Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth.
CVE-2018-0739
Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
myDSO_dsobyaddr and myDSO_free are only used in a narrow block of
code, and can therefore be made local to that block. Otherwise, some
compilers may warn that they are unused.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5733)
These errors were hidden because compiling this file didn't get the
macros derived from the dso_scheme attribute, and therefore, some code
never got compiled.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5733)
The macros resulting from the dso_scheme attribute were defined for
libraries only, but there's a test program that uses the macros as
well. The easier way is to move the handling of this macro to
crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h and having the modules that need it
include it.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5733)
.res files weren't treated consistently. They weren't included at all
in the build of a shared library, and were named inconsistently; .res
sometimes, and .res.o otherwise. Now we standardise it to .res.o,
which is the recommended way with GNU tools.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5730)
Add it to apps as well as libraries.
Fix the copyright year generation.
Thanks to user RTT for pointing this out.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5704)
Some platforms, cough-DJGPP, fail to compile claiming that requested
alignment is greater than maximum possible. Supposedly original
alignment was result of an attempt to utilize AVX2...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5708)
At earlier point e_os.h was omitted from a number of headers (in order
to emphasize OS neutrality), but this affected o_fopen.c, which is not
OS-neutral, and contains some DJGPP-specific code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5708)
Add missing guards around STRP-related fields
Remove two unneeded global variables: my 2'cents to #4679
Merge definition and instantiation of srpsrvparm global.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4908)
In particular, x and y may be NULL, as used in ecdsa_ossl.c. Make use of
this in ecdh_ossl.c as well, to save an otherwise unnecessary temporary.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5532)
Various code-cleanups.
Use SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) insead of handling
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ everywhere.
Turn off the linger option on connected sockets to avoid failure.
Add BIO_set_conn_mode(conn, BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) to improve thruput.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3952)
For DTLS/SCTP we were waiting for a dry event during the call to
tls_finish_handshake(). This function just tidies up various internal
things, and after it completes the handshake is over. I can find no good
reason for waiting for a dry event here, and nothing in RFC6083 suggests
to me that we should need to. More importantly though it seems to be
wrong. It is perfectly possible for a peer to send app data/alerts/new
handshake while we are still cleaning up our handshake. If this happens
then we will never get the dry event and so we cannot continue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)
At a couple of points in a DTLS/SCTP handshake we need to wait for a dry
event before continuing. However if an alert has been sent by the peer
then we will never receive that dry event and an infinite loop results.
This commit changes things so that we attempt to read a message if we
are waiting for a dry event but haven't got one yet. This should never
succeed, but any alerts will be processed.
Fixes#4763
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)
Fixes regression from #5667.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5701)
At earlier point e_os.h was omitted from a number of headers (in order
to emphasize OS neutrality), but this affected o_fopen.c and randfile.c
which are not OS-neutral, and contain some Win32-specific code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5676)
Although it deviates from the actual prototype of DSO_dsobyaddr(), this
is now ISO C compliant and gcc -Wpedantic accepts the code.
Added DATA segment checking to catch ptrgl virtual addresses. Avoid
memleaks with every AIX/dladdr() call. Removed debug-fprintf()s.
Added test case for DSO_dsobyaddr(), which will eventually call dladdr().
Removed unecessary AIX ifdefs again.
The implementation can only lookup function symbols, no data symbols.
Added PIC-flag to aix*-cc build targets.
As AIX is missing a dladdr() implementation it is currently uncertain our
exit()-handlers can still be called when the application exits. After
dlclose() the whole library might have been unloaded already.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kraft <makr@gmx.eu>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5668)
The sid_ctx is something of a "certificate request context" or a
"session ID context" -- something from the application that gives
extra indication of what sort of thing this session is/was for/from.
Without a sid_ctx, we only know that there is a session that we
issued, but it could have come from a number of things, especially
with an external (shared) session cache. Accordingly, when resuming,
we will hard-error the handshake when presented with a session with
zero-length sid_ctx and SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set -- we simply have no
information about the peer to verify, so the verification must fail.
In order to prevent these future handshake failures, proactively
decline to add the problematic sessions to the session cache.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5175)
The comment in EVP_DigestInit.pod is:
> Returns the NID of the public key signing algorithm associated with this
digest. For example EVP_sha1() is associated with RSA so this will return
B<NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption>. Since digests and signature algorithms are no
longer linked this function is only retained for compatibility reasons.
I.e. there is no link anymore.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5682)
WCOREDUMP and vsyslog are not portable
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5657)
Give meaningful error messages when the user incorrectly uses pkeyutl.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3987)
The travis logs are going above 4Mb causing the builds to fail. One
test creates excessive output. This change reduces that output by approx
180k.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5694)
[extended tests]
The test_rand_reseed assumed that the global DRBGs were not used
previously. This assumption is false when the tests are executed
in random order (OPENSSL_TEST_RAND_ORDER). So we uninstantiate
them first and add a test for the first instantiation.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5680)
We did the SSL_CONF_cmd() pass last of all things that could affect
the SSL ctx. However, the results of this, for example:
-max_protocol TLSv1.3 -tls1_2
... would mean that the protocol min got set to TLSv1.2 and the
protocol max to TLSv1.3, when they should clearly both be TLSv1.2.
However, if we see the SSL_CONF_cmd() switches as generic and those
internal to s_client and s_server as specialisations, we get something
that makes a little more sense.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5679)
