Add encoded point ctrl support for other curves: this makes it possible
to handle X25519 and other EC curve point encoding in a similar way
for TLS.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
extra spacing and 80 cols
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1366)
To avoid having to immediately free up r/s when setting them
don't allocate them automatically in DSA_SIG_new() and ECDSA_SIG_new().
RT#4590
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1273)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
Reorder arguments to follow convention.
Also allow r/s to be NULL in DSA_SIG_get0, similarly to ECDSA_SIG_get0.
This complements GH1193 which adds non-const setters.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
SSH2 implementations which use DSA_do_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() are given
the R and S values, and the data to be signed, by the client. Thus in order
to validate these signatures, SSH2 implementations will digest and sign
the data -- and then pass in properly provisioned DSA_SIG and ECDSA_SIG objects.
Unfortunately, the existing OpenSSL-1.1.0 APIs do not allow for directly setting
those R and S values in these objects, which makes using OpenSSL for such
SSH2 implementations much more difficult.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1193)
We already test in EC_POINT_oct2point that points are on the curve. To
be on the safe side, move this check to
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_* so as to also check point coordinates
received through some other method.
We do not check projective coordinates, though, as
- it's unlikely that applications would be receiving this primarily
internal representation from untrusted sources, and
- it's possible that the projective setters are used in a setting where
performance matters.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The ec_wNAF_mul() function allocates some temporary storage that it
doesn't always free on an error condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Don't copy parameters is they're already present in the destination.
Return error if an attempt is made to copy different parameters to
destination. Update documentation.
If key type is not initialised return missing parameters
RT#4149
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
- Missing checks for allocation failure.
- releasing memory in few missing error paths
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This demystifies two for-loops that do nothing. They were used to write
the ladder in a unified way. Now that the ladder is otherwise commented,
remove the dead loops.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We should only copy parameters and keys if the group is set. Otherwise
they don't really make any sense. Previously we copied the private key
regardless of whether the group was set...but if it wasn't a NULL ptr
deref could occur. It's unclear whether we could ever get into that
situation, but since we were already checking it for the public key we
should be consistent.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix a bug introduced by 6903e2e7e9 (Extended EC_METHOD customisation
support., 2016-02-01). key->meth->set_private() is wrongly called where
it should call key->group->meth->set_private().
PR#4517
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The Unix build was the last to retain the classic build scheme. The
new unified scheme has matured enough, even though some details may
need polishing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The private key is a scalar and should be sized by the order, not the
degree. See RFC 5915.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The reason to do so is that some of the generators detect PIC flags
like -fPIC and -KPIC, and those are normally delivered in LD_CFLAGS.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
