Fixes#4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
The introduction of thread local public and private DRBG instances (#5547)
makes it very cumbersome to change the reseeding (time) intervals for
those instances. This commit provides a function to set the default
values for all subsequently created DRBG instances.
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
unsigned int master_reseed_interval,
unsigned int slave_reseed_interval,
time_t master_reseed_time_interval,
time_t slave_reseed_time_interval
);
The function is intended only to be used during application initialization,
before any threads are created and before any random bytes are generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5576)
We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5506
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #5400
In PR #5295 it was decided that the locking api should remain private
and used only inside libcrypto. However, the locking functions were added
back to `libcrypto.num` by `mkdef.pl`, because the function prototypes
were still listed in `internal/rand.h`. (This header contains functions
which are internal, but shared between libcrypto and libssl.)
This commit moves the prototypes to `rand_lcl.h` and changes the names
to lowercase, following the convention therein. It also corrects an
outdated documenting comment.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5375)
The NIST standard presents two alternative ways for seeding the
CTR DRBG, depending on whether a derivation function is used or not.
In Section 10.2.1 of NIST SP800-90Ar1 the following is assessed:
The use of the derivation function is optional if either an
approved RBG or an entropy source provides full entropy output
when entropy input is requested by the DRBG mechanism.
Otherwise, the derivation function shall be used.
Since the OpenSSL DRBG supports being reseeded from low entropy random
sources (using RAND_POOL), the use of a derivation function is mandatory.
For that reason we change the default and replace the opt-in flag
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF with an opt-out flag RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
This change simplifies the RAND_DRBG_new() calls.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
The functions drbg_setup() and drbg_cleanup() used to duplicate a lot of
code from RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_free(). This duplication has been
removed, which simplifies drbg_setup() and makes drbg_cleanup() obsolete.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
This commit adds three new accessors to the internal DRBG lock
int RAND_DRBG_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
have locking enabled by default. It is the callers responsibility to
guard access to the shared DRBGs by calls to RAND_DRBG_lock() and
RAND_DRBG_unlock().
All other DRBG instances don't have locking enabled by default, because
they are intendended to be used by a single thread. If it is desired,
locking can be enabled by using RAND_DRBG_enable_locking().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
Remove the timer and TSC additional input code and instead provide a single
routine that attempts to use the "best" timer/counter available on the
system. It attempts to use TSC, then various OS dependent resources and
finally several tries to obtain the date. If any of these timer/counters
is successful, the rest are skipped.
No randomness is credited for this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
The functions RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes() are now both based
on a common implementation using RAND_DRBG_bytes() (if the default
OpenSSL rand method is active). This not only simplifies the code
but also has the advantage that additional input from a high precision
timer is added on every generate call if the timer is available.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
When comparing the implementations of drbg_bytes() and RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
it was noticed that the former split the buffer into chunks when calling
RAND_DRBG_generate() to circumvent the size limitation of the buffer
to outlen <= drb->max_request. This loop was missing in RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
so it was adopted from drbg_bytes().
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
This check not only prevented the automatic reinstantiation of the
DRBG, which is implemented in RAND_DRBG_generate(), but also prevented
an error message from being generated in the case of failure.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:
Revert "Address feedback"
This reverts commit 75551e07bd.
and
Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"
This reverts commit ed6b2c7938.
But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.
The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions! The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.
However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL. That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:
(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)
For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).
(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock). Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.) If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.
(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()
As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed. The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.
(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion. However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions. Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation. So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().
In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
Some older glibc versions require the `-lrt` linker option for
resolving the reference to `clock_gettime'. Since it is not desired
to add new library dependencies in version 1.1.1, the call to
clock_gettime() is replaced by a call to gettimeofday() for the
moment. It will be added back in version 1.2.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5199)
Fixes#5076
Since do_rand_drbg_init() allocates three locks, it needs to ensure
that OPENSSL_init_crypto() is called, otherwise these resources are
not cleaned up properly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5083)
The DRGB concept described in NIST SP 800-90A provides for having different
algorithms to generate random output. In fact, the FIPS object module used to
implement three of them, CTR DRBG, HASH DRBG and HMAC DRBG.
When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, two of the three algorithms
were dropped, and together with those the entire code that made RAND_DRBG
generic was removed, since only one concrete implementation was left.
