It was an ugly hack to avoid certain problems that are no more.
Also added GENERATE lines for perlasm scripts that didn't have that
explicitly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8125)
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS and EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD are only
exposed from EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl, which means callers must write more error-prone
code (see also issue #1319). Add the missing wrapper macros and document them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8093)
If the call the ERR_set_error_data() in ERR_add_error_vdata() fails then
a mem leak can occur. This commit checks that we successfully added the
error data, and if not frees the buffer.
Fixes#8085
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8105)
A CAdES Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES) contains, among other
specifications, a collection of Signing Certificate reference attributes,
stored in the signedData ether as ESS signing-certificate or as
ESS signing-certificate-v2. These are described in detail in Section 5.7.2
of RFC 5126 - CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES).
This patch adds support for adding ESS signing-certificate[-v2] attributes
to CMS signedData. Although it implements only a small part of the RFC, it
is sufficient many cases to enable the `openssl cms` app to create signatures
which comply with legal requirements of some European States (e.g Italy).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7893)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping Yu <ping.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Linsell <stevenx.linsell@intel.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7573)
When the ret parameter is NULL the generated prime
is in rnd variable and not in ret.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8076)
Add platform::Unix, which is a generic Unix module to support product
name and extensions functionlity. However, this isn't quite enough,
as mingw and Cygwin builds are done using the same templates, but
since shared libraries work as on Windows and are named accordingly,
platform::mingw and platform::Cygwin were also added to provide the
necessary tweaks.
This reworks Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl to work out product
names in platform::Unix et al terms. In this one, we currently do
care about the *_extension config attributes, and the modules adapt
accordingly where it matters.
This change also affected crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in, since
the DSO extension is meant to be the same as the short shared library
extension, which isn't '.so' everywhere.
'shared_extension' attributes that had the value
'.so.\$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER)' are removed, platform::Unix provides
an extension where the shared library version number is hard-coded
instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7473)
If this fails try out if mfspr268 works.
Use OPENSSL_ppccap=0x20 for enabling mftb,
OPENSSL_ppccap=0x40 for enabling mfspr268,
and OPENSSL_ppccap=0 for enabling neither.
Fixes#8012
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8043)
If you use a BIO and set up your own buffer that is not freed, the
memory bio will leak the BIO_BUF_MEM object it allocates.
The trouble is that the BIO_BUF_MEM is allocated and kept around,
but it is not freed if BIO_NOCLOSE is set.
The freeing of BIO_BUF_MEM was fairly confusing, simplify things
so mem_buf_free only frees the memory buffer and free the BIO_BUF_MEM
in mem_free(), where it should be done.
Alse add a test for a leak in the memory bio
Setting a memory buffer caused a leak.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8051)
Some of these functions take char*, which is seldom right, they should
have been unsigned char*, because the content isn't expected to be
text.
Even better is to simply take void* as data type, which also happens
to be transparent for any type these functions are called with, be it
char* or unsigned char*. This shouldn't break anything.
While we're at it, constify the input data parameters.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7890)
Having a weak getauxval() and only depending on GNU C without looking
at the library we build against meant that it got picked up where not
really expected.
So we change this to check for the glibc version, and since we know it
exists from that version, there's no real need to make it weak.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8028)
It turns out that AT_SECURE may be defined through other means than
our inclusion of sys/auxv.h, so to be on the safe side, we define our
own guard and use that to determine if getauxval() should be used or
not.
Fixes#7932
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7933)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8016)
1. In addition to overriding the default application name,
one can now also override the configuration file name
and flags passed to CONF_modules_load_file().
2. By default we still keep going when configuration file
processing fails. But, applications that want to be strict
about initialization errors can now make explicit flag
choices via non-null OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS that omit the
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES flag (which had so far been
both undocumented and unused).
3. In OPENSSL_init_ssl() do not request OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG
if the options already include OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG.
4. Don't set up atexit() handlers when called with INIT_BASE_ONLY.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7986)
Some Travis builds appear to fail because generated objects get
2019 copyrights now, and the diff complains.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7986)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6919)
Added crypto/perlasm/s390x.pm Perl module. Its primary use is to be
independent of binutils version, that is to write byte codes of
instructions that are not part of the base instruction set.
