Add a unit-test for ktls.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version
number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was
this simple number.
With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and
it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able
to support pre-3.0.0 version limits.
Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0
style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can
be defined like this for any application:
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3
Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to
distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical
version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time.
Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of
OPENSSL_API_COMPAT:
OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
OPENSSL_API_3
They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the
corresponding major release shall not be built if defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
We're strictly use version numbers of the form MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.
Letter releases are things of days past.
The most central change is that we now express the version number with
three macros, one for each part of the version number:
OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR
OPENSSL_VERSION_MINOR
OPENSSL_VERSION_PATCH
We also provide two additional macros to express pre-release and build
metadata information (also specified in semantic versioning):
OPENSSL_VERSION_PRE_RELEASE
OPENSSL_VERSION_BUILD_METADATA
To get the library's idea of all those values, we introduce the
following functions:
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_major(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_minor(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_patch(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_pre_release(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_build_metadata(void);
Additionally, for shared library versioning (which is out of scope in
semantic versioning, but that we still need):
OPENSSL_SHLIB_VERSION
We also provide a macro that contains the release date. This is not
part of the version number, but is extra information that we want to
be able to display:
OPENSSL_RELEASE_DATE
Finally, also provide the following convenience functions:
const char *OPENSSL_version_text(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_text_full(void);
The following macros and functions are deprecated, and while currently
existing for backward compatibility, they are expected to disappear:
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
OPENSSL_VERSION
OpenSSL_version_num()
OpenSSL_version()
Also, this function is introduced to replace OpenSSL_version() for all
indexes except for OPENSSL_VERSION:
OPENSSL_info()
For configuration, the option 'newversion-only' is added to disable all
the macros and functions that are mentioned as deprecated above.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
This is in preparation for a switch to MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH versioning
and calling the next major version 3.0.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
Fix some issues in tls13_hkdf_expand() which impact the above function
for TLSv1.3. In particular test that we can use the maximum label length
in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7755)
Config options 'no-err' and 'no-autoerrinit'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7711)
There's too high a chance that the openssl app and perl get different
messages for some error numbers.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7699)
This ensures we collected them properly and and as completely as can
be tested safely.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7681)
When libssl and libcrypto are compiled on Linux with "-rpath", but
not "--enable-new-dtags", the RPATH takes precedence over
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and we end up running with the wrong libraries.
This is resolved by using full (or at least relative, rather than
just the filename to be found on LD_LIBRARY_PATH) paths to the
shared objects.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7626)
SSL_get_signature_nid() -- local signature algorithm
SSL_get_signature_type_nid() -- local signature algorithm key type
SSL_get_peer_tmp_key() -- Peer key-exchange public key
SSL_get_tmp_key -- local key exchange public key
Aliased pre-existing SSL_get_server_tmp_key(), which was formerly
just for clients, to SSL_get_peer_tmp_key(). Changed internal
calls to use the new name.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Setting the SipHash hash size and setting its key is done with two
independent functions... and yet, the internals depend on both.
Unfortunately, the function to change the size wasn't adapted for the
possibility that the key was set first, with a different hash size.
This changes the hash setting function to fix the internal values
(which is easy, fortunately) according to the hash size.
evpmac.txt value for digestsize:8 is also corrected.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7613)
Remove GMAC demo program because it has been superceded by the EVP MAC one
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7548)
When wanting to compare the end of a string with another string, make
sure not to start somewhere before the start of the first string.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7520)
pkey_test_ctrl() was designed for parsing values, not for using in
test runs. Relying on its returned value when it returned 1 even for
control errors made it particularly useless for mac_test_run().
Here, it gets replaced with a MAC specific control function, that
parses values the same way but is designed for use in a _run() rather
than a _parse() function.
This uncovers a SipHash test with an invalid control that wasn't
caught properly. After all, that stanza is supposed to test that
invalid control values do generate an error. Now we catch that.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7500)
If a MAC isn't available as an EVP_MAC, the MAC test falls back to the
corresponding EVP_PKEY method.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
Commit 5b4cb385c1 (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect
that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than
32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used
exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input
was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed
without querying the available entropy sources.
This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy
requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check,
it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data.
More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy
source was configured (which is the default on most os):
- If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer
content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and
trigger a regular reseeding.
- If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents
into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a
dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
Related-to: #7449
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
When building shared libraries on Windows, we had a clash between
'libcrypto.lib' the static routine library and 'libcrypto.lib' the
import library.
We now change it so the static versions of our libraries get '_static'
appended to their names. These will never get installed, but can
still be used for our internal purposes, such as internal tests.
When building non-shared, the renaming mechanism doesn't come into
play. In that case, the static libraries 'libcrypto.lib' and
'libssl.lib' are installed, just as always.
Fixes#7492
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7496)
NIST has updated their guidelines in appendix D of SP 800-56B rev2 (draft)
providing a formula for the number of security bits it terms of the length
of the RSA key.
This is an implementation of this formula using fixed point arithmetic.
For integers 1 .. 100,000 it rounds down to the next smaller 8 bit strength
270 times. It never errs to the high side. None of the rounded values occur
near any of the commonly selected lengths.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7352)
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.