This commit restores the original generic implementation of the DRBG, making it
possible again to add additional implementations using different algorithms
(like RAND_DRBG_CHACHA20) in the future.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
The generic part of the FIPS DRBG was implemented in fips_drbg_lib.c and the
algorithm specific parts in fips_drbg_<alg>.c for <alg> in {ctr, hash, hmac}.
Additionally, there was the module fips_drbg_rand.c which contained 'gluing'
code between the RAND_METHOD api and the FIPS DRBG.
When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, for some reason the ctr-drbg
implementation from fips_drbg_ctr.c ended up in drbg_rand.c instead of drbg_ctr.c.
This commit renames the module drbg_rand.c back to drbg_ctr.c, thereby restoring
a simple relationship between the original fips modules and the drbg modules
in master:
fips_drbg_lib.c => drbg_lib.c /* generic part of implementation */
fips_drbg_<alg>.c => drbg_<alg>.c /* algorithm specific implementations */
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
Previously, the RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate() call was not exactly inverse to
RAND_DRBG_instantiate(), because some important member values of the
drbg->ctr member where cleared. Now these values are restored internally.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
Every DRBG now supports automatic reseeding not only after a given
number of generate requests, but also after a specified time interval.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
A third shared DRBG is added, the so called master DRBG. Its sole purpose
is to reseed the two other shared DRBGs, the public and the private DRBG.
The randomness for the master DRBG is either pulled from the os entropy
sources, or added by the application using the RAND_add() call.
The master DRBG reseeds itself automatically after a given number of generate
requests, but can also be reseeded using RAND_seed() or RAND_add().
A reseeding of the master DRBG is automatically propagated to the public
and private DRBG. This construction fixes the problem, that up to now
the randomness provided by RAND_add() was added only to the public and
not to the private DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
The drbg's lock must be held across calls to RAND_DRBG_generate()
to prevent simultaneous modification of internal state.
This was observed in practice with simultaneous SSL_new() calls attempting
to seed the (separate) per-SSL RAND_DRBG instances from the global
rand_drbg instance; this eventually led to simultaneous calls to
ctr_BCC_update() attempting to increment drbg->bltmp_pos for their
respective partial final block, violating the invariant that bltmp_pos < 16.
The AES operations performed in ctr_BCC_blocks() makes the race window
quite easy to trigger. A value of bltmp_pos greater than 16 induces
catastrophic failure in ctr_BCC_final(), with subtraction overflowing
and leading to an attempt to memset() to zero a very large range,
which eventually reaches an unmapped page and segfaults.
Provide the needed locking in get_entropy_from_parent(), as well as
fixing a similar issue in RAND_priv_bytes(). There is also an
unlocked call to RAND_DRBG_generate() in ssl_randbytes(), but the
requisite serialization is already guaranteed by the requirements on
the application's usage of SSL objects, and no further locking is
needed for correct behavior. In that case, leave a comment noting
the apparent discrepancy and the reason for its safety (at present).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
The DRBG_RESEED state plays an analogue role to the |reseed_required_flag| in
Appendix B.3.4 of [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1]. The latter is a local variable,
the scope of which is limited to the RAND_DRBG_generate() function. Hence there
is no need for a DRBG_RESEED state outside of the generate function. This state
was removed and replaced by a local variable |reseed_required|.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API
and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when
the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular,
RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed
on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API'
and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues,
introducing the following changes:
- Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which
facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback.
- Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the
get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by
RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG
in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current
state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller
provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding.
- Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll()
(namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based
on rand_drbg_restart().
- Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy
source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
cryptilib.h is the second.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
The one creating the DRBG should instantiate it, it's there that we
know which parameters we should use to instantiate it.
