Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Incorrect name used for SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR.
Signed-off-by: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
After the finale, the "real" final part. :) Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
EVP_.*free; this gets:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_asn1_free
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free EVP_PKEY_free EVP_PKEY_free_it
EVP_PKEY_meth_free; and also EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Change ssl_set_handshake_header from return void to returning int, and
handle error return code appropriately.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Ensure that all functions have their return values checked where
appropriate. This covers all functions defined and called from within
libssl.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
cipher being used and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent
by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
CVE-2015-1787
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is a workaround for a browser bug from many years ago
(2000).
It predates DTLS, so certainly has no place in d1_srvr.c.
In s3_srvr.c it forces the ServerDone to appear in the same record as the
CertificateRequest when doing client auth.
BoringSSL have already made the same commit:
79ae85e4f777f94d91b7be19e8a62016cb55b3c5
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This is an ancient bug workaround for Netscape clients. The documentation
talks about versions 3.x and 4.x beta.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Update master secret calculation to support extended master secret.
TLS 1.2 client authentication adds a complication because we need to
cache the handshake messages. This is simpllified however because
the point at which the handshake hashes are calculated for extended
master secret is identical to that required for TLS 1.2 client
authentication (immediately after client key exchange which is also
immediately before certificate verify).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Remove support for SHA0 and DSS0 (they were broken), and remove
the ability to attempt to build without SHA (it didn't work).
For simplicity, remove the option of not building various SHA algorithms;
you could argue that SHA_224/256/384/512 should be kept, since they're
like crypto algorithms, but I decided to go the other way.
So these options are gone:
GENUINE_DSA OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
OPENSSL_NO_SHA OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
OPENSSL_NO_SHA224 OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
OPENSSL_NO_SHA384 OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.
When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.
We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The supported signature algorithms extension needs to be processed before
the certificate to use is decided and before a cipher is selected (as the
set of shared signature algorithms supported may impact the choice).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56e8dc542b)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_err.c
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
