = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (j == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
|
|
* to reuse it
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
|
|
if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (j >= complen) {
|
|
/* no compress */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
|
|
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
|
|
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
|
|
* processing to use it in key derivation.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *pos;
|
|
pos = s->s3->server_random;
|
|
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
|
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
|
|
&pref_cipher,
|
|
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
|
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
ciphers = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
|
|
pref_cipher =
|
|
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->ciphers,
|
|
SSL_get_ciphers
|
|
(s));
|
|
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
|
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
|
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
|
|
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
|
|
/* Can't disable compression */
|
|
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for resumed compression method */
|
|
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
|
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
|
|
if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (k >= complen) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->hit)
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
|
|
/* See if we have a match */
|
|
int m, nn, v, done = 0;
|
|
unsigned int o;
|
|
|
|
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
|
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
|
v = comp->id;
|
|
for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
|
|
if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
|
|
done = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
else
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
|
* using compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
|
if (ciphers == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphers = NULL;
|
|
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
|
|
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
|
|
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
|
|
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
|
|
if (rv == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv < 0) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
}
|
|
cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
|
|
|
if (cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
|
|
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
|
|
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
|
|
((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
|
|
if (s->session->not_resumable)
|
|
/* do not send a session ticket */
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Session-id reuse */
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* we now have the following setup.
|
|
* client_random
|
|
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
|
|
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
|
|
* compression - basically ignored right now
|
|
* ssl version is set - sslv3
|
|
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
|
* s->hit - session reuse flag
|
|
* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
|
|
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* callback indicates further work to be done
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is not really an error but the only means to for
|
|
* a client to detect whether srp is supported.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->renegotiate = 2;
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i, sl;
|
|
int al = 0;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
|
|
* tls_process_client_hello()
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
|
|
* back in the server hello:
|
|
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
|
|
* we send back the old session ID.
|
|
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
|
|
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
|
|
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
|
|
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
|
|
* session ID.
|
|
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
|
|
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
|
|
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
|
|
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
|
|
* to send back.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->not_resumable ||
|
|
(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
|
|
&& !s->hit))
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*(p++) = sl;
|
|
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
|
|
p += sl;
|
|
|
|
/* put the cipher */
|
|
i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
/* put the compression method */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
*(p++) = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((p =
|
|
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
|
&al)) == NULL) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
l = (p - d);
|
|
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
int encodedlen = 0;
|
|
int curve_id = 0;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int al, i;
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
int n;
|
|
CERT *cert;
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
int nr[4], kn;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
cert = s->cert;
|
|
|
|
buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
|
|
*/
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
|
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
|
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = rsa->n;
|
|
r[1] = rsa->e;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
|
|
dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
|
|
if (dhp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
|
|
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
|
|
tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (dhp == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
|
|
DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
|
|
dh = dhp;
|
|
else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
|
|
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
|
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
|
|
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
|
dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
|
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = dh->p;
|
|
r[1] = dh->g;
|
|
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
|
|
int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
|
|
if (nid != NID_undef)
|
|
ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
|
|
if (ecdh == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
|
|
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
|
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
|
|
* (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
|
|
* non-zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((curve_id =
|
|
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
|
|
== 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
|
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
|
|
* ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
|
|
* additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
|
|
* structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
n += 4 + encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
|
|
* can set these to NULLs
|
|
*/
|
|
r[0] = NULL;
|
|
r[1] = NULL;
|
|
r[2] = NULL;
|
|
r[3] = NULL;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
|
|
r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
|
|
r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
|
|
r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
|
|
n += 1 + nr[i];
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
n += 2 + nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
|
|
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
|
|
== NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pkey = NULL;
|
|
kn = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
|
/* copy PSK identity hint */
|
|
if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
|
|
s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
|
|
strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
|
|
strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
|
|
p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
} else {
|
|
s2n(0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
|
*p = nr[i];
|
|
p++;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
s2n(nr[i], p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
|
|
p += nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
|
|
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
|
|
* CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
|
|
* point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
|
|
*/
|
|
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = curve_id;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = encodedlen;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
