openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c

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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define USE_SOCKETS
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "record_locl.h"
int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
return (0);
rl->d = d;
d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL
|| d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(d);
rl->d = NULL;
return (0);
}
return 1;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(rl->d);
rl->d = NULL;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
pitem *item = NULL;
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
pqueue *processed_rcds;
pqueue *buffered_app_data;
d = rl->d;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
{
if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
rl->write_sequence,
sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
rl->d->last_write_sequence,
sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
} else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
rl->write_sequence,
sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
}
rl->d->w_epoch = e;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
}
DTLSv1_listen rewrite The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the cookie. Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code, which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for example) SSL_accept(). Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer. The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from different clients. The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can cause various problems. A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors. Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call to DTLSv1_listen(). This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2015-09-14 21:49:35 +00:00
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
{
memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
}
static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek);
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/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
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/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
return (1);
}
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int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
return 0;
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
item->data = rdata;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
(SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
|| SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return (-1);
}
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/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return (-1);
}
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return (1);
}
int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
{
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pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
if (item) {
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dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
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return (1);
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}
return (0);
}
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/*
* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
* processed yet
*/
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#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
&((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
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int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
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pitem *item;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
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/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
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/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
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dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(&s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
return -1;
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}
}
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/*
* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
* processed
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
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return (1);
}
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/*-
* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
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* 'type' is one of the following:
*
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
*
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
*
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
* messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
* argument is non NULL.
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* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
* Change cipher spec protocol
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
* Alert protocol
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
* Handshake protocol
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return (-1);
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
*/
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
return ret;
/*
* Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
* type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
* SCTP.
*/
if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
&& ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
&& s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
#else
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
#endif
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
/*
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
*/
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|| (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
/*
* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
* the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
* data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
*/
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
/*
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
* 'peek' mode)
*/
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (0);
}
if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
|| (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
/*
* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
* SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
*/
/*
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
* doing a handshake for the first time
*/
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
if (recvd_type != NULL)
*recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
if (len <= 0)
return (len);
if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
else
n = (unsigned int)len;
memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
if (!peek) {
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
* data first, so retry.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
}
/*
* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
* app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
* anymore, finally set shutdown.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
s->d1->shutdown_received
&& !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return (0);
}
#endif
return (n);
}
/*
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
*/
/*
* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
* that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len;
} else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment);
dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
/* We allow a 0 return */
if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Exit and notify application to read again */
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
return (-1);
}
#endif
/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
* reading.
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
BIO *bio;
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
/*
* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
* fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
/*
* for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
* dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
* non-existing alert...
*/
FIX ME
#endif
s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
}
*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
}
}
/*-
* s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&
(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
(s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
*/
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate) {
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
s->new_session = 1;
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data,
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
}
}
}
/*
* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
* again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
*/
goto start;
}
if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0];
int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1];
s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
* after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
* that nothing gets discarded.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
return -1;
}
#endif
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return (0);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
#if 0
/* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
/* now check if it's a missing record */
if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
unsigned short seq;
unsigned int frag_off;
unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]);
n2s(p, seq);
n2l3(p, frag_off);
dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
dtls1_get_queue_priority
(frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
&found);
if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
/*
* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
*/
/*
* requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
* ourselves
*/
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
}
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
#endif
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
return (0);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
* shutdown */
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
return (0);
}
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
* are still missing, so just drop it.
*/
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
/*
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
*/
if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
/*
* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
* here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
*/
if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
return -1;
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
* problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return (-1);
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
default:
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/*
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
* that should not happen when type != rr->type
*/
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
* started), we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
return (-1);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* not reached */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (-1);
}
/*
* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
* is started.
*/
static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
&& (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
{
unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k, n;
/* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
*dst++ = *src++;
len--;
s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--;
n++;
}
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
return n;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
* not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
*/
int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
{
int i;
OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
return i;
}
int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *p, *pseq;
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
int prefix_len = 0;
int eivlen;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
}
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return (i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
clear = 1;
if (clear)
mac_size = 0;
else {
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
if (mac_size < 0)
goto err;
}
p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
/* write the header */
*(p++) = type & 0xff;
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type);
/*
* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
* haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
* header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
} else {
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
}
/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
pseq = p;
p += 10;
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
} else
eivlen = 0;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(wr, (int)len);
SSL3_RECORD_set_input(wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
/*
* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
*/
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(wr),
SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/*
* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
* wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
* wb->buf
*/
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (mac_size != 0) {
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,
&(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr) + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
goto err;
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* this is true regardless of mac size */
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p);
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (eivlen)
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, eivlen);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
goto err;
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* record length after mac and block padding */
/*
* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
* SSL_in_init(s)))
*/
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* XDTLS: ?? */
/*
* else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
*/
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
pseq += 6;
s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr), pseq);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/*
* we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long
*/
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (create_empty_fragment) {
/*
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
* out anything here
*/
return wr->length;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* now let's set up wb */
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
/*
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
* retries later
*/
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
err:
return -1;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
{
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
*is_next_epoch = 0;
/* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
*is_next_epoch = 1;
return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
return NULL;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
{
unsigned char *seq;
unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0,
sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
} else {
seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
}
memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);
}