2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
|
|
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
|
|
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
|
|
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "rand_lcl.h"
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-27 21:13:05 +00:00
|
|
|
static RAND_DRBG rand_drbg; /* The default global DRBG. */
|
|
|
|
static RAND_DRBG priv_drbg; /* The global private-key DRBG. */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
|
|
|
|
static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
|
|
|
|
* does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
|
|
|
|
* instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
|
|
|
|
* lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
|
|
|
|
* DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
|
|
|
|
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const char *name);
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return -2 if the type is not supported, 1 on success and -1 on
|
|
|
|
* failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
|
|
|
|
drbg->flags = flags;
|
|
|
|
drbg->nid = nid;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (nid) {
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
/* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case NID_aes_128_ctr:
|
|
|
|
case NID_aes_192_ctr:
|
|
|
|
case NID_aes_256_ctr:
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = ctr_init(drbg);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-22 22:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL) {
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-06 22:12:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->parent = parent;
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parent != NULL) {
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
|
|
|
|
rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
NULL, NULL))
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return drbg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(drbg);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
|
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
|
|
|
|
RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
|
|
|
|
drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
|
|
|
|
: RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
|
|
|
|
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|
|
|
|
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->max_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
|
|
|
|
if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
|
|
|
|
RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ctr_instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
|
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
|
2017-08-25 21:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
|
2017-08-25 21:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
|
|
|
|
RAND_R_ERROR_ENTROPY_POOL_WAS_IGNORED);
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
|
|
|
|
drbg->pool = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
|
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data
|
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t entropylen = 0;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (adin == NULL)
|
|
|
|
adinlen = 0;
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
|
|
|
|
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|
|
|
|
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ctr_reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
|
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
|
2017-08-25 21:26:53 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
|
|
|
|
* regardless of its current state.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
|
|
|
|
* which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function is used internally only.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int reseeded = 0;
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t adinlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
|
|
|
|
drbg->pool = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (buffer != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (entropy > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
|
|
|
|
RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (entropy > 8 * len) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
|
|
|
|
drbg->pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, len, len);
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->pool == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RAND_POOL_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
|
|
|
|
RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
adin = buffer;
|
|
|
|
adinlen = len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* repair error state */
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* repair uninitialized state */
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
|
|
drbg_setup(drbg, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
|
|
|
|
reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
|
|
|
|
if (adin != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* mix in additional input without reseeding
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
|
|
|
|
* data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
|
|
|
|
* entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
|
|
|
|
* This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ctr_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
} else if (reseeded == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check whether a given entropy pool was cleared properly during reseed */
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
|
|
|
|
drbg->pool = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
|
|
|
|
* to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
|
|
|
|
* sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int prediction_resistance,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-10-09 21:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
int reseed_required = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
|
|
|
|
/* try to recover from previous errors */
|
|
|
|
rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
DRBG: clarify difference between entropy counts and buffer lengths
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
2017-08-20 21:02:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-06 22:12:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
|
|
|
|
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
|
2017-10-09 21:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
reseed_required = 1;
|
2017-08-06 22:12:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
|
2017-10-09 21:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
reseed_required = 1;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-09 21:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
adin = NULL;
|
|
|
|
adinlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ctr_generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-09 21:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_counter++;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In the following, the signature and the semantics of the
|
|
|
|
* get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy() callbacks are explained.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* GET_ENTROPY
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* size_t get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
|
|
|
|
* unsigned char **pout,
|
|
|
|
* int entropy,
|
|
|
|
* size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is a request to allocate and fill a buffer of size
|
|
|
|
* |min_len| <= size <= |max_len| (in bytes) which contains
|
|
|
|
* at least |entropy| bits of randomness. The buffer's address is
|
|
|
|
* to be returned in |*pout| and the number of collected
|
|
|
|
* randomness bytes (which may be less than the allocated size
|
|
|
|
* of the buffer) as return value.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the callback fails to acquire at least |entropy| bits of
|
|
|
|
* randomness, it shall return a buffer length of 0.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* CLEANUP_ENTROPY
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* void cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
|
|
|
|
* unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* A request to clear and free the buffer allocated by get_entropy().
|
|
|
|
* The values |out| and |outlen| are expected to be the random buffer's
|
|
|
|
* address and length, as returned by the get_entropy() callback.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* GET_NONCE, CLEANUP_NONCE
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Signature and semantics of the get_nonce() and cleanup_nonce()
|
|
|
|
* callbacks are analogous to get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy().
|
|
|
|
* Currently, the nonce is used only for the known answer tests.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
|
|
|
|
drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
|
|
|
|
drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
|
|
|
|
drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Set the reseed interval.
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int interval)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-07-19 21:41:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (interval < 0 || interval > MAX_RESEED)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
|
2017-07-19 21:41:26 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get and set the EXDATA
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
|
|
|
|
* global DRBG. They lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* Initializes the DRBG with default settings.
|
|
|
|
* For global DRBGs a global lock is created with the given name
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
static int drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const char *name)
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (name != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->lock != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_glock_new(name);
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
ret &= RAND_DRBG_set(drbg,
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_NID, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) == 1;
|
|
|
|
ret &= RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
|
|
|
|
rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy, NULL, NULL) == 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ignore instantiation error so support just-in-time instantiation.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
|
|
|
|
* an automatic recovery is attempted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
|
|
|
|
(const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialize the global DRBGs on first use.
|
|
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ret &= drbg_setup(&rand_drbg, "rand_drbg");
|
|
|
|
ret &= drbg_setup(&priv_drbg, "priv_drbg");
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Cleans up the given global DRBG */
|
|
|
|
static void drbg_cleanup(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg_cleanup(&rand_drbg);
|
|
|
|
drbg_cleanup(&priv_drbg);
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t chunk;
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_global();
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for ( ; count > 0; count -= chunk, out += chunk) {
|
|
|
|
chunk = count;
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
|
|
|
|
chunk = drbg->max_request;
|
|
|
|
ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, NULL, 0);
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_global();
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (randomness > (double)drbg->max_entropylen) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
|
|
|
|
* relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
|
|
|
|
* overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
|
|
|
|
* call below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf,
|
|
|
|
(size_t)(unsigned int)num,
|
|
|
|
(size_t)(8*randomness));
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int drbg_status(void)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_global();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get the global public DRBG.
|
|
|
|
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_global(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return &rand_drbg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get the global private DRBG.
|
|
|
|
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_priv_global(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
|
2017-08-27 15:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return &priv_drbg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
|
|
|
|
drbg_seed,
|
|
|
|
drbg_bytes,
|
2017-08-02 18:00:52 +00:00
|
|
|
NULL,
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
drbg_add,
|
|
|
|
drbg_bytes,
|
|
|
|
drbg_status
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 13:23:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return &rand_meth;
|
2017-06-27 16:04:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|