This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When config'd with "sctp" running "make test" causes a seg fault. This is
actually due to the way ssltest works - it dives under the covers and frees
up BIOs manually and so some BIOs are NULL when the SCTP code does not
expect it. The simplest fix is just to add some sanity checks to make sure
the BIOs aren't NULL before we use them.
This problem occurs in master and 1.0.2. The fix has also been applied to
1.0.1 to keep the code in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
There are some missing return value checks in the SCTP code. In master this
was causing a compilation failure when config'd with
"--strict-warnings sctp".
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Use a dynamic engine for ossltest engine so that we can build it without
subsequently deploying it during install. We do not want people accidentally
using this engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add ServerHello parsing to TLSProxy.
Also add some (very) limited ServerKeyExchange parsing.
Add the capability to set client and server cipher lists
Fix a bug with fragment lengths
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Two tests are added: one is a simple version tolerance test; the second is
a test to ensure that OpenSSL operates correctly in the case of a zero
length extensions block. The latter was broken inadvertently (now fixed)
and it would have been helpful to have a test case for it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit provides a set of perl modules that support the testing of
libssl. The test harness operates as a man-in-the-middle proxy between
s_server and s_client. Both s_server and s_client must be started using the
"-testmode" option which loads the new OSSLTEST engine.
The test harness enables scripts to be written that can examine the packets
sent during a handshake, as well as (potentially) modifying them so that
otherwise illegal handshake messages can be sent.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This engine is for testing purposes only. It provides crippled crypto
implementations and therefore must not be used in any instance where
security is required.
This will be used by the forthcoming libssl test harness which will operate
as a man-in-the-middle proxy. The test harness will be able to modify
TLS packets and read their contents. By using this test engine packets are
not encrypted and MAC codes always verify.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The function BN_MONT_CTX_set was assuming that the modulus was non-zero
and therefore that |mod->top| > 0. In an error situation that may not be
the case and could cause a seg fault.
This is a follow on from CVE-2015-1794.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)
The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.
CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
make errors wants things in a different order to the way things are
currently defined in the header files. The easiest fix is to just let it
reorder it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add Host Header in OCSP query if no host header is set via -header
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
We could just initialize it, but to be consistent with the rest of the file
it seemed to make more sense to just drop.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This reverts commit 704563f04a.
Reverting in favour of the next commit which removes the underlying cause
of the warning.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
--strict-warnings started showing warnings for this today...
Surely an error should be raised if these reads fail?
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The -use_srtp s_client/s_server option is supposed to take a colon
separated string as an argument. In master this was incorrectly set to
expect a filename.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Some of the PACKET functions were returning incorrect data. An unfortunate
choice of test data in the unit test was masking the failure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates was using some variables that only
apply if OPENSSL_NO_EC2M is not defined.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The move of CCS into the state machine introduced a bug in ssl3_read_bytes.
The value of |recvd_type| was not being set if we are satisfying the request
from handshake fragment storage. This can occur, for example, with
renegotiation and causes the handshake to fail.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Continuing on from the previous commit this moves the processing of DTLS
CCS messages out of the record layer and into the state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Provide more robust (inline) functions to replace n2s, n2l, etc. These
functions do the same thing as the previous macros, but also keep track
of the amount of data remaining and return an error if we try to read more
data than we've got.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Commit e481f9b90b removed OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT from the code.
Previously if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT *was not* defined then the server random was
filled during getting of the ClientHello. If it *was* defined then the
server random would be filled in ssl3_send_server_hello(). Unfortunately in
commit e481f9b90b the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT guards were removed but *both*
server random fillings were left in. This could cause problems for session
ticket callbacks.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
