once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0ede)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
ssl/s3_srvr.c
When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.
When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.
We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3881d8106d)
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
(Original commit adb46dbc6d)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab)
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.
(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6d)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
ssl/s3_lib.c
Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
Replace manual ASN.1 decoder with ASN1_get object. This
will decode the tag and length properly and check against
it does not exceed the supplied buffer length.
PR#3335
(cherry picked from commit b0308dddd1cc6a8e1de803ef29ba6da25ee072c2)
When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.
Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.
PR#3191
Submitted by: steve
Update maximum message size for certifiate verify messages to support
4096 bit RSA keys again as TLS v1.2 messages is two bytes longer.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
- remove some unncessary SSL_err and permit
an srp user callback to allow a worker to obtain
a user verifier.
- cleanup and comments in s_server and demonstration
for asynchronous srp user lookup
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Make SRP conformant to rfc 5054.
Changes are:
- removal of the addition state after client hello
- removal of all pre-rfc srp alert ids
- sending a fatal alert when there is no srp extension but when the
server wants SRP
- removal of unnecessary code in the client.
than client side as we need to keep the handshake record cache frozen when
it contains all the records need to process the certificate verify message.
(backport from HEAD).
Submitted by: steve@openssl.org
More robust fix and workaround for PR#1949. Don't try to work out if there
is any write pending data as this can be unreliable: always flush.
ctrl is incorrectly implemented (e.g. some versions of Apache). As a workaround
call both BIO_CTRL_INFO and BIO_CTRL_WPENDING if it returns zero. This should
both address the original bug and retain compatibility with the old behaviour.