Currently only gas format is supported.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6919)
This enables cleanup to happen on DLL unload instead of at process exit.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7647)
We have a number of instances where there are multiple "init" functions for
a single CRYPTO_ONCE variable, e.g. to load config automatically or to not
load config automatically. Unfortunately the RUN_ONCE mechanism was not
correctly giving the right return value where an alternative init function
was being used.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7647)
CLA: trivial
Function EVP_PKEY_size has been modified to take a const parameter
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7892)
FreeBSD does not enable cryptodev(4) by default. OpenBSD disabled support
for /dev/crypto by default from 4.9 and removed it from 5.7. Now the engine
is properly enabled by default on BSD platforms (see #7885), it continuously
complains:
Could not open /dev/crypto: No such file or directory
Hide the nagging error message behind ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_DEBUG.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7896)
Call to i2d method returns an int value.
Fix:
CID 1338183 (#1 of 1): Improper use of negative value (NEGATIVE_RETURNS)
CID 1371691 (#1 of 1): Improper use of negative value (NEGATIVE_RETURNS)
CID 1371692 (#1 of 1): Improper use of negative value (NEGATIVE_RETURNS)
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7359)
The check_key_level() function currently fails when the public key
cannot be extracted from the certificate because its algorithm is not
supported. However, the public key is not needed for the last
certificate in the chain.
This change moves the check for level 0 before the check for a
non-NULL public key.
For background, this is the TPM 1.2 endorsement key certificate.
I.e., this is a real application with millions of certificates issued.
The key is an RSA-2048 key.
The TCG (for a while) specified
Public Key Algorithm: rsaesOaep
rather than the commonly used
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
because the key is an encryption key rather than a signing key.
The X509 certificate parser fails to get the public key.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7906)
It turns out that intialization may change the error number, so we
need to preserve the system error number in functions where
initialization is called for.
These are ERR_get_state() and err_shelve_state()
Fixes#7897
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7902)
Convert CMAC APIs to EVP_MAC APIs
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7891)
Based originally on github.com/dfoxfranke/libaes_siv
This creates an SIV128 mode that uses EVP interfaces for the CBC, CTR
and CMAC code to reduce complexity at the cost of perfomance. The
expected use is for short inputs, not TLS-sized records.
Add multiple AAD input capacity in the EVP tests.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3540)
Check that s is less than the order before attempting to verify the
signature as per RFC8032 5.2.7
Fixes#7706
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7748)
This is useful to determine the kernel driver running each algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
USE_SOFTDRIVERS: whether to use software (not accelerated) drivers
CIPHERS: list of ciphers to enable
DIGESTS: list of digests to enable
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Since each ioctl causes a context switch, slowing things down, if
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT is set, then:
- call the ioctl in digest_update, saving the result; and
- just copy the result in digest_final, instead of using another ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Digest must be able to do partial-state copy to be used.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Make CTR mode behave like a stream cipher.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
The engine needs a custom cipher context copy function to open a new
/dev/crypto session.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Close the session in digest_cleanup instead of digest_final. A failure
in closing the session does not mean a previous successful digest final
has failed as well.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
If the source ctx has not been initialized, don't initialize the copy
either.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Return failure when the digest_ctx is null in digest_update and
digest_final, and when md is null in digest_final.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
Call functions to prepare methods after confirming that /dev/crytpo was
sucessfully open and that the destroy function has been set.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7585)
For the same reasons as in the previous commit we must preserve errno
across dlopen calls. Some implementations (e.g. solaris) do not preserve
errno even on a successful dlopen call.
Fixes#6953
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7680)
This function can end up being called during ERR_get_error() if we are
initialising. ERR_get_error() must preserve errno since it gets called via
SSL_get_error(). If that function returns SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL then you are
supposed to inspect errno.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7680)
fix nmake compiler error
```
crypto\kmac\kmac.c : warning treated as error - no object file generated
crypto\kmac\kmac.c : warning C4819: The file contains a character that cannot be represented in the current code page (936). Save the file in Unicode format to prevent data loss
```
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7846)
This commit exposes the cipher's IV to applications.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
Add support for Linux TLS offload in the BIO layer
and specifically in bss_sock.c.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in
EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed
for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the
method is getting registered.
Fixes#7758
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7847)
Make it just say "the License", which refers back to the standard
boilerplate.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7764)
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version
number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was
this simple number.
With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and
it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able
to support pre-3.0.0 version limits.
Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0
style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can
be defined like this for any application:
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3
Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to
distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical
version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time.
Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of
OPENSSL_API_COMPAT:
OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
OPENSSL_API_3
They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the
corresponding major release shall not be built if defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
We're strictly use version numbers of the form MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.
Letter releases are things of days past.
