In light of potential UKS (unknown key share) attacks on some
applications, primarily browsers, despite RFC761, name checks are
by default applied with DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. Applications for
which UKS is not a problem can optionally disable DANE-EE(3) name
checks via the new SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags() and friends.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
New hostname checking function asn1_valid_host()
Check commonName entries against nameConstraints: any CN components in
EE certificate which look like hostnames are checked against
nameConstraints.
Note that RFC5280 et al only require checking subject alt name against
DNS name constraints.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
When the proxy cert code was initially added, some application authors
wanted to get them verified without having to change their code, so a
check of the env var OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS was added.
Since then, the use of this variable has become irrelevant, as it's
likely that code has been changed since, so it's time it gets removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
While travelling up the certificate chain, the internal
proxy_path_length must be updated with the pCPathLengthConstraint
value, or verification will not work properly. This corresponds to
RFC 3820, 4.1.4 (a).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The subject name MUST be the same as the issuer name, with a single CN
entry added.
RT#1852
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1074)
Since with SSL_VERIFY_NONE, the connection may continue and the
session may even be cached, we should save some evidence that the
chain was not sufficiently verified and would have been rejected
with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. To that end when a CT callback returs failure
we set the verify result to X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS.
Note: We only run the CT callback in the first place if the verify
result is still X509_V_OK prior to start of the callback.
RT #4502
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure. Also, when X509_verify_cert()
returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain
X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
just in case some code path returns an error without setting an
appropriate value of ctx->error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
An if checks the value of |type| to see if it is V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING
twice. We only need to do it once.
GitHub Issue #656
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add a status return value instead of void.
Add some sanity checks on reference counter value.
Update the docs.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.
Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.
RT#4531
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The length is a long, so returning the difference does not quite work.
Thanks to Torbjörn Granlund for noticing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5 has made some additional structs opaque. Python's ssl
module requires access to some of the struct members. Three new getters
are added:
int X509_OBJECT_get_type(X509_OBJECT *a);
STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx);
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Coverity reports a potential NULL deref when "2 0 0" DANE trust-anchors
from DNS are configured via SSL_dane_tlsa_add() and X509_STORE_CTX_init()
is called with a NULL stack of untrusted certificates.
Since ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provideds a non-NULL stack of
untrusted certs, and no other code path enables DANE, the problem
can only happen in applications that use SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback()
to implement their own wrappers around X509_verify_cert() passing
only the leaf certificate to the latter.
Regardless of the "improbability" of the problem, we do need to
ensure that build_chain() handles this case correctly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add X509_STORE_{set,get}_ex_data() function and
X509_STORE_get_ex_new_index() macro.
X509_STORE has ex_data and the documentation also mentions them but they
are not actually implemented.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.
Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The Unix build was the last to retain the classic build scheme. The
new unified scheme has matured enough, even though some details may
need polishing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Make OBJ_name_cmp internal
Rename idea_xxx to IDEA_xxx
Rename get_rfc_xxx to BN_get_rfc_xxx
Rename v3_addr and v3_asid functions to X509v3_...
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
