EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates was using some variables that only
apply if OPENSSL_NO_EC2M is not defined.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8d11b7c7ee)
The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext can be used to set custom session
ticket data passed in the initial ClientHello. This can be particularly
useful for EAP-FAST. However, when using SSLv23_method, the session does
not get created until the ServerHello has been received. The extension code
will only add the SessionTicket data to the ClientHello if a session already
exists. Therefore SSL_set_session_ticket_ext has no impact when used in
conjunction with SSLv23_method. The solution is to simply create the session
during creation of the ClientHello instead of waiting for the ServerHello.
This commit fixes the test failure introduced by the previous commit.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext sets the ticket data to be sent in
the ClientHello. This is useful for EAP-FAST. This commit adds a test to
ensure that when this function is called the expected ticket data actually
appears in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'. These
should be safe to remove. If something went wrong when re-encoding,
there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f608b4064d)
Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
already expect that tar variant).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
This is a follow up to the alternate chains certificate forgery issue
(CVE-2015-1793). That issue is exacerbated in 1.0.1 by a related bug which
means that we *always* check for an alternative chain, even if we have
already found a chain. The code is supposed to stop as soon as it has found
one (and does do in master and 1.0.2).
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
verification tests.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
test/Makefile
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
CVE-2015-1793
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d)
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c66a669df)
Construct bio_err and bio_stdout from file handles instead of FILE
pointers, since the latter might not be implemented (when OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
is defined).
Convert all output to use BIO_printf.
Change lh_foo to lh_SSL_SESSION_foo.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb8abd6735)
Conflicts:
crypto/threads/mttest.c
It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Recent HMAC changes broke ABI compatibility due to a new field in HMAC_CTX.
This backs that change out, and does it a different way.
Thanks to Timo Teras for the concept.
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