The most central change is that we now express the version number with
three macros, one for each part of the version number:
OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR
OPENSSL_VERSION_MINOR
OPENSSL_VERSION_PATCH
We also provide two additional macros to express pre-release and build
metadata information (also specified in semantic versioning):
OPENSSL_VERSION_PRE_RELEASE
OPENSSL_VERSION_BUILD_METADATA
To get the library's idea of all those values, we introduce the
following functions:
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_major(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_minor(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_patch(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_pre_release(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_build_metadata(void);
Additionally, for shared library versioning (which is out of scope in
semantic versioning, but that we still need):
OPENSSL_SHLIB_VERSION
We also provide a macro that contains the release date. This is not
part of the version number, but is extra information that we want to
be able to display:
OPENSSL_RELEASE_DATE
Finally, also provide the following convenience functions:
const char *OPENSSL_version_text(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_text_full(void);
The following macros and functions are deprecated, and while currently
existing for backward compatibility, they are expected to disappear:
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
OPENSSL_VERSION
OpenSSL_version_num()
OpenSSL_version()
Also, this function is introduced to replace OpenSSL_version() for all
indexes except for OPENSSL_VERSION:
OPENSSL_info()
For configuration, the option 'newversion-only' is added to disable all
the macros and functions that are mentioned as deprecated above.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
This is in preparation for a switch to MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH versioning
and calling the next major version 3.0.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
Fixed-top interfaces tolerate zero-padded inputs and facilitate
constant-time-ness. bn_div_fixed_top tolerates zero-padded dividend,
but not divisor. It's argued that divisor's length is public even
when value is secret.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7589)
and add template for constant-time bn_div_3_words.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7589)
It's being replaced with constant-time alternative.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7589)
Check that s is less than the order before attempting to verify the
signature as per RFC8032 5.1.7
Fixes#7693
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7697)
Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
wipe it if there was no actual error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
It turns out that on VMS, strerror() returns messages with added
spaces at the end.
We wouldn't had noticed if it wasn't for perl trimming those spaces
off for its own sake and thereby having test/recipes/02-test_errstr.t
fail on VMS.
The safe fix is to do the same trimming ourselves.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7701)
We stored copies of the system error texts in a fixed line size array,
which is a huge waste. Instead, use a static memory pool and pack all
the string in there. The wasted space at the end, if any, gives us
some leeway for longer strings than we have measured so far.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7681)
Blinding is performed more efficiently and securely if MONT_CTX for public
modulus is available by the time blinding parameter are instantiated. So
make sure it's the case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7586)
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7522)
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7522)
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7522)
Setting the SipHash hash size and setting its key is done with two
independent functions... and yet, the internals depend on both.
Unfortunately, the function to change the size wasn't adapted for the
possibility that the key was set first, with a different hash size.
This changes the hash setting function to fix the internal values
(which is easy, fortunately) according to the hash size.
evpmac.txt value for digestsize:8 is also corrected.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7613)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7599)
Rather than relying only on mandatory default digests, add a way for
the EVP_PKEY to individually report whether each digest algorithm is
supported.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7408)
ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID is documented to return 2 for a mandatory
digest algorithm, when the key can't support any others. That isn't true
here, so return 1 instead.
Partially fixes#7348
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7408)
Commit c7504aeb64 (pr #6432) fixed a regression for applications in
chroot environments, which compensated the fact that the new OpenSSL CSPRNG
(based on the NIST DRBG) now reseeds periodically, which the previous
one didn't. Now the reseeding could fail in the chroot environment if the
DEVRANDOM devices were not present anymore and no other entropy source
(e.g. getrandom()) was available.
The solution was to keep the file handles for the DEVRANDOM devices open
by default. In fact, the fix did more than this, it opened the DEVRANDOM
devices early and unconditionally in rand_pool_init(), which had the
unwanted side effect that the devices were opened (and kept open) even
in cases when they were not used at all, for example when the getrandom()
system call was available. Due to a bug (issue #7419) this even happened
when the feature was disabled by the application.
This commit removes the unconditional opening of all DEVRANDOM devices.
They will now only be opened (and kept open) on first use. In particular,
if getrandom() is available, the handles will not be opened unnecessarily.
This change does not introduce a regression for applications compiled for
libcrypto 1.1.0, because the SSLEAY RNG also seeds on first use. So in the
above constellation the CSPRNG will only be properly seeded if it is happens
before the forking and chrooting.
Fixes#7419
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7437)
... to make the intended use more clear and differentiate
it from the data member "adin_pool".
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7575)
We kept a number of arrays of directory names to keep track of exactly
which directories to look for build.info. Some of these had the extra
function to hold the directories to actually build.
With the added SUBDIRS keyword, these arrays are no longer needed.
The logic for skipping certain directories needs to be kept, though.