This splits the rand init in two parts to avoid a deadlock
because when the global drbg is created it wands to call
rand_add on the global rand method.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #4268
The DRBG callbacks 'get_entropy()' and 'cleanup_entropy()' are designed
in such a way that the randomness buffer does not have to be allocated
by the calling function. It receives the address of a dynamically
allocated buffer from get_entropy() and returns this address to
cleanup_entropy(), where it is freed. If these two calls are properly
paired, the address can be stored in a stack local variable of the
calling function, so there is no need for having a 'randomness' member
(and a 'filled' member) in 'RAND_DRBG'.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
With the introduction of RAND_poll_ex(), the `RAND_add()` calls were
replaced by meaningless cb(...). This commit changes the 'cb(...)'
calls back to 'rand_add(...)' calls by changing the signature as follows:
-int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_cb rand_add, void *arg);
Changed the function typedef name to 'RAND_poll_cb' to emphasize the fact
that the function type represents a callback function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
Unlike the NIST DRBG standard, entropy counts are in bits and
buffer lengths are in bytes. This has lead to some confusion and
errors in the past, see my comment on PR 3789.
To clarify the destinction between entropy counts and buffer lengths,
a 'len' suffix has been added to all member names of RAND_DRBG which
represent buffer lengths:
- {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}
+ {min,max}_{entropy,adin,nonce,pers}len
This change makes naming also more consistent, as can be seen in the
diffs, for example:
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
Also replaced all 'ent's by 'entropy's, following a suggestion of Paul Dale.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
Try to put DRBG and rand_bytes buffers in secure heap
Read the TSC fewer times (but it's still not enabled).
Short-circuit return in win RAND_poll_ex; other minor tweaks and
format-fixes.
Use the _bytes version of rdrand/rdseed
Fix ia32cap checks.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4100)
Use atfork to count child forks, and reseed DRBG when the counts don't
match.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4101)
Add a new global DRBG for private keys used by RAND_priv_bytes.
Add BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() which use RAND_priv_bytes().
Change callers to use the appropriate BN_priv... function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4076)
Give each SSL object it's own DRBG, chained to the parent global
DRBG which is used only as a source of randomness into the per-SSL
DRBG. This is used for all session, ticket, and pre-master secret keys.
It is NOT used for ECDH key generation which use only the global
DRBG. (Doing that without changing the API is tricky, if not impossible.)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4050)
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.
Re-order seeding and stop after first success.
Add RAND_poll_ex()
Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.
Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.
Various code cleanups:
-Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
-Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
-Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
-Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
-Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
implementation of NIST DRBG.
-Remove blocklength
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
Instead of setting a "magic" global variable to force RAND to keep
consistent state and always generate the same bytestream, have
the fuzzing code install its own RAND_METHOD that does this. For
BN_RAND_DEBUG, we just don't do it; that debugging was about mucking
with BN's internal representation, not requiring predictable rand
bytes.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4025)
In 'crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c', a call to
'ASYNC_unblock_pause()' is missing in an error case.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4020)
Add a new config param to specify how the CSPRNG should be seeded.
Illegal values or nonsensical combinations (e.g., anything other
than "os" on VMS or HP VOS etc) result in build failures.
Add RDSEED support.
Add RDTSC but leave it disabled for now pending more investigation.
Refactor and reorganization all seeding files (rand_unix/win/vms) so
that they are simpler.
Only require 128 bits of seeding material.
Many document improvements, including why to not use RAND_add() and the
limitations around using load_file/write_file.
Document RAND_poll().
Cleanup Windows RAND_poll and return correct status
More completely initialize the default DRBG.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3965)
Looking at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
we see that in the CTR_DRBG_Update() algorithm (internal page number 51),
the provided input data is (after truncation to seedlen) xor-d with the
key and V vector (of length keylen and blocklen respectively). The comment
in ctr_XOR notes that xor-ing with 0 is the identity function, so we can
just ignore the case when the provided input is shorter than seedlen.
The code in ctr_XOR() then proceeds to xor the key with the input, up
to the amount of input present, and computes the remaining input that
could be used to xor with the V vector, before accessing a full 16-byte
stretch of the input vector and ignoring the calculated length. The correct
behavior is to respect the supplied input length and only xor the
indicated number of bytes.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3971)
Ported from the last FIPS release, with DUAL_EC and SHA1 and the
self-tests removed. Since only AES-CTR is supported, other code
simplifications were done. Removed the "entropy blocklen" concept.
Moved internal functions to new include/internal/rand.h.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3789)
Standardized the -rand flag and added a new one:
-rand file...
Always reads the specified files
-writerand file
Always writes to the file on exit
For apps that use a config file, the RANDFILE config parameter reads
the file at startup (to seed the RNG) and write to it on exit if
the -writerand flag isn't used.
