openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c

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/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl3_check_change(SSL *s);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p,
int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
unsigned char *));
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
if (!SSL_clear(s))
return -1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
* handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;) {
state = s->state;
switch (s->state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server = 0;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&& s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION &&
!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
return -1;
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
buf = NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
*/
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A;
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
} else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
/* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
ret = ssl3_check_change(s);
if (ret < 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 1) {
s->hit = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
}
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
2011-03-12 17:01:19 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
/*
* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
*/
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
} else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
2010-07-28 10:06:55 +00:00
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
2010-07-28 10:06:55 +00:00
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
2010-07-28 10:06:55 +00:00
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit) {
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
} else {
/*
* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
*/
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B:
ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
Remove support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified. Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely undocumented). The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message. This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER. There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the implementation of ssl3_write: /* This is an experimental flag that sends the * last handshake message in the same packet as the first * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during * session-id reuse */ It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay. This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-07-20 23:02:39 +00:00
/* remove the buffering */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret = 1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
goto end;
/* break; */
case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->debug) {
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
new_state = s->state;
s->state = state;
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
s->state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
* the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
* Returns 1 on success
* Returns 0 on error
*/
static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/*
* SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
* some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
* to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
* that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
* TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
* answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
*/
mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
#endif
;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
if ((options & mask) != mask) {
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
} else {
s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
#else
if ((options & mask) == mask) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#endif
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
#endif
if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return 0;
}
} else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Determine which DTLS version to use */
/* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
*/
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
} else {
/*
* We only support one version: update method
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
}
}
s->client_version = s->version;
return 1;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
int al = 0;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
goto err;
if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
*/
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
(sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
}
}
} else
i = 1;
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++) = i;
if (i != 0) {
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
p += i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i, p);
p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 1;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#else
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j = 0;
else
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++) = 1 + j;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
*(p++) = comp->id;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p =
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
l = p - d;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
unsigned int j;
long n;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
/*
* Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
* first packet if we're negotiating version.
*/
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
} else { /* already sent a cookie */
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
int sversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
#error Code needs updating for new TLS version
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
if (FIPS_mode()) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
} else
#endif
if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
} else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
} else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Work out correct protocol version to use */
int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
int options = s->options;
if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = hversion;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = hversion;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
} else if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
p += 2;
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
s->hit = 0;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
* server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length = j;
memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
}
p += j;
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
* return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/*
* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
* authentication.
*/
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto f_err;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (*(p++) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#else
j = *(p++);
if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (j == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
} else
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if (p != (d + n)) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al, i, ok, ret = -1, exp_idx;
unsigned long n, cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
PACKET pkt;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != cert_list_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_type = i;
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param, *p;
int al, j, ok;
long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
/*
* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
* ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
*/
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp);
s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len = 0;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
if (i != 0) {
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
}
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2011-03-12 17:01:19 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (1 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
2011-03-12 17:01:19 +00:00
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2011-03-12 17:01:19 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
rsa = NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0) ;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/*
* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
* byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len = 4;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p += 3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p += 1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n -= param_len;
p += encoded_pt_len;
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int rv;
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0) {
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
} else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
n -= 2;
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/*
* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
*/
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int num;
unsigned int size;
j = 0;
q = md_buf;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
q += size;
j += size;
}
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA_free(rsa);
1999-07-12 15:20:08 +00:00
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
1999-07-12 15:20:08 +00:00
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
unsigned long n, nc, l;
unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *p, *q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
/*
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
* wont be doing client auth.
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num = *(p++);
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
p += p[-1];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
n2s(p, llen);
/*
* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
* length value.
*/
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += llen;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p, llen);
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2s(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q = p;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += l;
nc += l + 2;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto done;
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al, ret = 0;
unsigned int ticklen;
long n;
PACKET pkt;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
/*
* Remove the old session from the cache
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
s->session);
} else {
/* We carry on if this fails */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
}
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &ticklen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != ticklen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
ret = 1;
return (ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
unsigned long resplen, n;
unsigned int type;
PACKET pkt;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &resplen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != resplen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
long n;
/* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
ret = 1;
return (ret);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
#endif
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
int psk_err = 1;
/*
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
* strnlen.
*/
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identitylen;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
s2n(identitylen, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
p += identitylen;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
if (psk_err != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
n = 0;
} else
#endif
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
RSA *rsa;
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
else {
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
s2n(n, q);
n += 2;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
else {
/* we get them from the cert */
EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
dh_srvr = NULL;
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (spkey) {
dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
}
if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
/* Use client certificate key */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
dh_clnt = NULL;
if (clkey)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
}
pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
DH_free(dh_srvr);
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
pmslen = n;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
n = 0;
else {
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
n += 2;
}
DH_free(dh_clnt);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
/*
* Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
/*-
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
} else {
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/*
* Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
* private key to perform the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
} else {
/*
* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
* accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
peer_cert = s->session->peer;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
*
* * parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
/*
* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* * would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
shared_ukm) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*
* Encapsulate it into sequence
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80) {
*(p++) = 0x81;
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 3;
} else {
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
2011-03-12 17:01:19 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
n += 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
n += pskhdrlen;
#endif
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
n = ssl_do_write(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
/*
* If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
* srp_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
*/
if (n > 0) {
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
} else
#endif
/* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
if (n <= 0) {
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
} else {
/* If we don't have a PMS restore */
if (pms == NULL) {
pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
}
if (pms == NULL && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
return n;
memerr:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
* digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize = 64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
/*
* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
int i = s->session->peer_type;
EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
return 1;
if (i >= 0)
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (spkey) {
/* Compare server and client parameters */
i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
if (i != 1)
return 0;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
return 1;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = 0;
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return (-1);
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return (1);
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
}
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int pkey_bits;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx = s->session->peer_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else {
return 1;
}
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if (rsa != NULL) {
/* server key exchange is not allowed. */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
} else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# endif
#endif
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else if (RSA_bits(rsa) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
/* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (DH_bits(dh) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
/* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
/* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (0);
}
/*
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
* the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
* message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
* Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
* ssl3_check_change returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
* pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server message
* is CCS; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
*/
static int ssl3_check_change(SSL *s)
{
int ok = 0;
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return 0;
/*
* This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
* so permit appropriate message length.
* We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
* and not its length.
*/
s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return -1;
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
return 1;
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2010-07-28 10:06:55 +00:00
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
}
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p,
int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
unsigned char *))
{
int i, j = 0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
if (put_cb == NULL)
put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
continue;
else
empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
}
#endif
j = put_cb(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
p += j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}