That is now very much simplified, and is made opportunistic.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7558)
Remove GMAC demo program because it has been superceded by the EVP MAC one
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7548)
If engine building fails for some reason, we must make sure to close
the /dev/crypto handle.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7506)
We opened /dev/crypto once for each session, which is quite unnecessary.
With this change, we open /dev/crypto once at engine init, and close
it on unload.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7506)
Copying an EVP_MD_CTX, including the implementation local bits, is a
necessary operation. In this case, though, it's the same as
initializing the local bits to be "copied to".
Fixes#7495
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7506)
The EVP_PKEY methods for CMAC and HMAC needed a rework, although it
wasn't much change apart from name changes.
This also meant that EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() needed an adjustment.
(the possibility to rewrite this function to work with any MAC is yet
to be explored)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7484)
dsa_builtin_paramgen2 expects the L parameter to be greater than N,
otherwise the generation will get stuck in an infinite loop.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7493)
These functions are generalizations of EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl() and
EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(). They will parse the value, and then pass the
parsed result and length to a callback that knows exactly how to pass
them on to a main _ctrl function, along with a context structure
pointer.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
The MAC EVP_PKEY implementations are currently implemented for each
MAC. However, with the EVP_MAC API, only one such implementation is
needed.
This implementation takes into account the differences between HMAC
and CMAC implementations, and observes that all other current MAC
implementations seem to follow the HMAC model.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
We currently implement EVP MAC methods as EVP_PKEY methods. This
change creates a separate EVP API for MACs, to replace the current
EVP_PKEY ones.
A note about this EVP API and how it interfaces with underlying MAC
implementations:
Other EVP APIs pass the EVP API context down to implementations, and
it can be observed that the implementations use the pointer to their
own private data almost exclusively. The EVP_MAC API deviates from
that pattern by passing the pointer to the implementation's private
data directly, and thereby deny the implementations access to the
EVP_MAC context structure. This change is made to provide a clearer
separation between the EVP library itself and the implementations of
its supported algorithm classes.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
that can potentially provide a side channel.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that
triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs
prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack.
Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of
the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the
primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse
without leaking information.
Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7487)
Found by Coverity Scan
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7511)
The Name Constraints extension contains GeneralSubtree values
indicating included or excluded subtrees. It is defined as:
GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
base GeneralName,
minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
RFC 5280 further specifies:
Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
absent.
Because the minimum fields has DEFAULT 0, and certificates should be
encoded using DER, the situation where minimum = 0 occurs in a
certificate should not arise. Nevertheless, it does arise. For
example, I have seen certificates issued by Microsoft programs that
contain GeneralSubtree values encoded thus.
Enhance the Name Constraints matching routine to handle the case
where minimum is specified. If present, it must be zero. The
maximum field remains prohibited.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7039)
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7474)
Commit 5b4cb385c1 (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect
that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than
32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used
exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input
was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed
without querying the available entropy sources.
This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy
requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check,
it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data.
More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy
source was configured (which is the default on most os):
- If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer
content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and
trigger a regular reseeding.
- If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents
into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a
dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
Increase the load buffer size such that it exceeds the chunk
size by a comfortable amount. This is done to avoid calling
RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such a small
final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk
(unless it's the only one).
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
The failure of RAND_load_file was only noticed because of the
heap corruption which was reported in #7499 and fixed in commit
5b4cb385c1. To prevent this in the future, RAND_load_file()
now explicitly checks RAND_status() and reports an error if it
fails.
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
NIST has updated their guidelines in appendix D of SP 800-56B rev2 (draft)
providing a formula for the number of security bits it terms of the length
of the RSA key.
This is an implementation of this formula using fixed point arithmetic.
For integers 1 .. 100,000 it rounds down to the next smaller 8 bit strength
270 times. It never errs to the high side. None of the rounded values occur
near any of the commonly selected lengths.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7352)
This bug was introduced by #7382 which enhanced RAND_add() to
accept large buffer sizes. As a consequence, RAND_add() now fails
for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes (i.e. less than 256 bits).
In addition, rand_drbg_get_entropy() forgets to reset the attached
drbg->pool in the case of an error, which leads to the heap corruption.
The problem occurred with RAND_load_file(), which reads the file in
chunks of 1024 bytes each. If the size of the final chunk is less than
32 bytes, then RAND_add() fails, whence RAND_load_file() fails
silently for buffer sizes n = k * 1024 + r with r = 1,...,31.
This commit fixes the heap corruption only. The other issues will
be addressed in a separate pull request.
Thanks to Gisle Vanem for reporting this issue.