p += encodedlen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
|
|
* points to the space at the end.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (md) {
|
|
/* send signature algorithm */
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i, p);
|
|
n += i + 2;
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i, j, nl, off, n;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
p++;
|
|
n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
|
|
d[0] = n;
|
|
p += n;
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
const unsigned char *psigs;
|
|
unsigned char *etmp = p;
|
|
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
|
|
/* Skip over length for now */
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
|
|
/* Now fill in length */
|
|
s2n(nl, etmp);
|
|
p += nl;
|
|
n += nl + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
off = n;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
|
|
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
|
nl = 0;
|
|
if (sk != NULL) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
|
|
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
|
|
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
|
|
(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
|
|
s2n(j, p);
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
|
n += 2 + j;
|
|
nl += 2 + j;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else no CA names */
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
|
|
s2n(nl, p);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al;
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
|
|
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
|
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
PACKET enc_premaster;
|
|
unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
|
|
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
|
|
size_t psklen;
|
|
PACKET psk_identity;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
|
|
psk, sizeof(psk));
|
|
|
|
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (psklen == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK related to the given identity not found
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
|
|
}
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
|
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
int decrypt_len;
|
|
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
|
|
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
|
|
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
|
|
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
|
|
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
|
|
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
|
enc_premaster = *pkt;
|
|
} else {
|
|
PACKET orig = *pkt;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
/* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
|
|
enc_premaster = orig;
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
|
|
* iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
|
|
* (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
|
|
* their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
|
|
if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
|
|
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
|
|
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
|
|
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
|
|
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
|
|
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
|
|
PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
|
|
rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
|
|
* be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
decrypt_good =
|
|
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
|
|
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
|
|
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
|
|
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
|
|
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
|
|
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
|
|
*/
|
|
version_good =
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
|
|
(unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
|
|
version_good &=
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
|
|
(unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
|
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
|
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
|
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
|
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
|
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
|
|
* clients.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
|
|
unsigned char workaround_good;
|
|
workaround_good =
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
|
|
workaround_good &=
|
|
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
|
|
(unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
|
|
version_good |= workaround_good;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
|
|
* remain non-zero (0xff).
|
|
*/
|
|
decrypt_good &= version_good;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
|
|
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
|
|
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
|
|
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
|
|
rsa_decrypt[j] =
|
|
constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
|
|
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
|
|
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
|
|
rsa_decrypt = NULL;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
int idx = -1;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
|
|
PACKET bookmark = *pkt;
|
|
unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*pkt = bookmark;
|
|
i = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
|
|
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
|
|
if (idx >= 0) {
|
|
skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
|
|
if ((skey == NULL) ||
|
|
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
|
|
} else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
|
/* Get pubkey from cert */
|
|
EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
if (clkey) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
|
|
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
|
|
}
|
|
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
|
|
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
|
/* We already checked we have enough data */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
if (pub == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
BN_clear_free(pub);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
|
|
if (dh_clnt)
|
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
|
else
|
|
BN_clear_free(pub);
|
|
pub = NULL;
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (dh_clnt) {
|
|
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
int field_size = 0;
|
|
const EC_KEY *tkey;
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
|
unsigned char *shared;
|
|
|
|
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
|
|
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
|
|
/* use the certificate */
|
|
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange msg.
|
|
*/
|
|
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
|
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
|
|
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's get client's public key */
|
|
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
|
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
|
|
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
|
|
== NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
|
|
* using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
|
|
* code is never executed. When that support is added, we
|
|
* ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
|
|
* authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
|
|
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
|
|
*/
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
|
|
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
|
|
* ClientKeyExchange message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get encoded point length */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
|
|
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
|
|
if (field_size <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
|
|
if (shared == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
|
|
srvr_ecdh, NULL);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(shared);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|
|
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
|
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
|
|
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a;
|
|
int Ttag, Tclass;
|
|
long Tlen;
|
|
long sess_key_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Get our certificate private key */
|
|
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
|
|
*/
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
|
|
if (pk == NULL) {
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pk == NULL) {
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
|
|
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
|
|
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
|
|
* client certificate for authorization only.