Ensured that every app that took -rand also took -writerand, and
made sure all of that agreed with all the documentation.
Fix error reporting in write_file and -rand
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3862)
Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection
Make rand_pseudo same as rand.
Cleanup formatting and ifdef control
Rename some things:
- rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global
- source file
- lock/init functions, start per-thread state
- ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init
Put state into RAND_STATE structure
And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h
Use "randomness" instead of "entropy"
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758)
Use stdio and its buffering.
Limit to 255 bytes (could remove that if neceessary).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3888)
Bounds checking strpy, strcat and sprintf.
These are the remaining easy ones to cover a recently removed commit.
Some are trivial, some have been modified and a couple left as they are because the reverted change didn't bounds check properly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3871)
Document an internal assumption that these are only for use with files,
and return an error if not. That made the code much simpler.
Leave it as writing 1024 bytes, even though we don't need more than 256
from a security perspective. But the amount isn't specified, now, so we
can change it later if we want.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3864)
Original text:
Check if a random "file" is really a device file, and treat it
specially if it is.
Add a few OpenBSD-specific cases.
This is part of a large change submitted by Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.or
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3700)
[extended tests]
Original text:
Use BUF_strlcpy() instead of strcpy().
Use BUF_strlcat() instead of strcat().
Use BIO_snprintf() instead of sprintf().
In some cases, keep better track of buffer lengths.
This is part of a large change submitted by Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3701)
Run perltidy on util/mkerr
Change some mkerr flags, write some doc comments
Make generated tables "const" when genearting lib-internal ones.
Add "state" file for mkerr
Renerate error tables and headers
Rationalize declaration of ERR_load_XXX_strings
Fix out-of-tree build
Add -static; sort flags/vars for options.
Also tweak code output
Moved engines/afalg to engines (from master)
Use -static flag
Standard engine #include's of errors
Don't linewrap err string tables unless necessary
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3392)
When configured no-engine, we still refered to rand_engine_lock.
Rework the lock init code to avoid that.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3145)
If no default method was yet given, RAND_get_rand_method() will set it
up. Doing so just to clean it away seems pretty silly, so instead,
use the default_RAND_meth variable directly.
This also clears a possible race condition where this will try to init
things, such as ERR or ENGINE when in the middle of a OPENSSL_cleanup.
Fixes#3128
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3136)
This removes the fips configure option. This option is broken as the
required FIPS code is not available.
FIPS_mode() and FIPS_mode_set() are retained for compatibility, but
FIPS_mode() always returns 0, and FIPS_mode_set() can only be used to
turn FIPS mode off.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
According to the documentation, the return code should be -1 when
RAND_status does not return 1.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1886)
There is code that retries calling RAND_bytes() until it gets something
other than 0, which just hangs if we always return 0.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #2041
Certain functions are automatically called during auto-deinit in order
to deallocate resources. However, if we have never entered a function which
marks lib crypto as inited then they never get called. This can happen if
the user only ever makes use of a small sub-set of functions that don't hit
the auto-init code.
This commit ensures all such resources deallocated by these functions also
init libcrypto when they are initially allocated.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
The previous change for Windows wasn't quite right. Corrected to use
%HOME%, %USERPROFILE% and %SYSTEMPROFILE%, in that order.
Also adding the default home for VMS, SYS$LOGIN:
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Previously we would try %RANDFILE%, then %HOME% and finally "C:".
Unfortunately this often ends up being "C:" which the user may not
have write permission for.
Now we try %RANDFILE% first, and then the same set of environment vars
as GetTempFile() uses, i.e. %TMP%, then %TEMP%, %USERPROFILE% and
%SYSTEMROOT%. If all else fails we fall back to %HOME% and only then "C:".
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Use STATUS_SUCCESS instead of 0.
Renamed USE_BCRYPT to RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT to avoid possible collisions with other defines.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1142)
Adds missing casts for 64-bit.
Removed zero initialization of hProvider. hProvider is an "out" parameter of CryptAcquireContextW.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1142)
When openssl is compiled with MSVC and _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0601 (Windows 7), BCryptGenRandom is used instead of the legacy CryptoAPI.
This change brings the following benefits:
- Removes dependency on CryptoAPI (legacy API) respectively advapi32.dll
- CryptoAPI Cryptographic Service Providers (rsa full) are not dynamically loaded.