Fixes#7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7455)
Yes, it's second halving, i.e. it's now 1/4 of original size, or more
specifically inner loop. The challenge with Keccak is that you need
more temporary registers than there are available. By reversing the
order in which columns are assigned in Chi, it's possible to use
three of A[][] registers as temporary prior their assigment.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7294)
{make|swap|get|set}context are removed in POSIX.1-2008, but glibc
apparently keeps providing it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7420)
Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE
cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate
CAs, but we also counted the leaf). Therefore, never count the EE
cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly. This may
be more clear to the reader.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and
top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph
of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see:
This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be
further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
certificates, and self-signed certificates. Cross-certificates are
CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
entities. Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
the two CAs. Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
the issuer and subject are the same entity. Self-issued certificates
are generated to support changes in policy or operations. Self-
signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
certificate. Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
key for use to begin certification paths. End entity certificates
are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates.
that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity
certificates. In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9
the description of path length constraints says:
The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is
asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3). In this case, it gives the
maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may
follow this certificate in a valid certification path. (Note: The
last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate
certificate, and is not included in this limit. Usually, the last
certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA
certificate.)
This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from
the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA
certificates. A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer
and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the
intermediate certificate count. The handling of all leaf certificates
must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the
path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued
intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain
of intermediates.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The OPENSSL_s390xcap environment variable is used to set bits in the s390x
capability vector to zero. This simplifies testing of different code paths.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6813)
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63()
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.
When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.
This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.
Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.
Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.
Fixes#7381
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
Negative displacement in memory references was not originally specified,
so that for maximum coverage one should abstain from it, just like with
any other extension. [Unless it's guarded by run-time switch, but there
is no switch in keccak1600-s390x.]
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7239)
We don't need to use secure clean for public key.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7363)
Fixes a compiler warning about an unused syscall_random()
and cleans up the OPENSSL_RAND_SEED preprocessor logic.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/779)
Should be 2018 instead of 20018.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7364)
We passed that ioctl a pointer to the whole session_op structure,
which wasn't quite right.
Notified by David Legault.
Fixes#7302
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7304)
The BIO callback handling incorrectly wrote over the return code passed
to the callback, meaning that an incorrect result was (eventually) returned
to the caller.
Fixes#7343
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7344)
BIO_s_log() is declared for everyone, so should return NULL when not
actually implemented. Also, it had explicit platform limitations in
util/mkdef.pl that didn't correspond to what was actually in code.
While at it, a few other hard coded things that have lost their
relevance were removed.
include/openssl/ocsp.h had a few duplicate declarations.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7331)
Change all calls to getenv() inside libcrypto to use a new wrapper function
that use secure_getenv() if available and an issetugid then getenv if not.
CPU processor override flags are unchanged.
Extra checks for OPENSSL_issetugid() have been removed in favour of the
safe getenv.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7047)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7277)
This module includes bn.h via other headers, so it picks up the
definition from there and doesn't need to define them locally (any
more?). Worst case scenario, the redefinition may be different and
cause all sorts of compile errors.
Fixes#7227
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7287)
These both indicate that the file descriptor we're trying to use as a
terminal isn't, in fact, a terminal.
Fixes#7271
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7272)
The latter causes problems when complex.h is #included.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7233)
It simply isn't available on older versions.
Issue submitted by Mark Daniels
Fixes#7229
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7230)
(cherry picked from commit d6d6aa3521)
The new DRBG API added the aforementioned #define. However, it is
used internally only and having it defined publicly does not serve
any purpose except causing potential version compatibility problems.
Fixes#7182
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7190)
- fix to use secure URL in generated Windows resources
- fix a potentially uninitialized variable
- fix an unused variable warning
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7189)
limit is ever reached.
This is a FIPS 140-2 requirement from IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
Requirements from SP 800-38D".
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7129)
Add a check that the two keys used for AES-XTS are different.
One test case uses the same key for both of the AES-XTS keys. This causes
a failure under FIP 140-2 IG A.9. Mark the test as returning a failure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1439138)
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7156)
The deprecated ASN.1 type LONG / ZLONG (incorrectly) produced zero
length INTEGER encoding for zeroes. For the sake of backward
compatibility, we allow those to be read without fault when using the
replacement types INT32 / UINT32 / INT64 / UINT64.
Fixes#7134
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7144)
This was originally part of SipHash_Init. However, there are cases
where there isn't any key material to initialize from when setting the
hash size, and we do allow doing so with a EVP_PKEY control. The
solution is to provide a separate hash_size setter and to use it in
the corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
Fixes#7143
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7145)
