mirror of
https://github.com/gradle/wrapper-validation-action
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68 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
<p align="center">
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<a href="https://github.com/gradle/wrapper-validation-action/actions"><img alt="gradle/wrapper-validation-action status" src="https://github.com/gradle/wrapper-validation-action/workflows/build-test/badge.svg"></a>
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</p>
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# Gradle Wrapper Validation Action
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This action validates the checksums of [Gradle Wrapper](https://docs.gradle.org/current/userguide/gradle_wrapper.html) JAR files present in the source tree and fails if unknown Gradle Wrapper JAR files are found.
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## The Gradle Wrapper Problem in Open Source
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The `gradle-wrapper.jar` is a binary blob of executable code that is checked into nearly
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[2.8 Million GitHub Repositories](https://github.com/search?l=&q=filename%3Agradle-wrapper.jar&type=Code).
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Searching across GitHub you can find many pull requests (PRs) with helpful titles like 'Update to Gradle xxx'.
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Many of these PRs are contributed by individuals outside of the organization maintaining the project.
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Many maintainers are incredibly grateful for these kinds of contributions as it takes an item off of their backlog.
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We assume that most maintainers do not consider the security implications of accepting the Gradle Wrapper binary from an external contributors.
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There is a certain amount of blind trust open source maintainers have.
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Further compounding the issue is that maintainers are most often greeted in these PRs with a diff to the `gradle-wrapper.jar` that looks like this.
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A fairly simple social engineering supply chain attack against open source would be contribute a helpful “Updated to Gradle xxx” PR that contains malicious code hidden inside this binary JAR.
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A malicious `gradle-wrapper.jar` could execute, download, or install arbitrary code while otherwise behaving like a completely normal `gradle-wrapper.jar`.
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This problem is unique to open source and doesn’t normally impact companies with closed source and pre-vetted employees.
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## Solution
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We have created a simple GitHub Action that can be applied to any GitHub repository.
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This GitHub Action will do one simple task:
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verify that any and all `gradle-wrapper.jar` files in the repository match the SHA-256 checksums of any of our official releases.
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If any are found that do not match the SHA-256 checksums of our official releases, the action will fail.
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## Usage
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Simply add this action to your workflow **after** having checked out your source tree and **before** running any Gradle build:
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```yaml
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uses: gradle/wrapper-validation-action@v1
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```
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Here's a sample complete workflow you can add to your repositories:
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**`.github/workflows/gradle-wrapper-validation.yml`**
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```yaml
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name: "Validate Gradle Wrapper"
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on: [push]
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jobs:
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validation:
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name: "Validation"
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v2
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- uses: gradle/wrapper-validation-action@v1
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```
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## Reporting Failures
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If this GitHub action fails because a `gradle-wrapper.jar` doesn't match one of our published SHA-256 checksums,
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we highly recommend that you reach out to us at [security@gradle.com](mailto:security@gradle.com).
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If you're curious and want to explore what the differences are between the `gradle-wrapper.jar` in your possession
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and one of our valid release, you can compare them using this online utility: [DiffScope](https://try.diffoscope.org/).
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Regardless of what you find, we still kindly request that you reach out to us and let us know about any issues you encountered.
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