openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
#endif
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
int rand_fork_count;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
* because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
* Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
* So for now this code is not used.
*/
# error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!"
/*
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
* Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
*
* Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
* high-speed clock, it can help.
*
* Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
* entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
*/
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
unsigned char c;
int i;
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
RAND_POOL_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
}
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
}
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
/*
* Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
*
* Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
* RDRAND if available.
*
* For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
* is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
*
* Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
* entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
*/
size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
size_t bytes_needed;
unsigned char *buffer;
bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
if (bytes_needed > 0) {
buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
/* If RDSEED is available, use that. */
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
== bytes_needed)
return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool,
bytes_needed,
8 * bytes_needed);
}
/* Second choice is RDRAND. */
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
== bytes_needed)
return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool,
bytes_needed,
8 * bytes_needed);
}
return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
}
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
}
#endif
/*
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
* Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
* If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
* is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
*
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
* Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
* using RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
*
* If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
* its entropy will be used up first.
*/
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
size_t ret = 0;
size_t entropy_available = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
if (drbg->pool) {
RAND_POOL_add(pool,
RAND_POOL_buffer(drbg->pool),
RAND_POOL_length(drbg->pool),
RAND_POOL_entropy(drbg->pool));
RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
drbg->pool = NULL;
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
if (drbg->parent) {
size_t bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8);
unsigned char *buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
/*
* Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
* Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
* generating bits from it.
*/
if (drbg->parent->lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->parent->lock);
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
buffer, bytes_needed,
0,
(unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg)) != 0)
bytes = bytes_needed;
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
if (drbg->parent->lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->parent->lock);
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
} else {
/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
entropy_available = RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool);
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
if (entropy_available > 0) {
ret = RAND_POOL_length(pool);
*pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool);
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
RAND_POOL_free(pool);
return ret;
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
/*
* Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
*/
void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
void rand_fork()
{
rand_fork_count++;
}
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
int ret = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_glock_new("rand_engine");
ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL;
#endif
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_glock_new("rand_meth");
ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
return ret;
}
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
}
/*
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
* RAND_poll() reseeds the default RNG using random input
*
* The random input is obtained from polling various entropy
* sources which depend on the operating system and are
* configurable via the --with-rand-seed configure option.
*/
int RAND_poll(void)
{
int ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
/* fill random pool and seed the default DRBG */
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_global();
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
pool = RAND_POOL_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8,
DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8));
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
if (RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
|| meth->add(RAND_POOL_buffer(pool),
RAND_POOL_length(pool),
(RAND_POOL_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
}
err:
RAND_POOL_free(pool);
return ret;
}
/*
* The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random
* input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about
* whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add()
* or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the
* random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and
* 4) cleanup the random pool again.
*
* The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and
* lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame.
*/
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
struct rand_pool_st {
unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */
size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */
};
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
*/
RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
if (pool == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->min_len = min_len;
pool->max_len = max_len;
pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->requested_entropy = entropy;
return pool;
err:
OPENSSL_free(pool);
return NULL;
}
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
/*
* Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
*/
void RAND_POOL_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool == NULL)
return;
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
OPENSSL_free(pool);
}
/*
* Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
*/
const unsigned char *RAND_POOL_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->buffer;
}
/*
* Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->entropy;
}
/*
* Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->len;
}
/*
* Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
* It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
* using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
*/
unsigned char *RAND_POOL_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
pool->buffer = NULL;
return ret;
}
/*
* If every byte of the input contains |entropy_per_bytes| bits of entropy,
* how many bytes does one need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy?
*/
#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_per_bytes) \
(((bits) + ((entropy_per_bytes) - 1))/(entropy_per_bytes))
/*
* Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller.
* This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough.
* Returns
*
* |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
* 0 otherwise
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy)
return 0;
if (pool->len < pool->min_len)
return 0;
return pool->entropy;
}
/*
* Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill
* the random pool.
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy)
return pool->requested_entropy - pool->entropy;
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
* the input has 'entropy_per_byte' entropy bits per byte.
* In case of an error, 0 is returned.
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte)
{
size_t bytes_needed;
size_t entropy_needed = RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(pool);
if (entropy_per_byte < 1 || entropy_per_byte > 8) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_per_byte);
if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
/* not enough space left */
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
if (pool->len < pool->min_len &&
bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len)
/* to meet the min_len requirement */
bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
return bytes_needed;
}
/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
Fix reseeding issues of the public RAND_DRBG Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
2017-08-31 21:16:22 +00:00
return pool->max_len - pool->len;
}
/*
* Add random bytes to the random pool.
*
* It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of
* random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
* randomness.
*
* Return available amount of entropy after this operation.
* (see RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool))
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (len > 0) {
memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
pool->len += len;
pool->entropy += entropy;
}
return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
}
/*
* Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
*
* Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place
* and returns a pointer to the buffer.
* The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer.
* If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
* is returned without producing an error message.
*
* After updating the buffer, RAND_POOL_add_end() needs to be called
* to finish the udpate operation (see next comment).
*/
unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0)
return NULL;
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
return NULL;
}
return pool->buffer + pool->len;
}
/*
* Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
*
* Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
* RAND_POOL_add_begin() (see previous comment).
* It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
* to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
* It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
*/
size_t RAND_POOL_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}
if (len > 0) {
pool->len += len;
pool->entropy += entropy;
}
return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
}
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
funct_ref = NULL;
#endif
default_RAND_meth = meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return 1;
}
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE *e;
/* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
&& (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
funct_ref = e;
default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
} else {
ENGINE_finish(e);
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
}
#else
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
#endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return tmp_meth;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
if (engine != NULL) {
if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
return 0;
tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
if (tmp_meth == NULL) {
ENGINE_finish(engine);
return 0;
}
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock);
/* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
funct_ref = engine;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
return 1;
}
#endif
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth->seed != NULL)
meth->seed(buf, num);
}
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth->add != NULL)
meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
}
/*
* This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
* the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
* sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
*/
int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
int ret;
if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
return RAND_bytes(buf, num);
drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_priv_global();
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
2017-10-11 17:25:26 +00:00
/* We have to lock the DRBG before generating bits from it. */
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buf, num, 0, NULL, 0);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
return ret;
}
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth->bytes != NULL)
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return -1;
}
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
return -1;
}
Deprecate RAND_pseudo_bytes The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the error queue. They both return 1 on success. Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not. Frequently there are constructions of this form: if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1) goto err; In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use. This form is also seen: if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...)) goto err; This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as an error. Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes. Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by insufficient entropy. If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case. Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security, RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-02-26 13:52:30 +00:00
#endif
int RAND_status(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth->status != NULL)
return meth->status();
return 0;
}