|
|
*/
|
|
client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
|
if (client_pub_pkey) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decrypt session key */
|
|
sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto gerr;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
|
|
&Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|
|
|| Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|
|
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto gerr;
|
|
}
|
|
start = data;
|
|
inlen = Tlen;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
|
|
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto gerr;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Generate master secret */
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
|
|
sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto gerr;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
|
|
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
|
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
gerr:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
|
|
err:
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
|
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
|
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
|
|
* used.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
|
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
}
|
|
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
|
|
/* Is this SCTP? */
|
|
&& BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
|
|
/* Are we renegotiating? */
|
|
&& s->renegotiate
|
|
/* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
|
|
&& (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
|
|
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
|
return WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
|
|
/* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
|
|
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
|
|
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!s->session->peer) {
|
|
/* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
|
|
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
|
|
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *sig, *data;
|
|
int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
int type = 0, j;
|
|
unsigned int len;
|
|
X509 *peer;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
long hdatalen = 0;
|
|
void *hdata;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
|
|
|
|
peer = s->session->peer;
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
|
|
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
|
|
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
|
|
/*
|
|
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
|
|
* length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
|
|
len = 64;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
|
|
if (rv == -1) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (rv == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Use default digest for this key type */
|
|
int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
|
|
if (idx >= 0)
|
|
md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
|
|
if (md == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
|
|
|| (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
|
|
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|
|
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|
|
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|
|
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
|
|
BUF_reverse(data, NULL, len);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
|
|
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(&mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
|
|
s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
s->session->master_key)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
}
|
|
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
|
|
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
unsigned long l, llen;
|
|
const unsigned char *certstart;
|
|
unsigned char *certbytes;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
|
PACKET spkt;
|
|
|
|
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certstart = certbytes;
|
|
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
|
|
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
|
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i > 1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
|
|
if (pkey == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
|
|
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
|
|
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
|
|
*/
|
|
sk = NULL;
|
|
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
done:
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
|
|
|
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
|
if (cpk == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *macstart;
|
|
const unsigned char *const_p;
|
|
int len, slen_full, slen;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char key_name[16];
|
|
|
|
/* get session encoding length */
|
|
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
|
|
* long
|
|
*/
|
|
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
|
|
if (senc == NULL) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
|
|
*/
|
|
const_p = senc;
|
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
|
|
if (sess == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
|
|
|
|
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
|
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
|
* follows handshake_header_length +
|
|
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
|
|
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
|
|
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
|
|
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
|
|
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
|
|
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
|
|
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
|
|
&hctx, 1) < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
|
EVP_sha256(), NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
|
|
* for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
|
|
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
|
|
*/
|
|
l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
|
|
|
|
/* Skip ticket length for now */
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
/* Output key name */
|
|
macstart = p;
|
|
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
|
|
p += 16;
|
|
/* output IV */
|
|
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
|
|
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
|
/* Encrypt session data */
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
p += len;
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
p += len;
|
|
|
|
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
|
|
/* Total length */
|
|
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
|
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
|
|
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
|
|
s2n(len - 6, p);
|
|
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
|
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
|
|
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
|
|
* + (ocsp response)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
|
|
/* message length */
|
|
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
|
|
/* status type */
|
|
*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
|
|
/* length of OCSP response */
|
|
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
|
|
/* actual response */
|
|
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/*
|
|
* tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
|
|
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
|
|
*/
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET next_proto, padding;
|
|
size_t next_proto_len;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* The payload looks like:
|
|
* uint8 proto_len;
|
|
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
|
|
* uint8 padding_len;
|
|
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
|
|
&next_proto_len)) {
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
|
|
PACKET *cipher_suites,
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
|
|
int sslv2format, int *al
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
int n;
|
|
/* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
|
|
unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
|
|
|
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
|
|
|
|
n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
|
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
|
|
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
|
|
if(sk == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
sk = *skp;
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
|
|
&s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
|
|
* first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
|
|
* first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
|
|
if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
|
(cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
|
|
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
|
|
if (s->renegotiate) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
|
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
|
|
if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
|
(cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
|
|
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
|
|
* downgrade.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
|
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
|
|
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
|
|
if (c != NULL) {
|
|
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (skp != NULL)
|
|
*skp = sk;
|
|
return (sk);
|
|
err:
|
|
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|