- Allows Universal Windows Platform (UWP) apps to use openssl (CryptGenRandom is not available for Windows store apps)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1142)
RT2630 -- segfault for int overlow
RT2877 -- check return values in apps/rand
Update CHANGES file for previous "windows rand" changes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1079)
Giving setbuf() a 64-bit pointer isn't faulty, as the argument is
passed by a 64-bit register anyway, so you only get a warning
(MAYLOSEDATA2) pointing out that only the least significant 32 bits
will be used.
However, we know that a FILE* returned by fopen() and such really is a
32-bit pointer (a study of the system header files make that clear),
so we temporarly turn off that warning when calling setbuf().
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Defintions of macros similar to _XOPEN_SOURCE belong in command line
or in worst case prior first #include directive in source. As for
macros is was allegedly controlling. One can argue that we are
probably better off demanding S_IS* macros but there are systems
that just don't comply, hence this compromise solution...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The Unix build was the last to retain the classic build scheme. The
new unified scheme has matured enough, even though some details may
need polishing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
There is a preference for suffixes to indicate that a function is internal
rather than prefixes. Note: the suffix is only required to disambiguate
internal functions and public symbols with the same name (but different
case)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There was a lot of naming inconsistency, so we try and standardise on
one form.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
RAND_cleanup() should not be called expicitly - we should leave
auto-deinit to clean this up instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Simplifies calling code. Also fixed up any !ptr tests that were
nearby, turning them into NULL tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This takes us away from the idea that we know exactly how our static
libraries are going to get used. Instead, we make them available to
build shareable things with, be it other shared libraries or DSOs.
On the other hand, we also have greater control of when the shared
library cflags. They will never be used with object files meant got
binaries, such as apps/openssl or test/test*.
With unified, we take this a bit further and prepare for having to
deal with extra cflags specifically to be used with DSOs (dynamic
engines), libraries and binaries (applications).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
All those flags existed because we had all the dependencies versioned
in the repository, and wanted to have it be consistent, no matter what
the local configuration was. Now that the dependencies are gone from
the versioned Makefile.ins, it makes much more sense to use the exact
same flags as when compiling the object files.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add -DBIO_DEBUG to --strict-warnings.
Remove comments about outdated debugging ifdef guards.
Remove md_rand ifdef guarding an assert; it doesn't seem used.
Remove the conf guards in conf_api since we use OPENSSL_assert, not assert.
For pkcs12 stuff put OPENSSL_ in front of the macro name.
Merge TLS_DEBUG into SSL_DEBUG.
Various things just turned on/off asserts, mainly for checking non-NULL
arguments, which is now removed: camellia, bn_ctx, crypto/modes.
Remove some old debug code, that basically just printed things to stderr:
DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES, DEBUG_ZLIB, OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG,
RL_DEBUG, RSA_DEBUG, SCRYPT_DEBUG.
Remove OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
As part of this, change util/mkdef.pl to stop adding libraries to
depend on in its output. mkdef.pl should ONLY output a symbol
vector.
Because symbol names can't be longer than 31 characters, we use the
compiler to shorten those that are longer down to 23 characters plus
an 8 character CRC. To make sure users of our header files will pick
up on that automatically, add the DEC C supported extra headers files
__decc_include_prologue.h and __decc_include_epilogue.h.
Furthermore, we add a config.com, so VMS people can configure just as
comfortably as any Unix folks, thusly:
@config
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Now that we have the foundation for the "unified" build scheme in
place, we add build.info files. They have been generated from the
Makefiles in the same directories. Things that are platform specific
will appear in later commits.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The use of the uninitialized buffer in the RNG has no real security
benefits and is only a nuisance when using memory sanitizers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Remove lint, tags, dclean, tests.
This is prep for a new makedepend scheme.
This is temporary pending unified makefile, and might help it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The entropy-gathering daemon is used only on a small number of machines.
Provide a configure knob so that EGD support can be disabled by default
but re-enabled on those systems that do need it.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Create Makefile's from Makefile.in
Rename Makefile.org to Makefile.in
Rename Makefiles to Makefile.in
Address review feedback from Viktor and Richard
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Provide backwards-compatiblity for functions, macros and include
files if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT is either not defined or defined less
than the version number of the release in which the feature was
deprecated.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