When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.
This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.
Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.
Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.
Fixes#7381
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
Hash can be longer than EC group degree and it will be truncated.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7329)
Check that different return values passed to the BIO callback are
correctly handled.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7344)
Move the .num updating functionality to util/mknum.pl.
Rewrite util/mkdef.pl to create .def / .map / .opt files exclusively,
using the separate ordinals reading module.
Adapt the build files.
Adapt the symbol presence test.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7191)
In drbgtest, test_set_defaults changes the default DRBGs. This works fine
when tests are run in the normal order. However if
OPENSSL_TEST_RAND_ORDER is defined then it may fail (dependent on the
ordering). This environment variable is defined for one of the Travis
tests, so this issue was causing intermittent travis test failures.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7338)
This commit reuses a variable instead of reevaluating the expression
and updates an outdated comment in the EVP test.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7242)
With the change to have separate object files by intent, VMS name
mangling gets done differently. While we previously had that for
libraries only, we must now turn that on generally for our programs,
because some of them depend in internal libraries where mangled names
are all that there is.
Dynamic modules are still built with non-mangled names, which is good
enough to show that it's possible to build with our public libraries
using our public headers.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7208)
Add a check that the two keys used for AES-XTS are different.
One test case uses the same key for both of the AES-XTS keys. This causes
a failure under FIP 140-2 IG A.9. Mark the test as returning a failure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
It's actually not a real issue but caused by the absence of the default case
which does not occur in reality but which makes coverity see a code path where
pkey remains unassigned.
Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1423323)
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7158)
This was originally part of SipHash_Init. However, there are cases
where there isn't any key material to initialize from when setting the
hash size, and we do allow doing so with a EVP_PKEY control. The
solution is to provide a separate hash_size setter and to use it in
the corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
Fixes#7143
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7145)
PR #3783 introduce coded to reset the server side SNI state in
SSL_do_handshake() to ensure any erroneous config time SNI changes are
cleared. Unfortunately SSL_do_handshake() can be called mid-handshake
multiple times so this is the wrong place to do this and can mean that
any SNI data is cleared later on in the handshake too.
Therefore move the code to a more appropriate place.
Fixes#7014
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7149)
Even though we already sent close_notify the server may not have recieved
it yet and could issue a CertificateRequest to us. Since we've already
sent close_notify we can't send any reasonable response so we just ignore
it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7114)
This test case is originally submitted in #6757, by Jack Lloyd. The test
case has been modified to use the a different method to set the ID when
computing the Z hash of SM2 signature.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
zero-length ID is allowed, but it's not allowed to skip the ID.
Fixes: #6534
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7113)
Check that we use an RSA certificate if an RSA key exchange ciphersuite
is being used and we have both RSA and RSA-PSS certificates configured.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7099)
Add a test to check that we create the correct number of tickets after a
TLSv1.3 PSK.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7097)
Added NIST test cases for these two as well.
Additionally deprecate the public definiton of HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK in 1.2.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6972)
Add one more unit test case
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6892)
The shared libraries are now stored as members of archives, as it is usual
on AIX. To correctly address this the custom dladdr()-implementation as
well as the dlfcn_load() routine need to be able to cope with such a
construct: libname.a(libname.so).
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kraft <Matthias.Kraft@softwareag.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6872)
We recently turned on the TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels by default.
Unfortunately we are using a very old version of the BoringSSL test
runner which uses an old draft implementation of TLSv1.3 that also
uses the downgrade sentinels by default. The two implementations do
not play well together and were causing spurious test failures. Until
such time as we update the BoringSSL test runner we disable the failing
tests:
SendFallbackSCSV
In this test the client is OpenSSL and the server is the boring test runner.
The client and server fail to negotiate TLSv1.3 because the test runner is
using an old draft TLSv1.3 version. The server does however add the
TLSv1.3->TLSv1.2 downgrade sentinel in the ServerHello random. Since we
recently turned on checking of the downgrade sentinels on the client side
this causes the connection to fail.
VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS11
In this test the test runner is the client and OpenSSL is the server. The
test modifies the supported_versions extension sent by the client to only
include TLSv1.1 (and some other spurious versions), even though the client
does actually support TLSv1.2. The server successfully selects TLSv1.1, but
adds the TLSv1.3->TLSv1.1 downgrade sentinel. This behaviour was recently
switched on by default. The test runner then checks the downgrade sentinel
and aborts the connection because it knows that it really supports TLSv1.2.
VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS1
VersionNegotiationExtension-SSL3
The same as VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS11 but for TLSv1 and SSLv3.
ConflictingVersionNegotiation
In this test the client is the test runner, and OpenSSL is the server. The
client offers TLSv1.2 in ClientHello.version, but also adds a
supported_versions extension that only offers TLSv1.1. The
supported_versions extension takes precedence and the server (correctly)
selects TLSv1.1. However it also adds the TLSv1.3->TLSv1.1 downgrade
sentinel. On the client side it knows it actually offered TLSv1.2 and so the
downgrade sentinel check fails.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
This commit destroys the free list pointers which would otherwise be
present in the returned memory blocks. This in turn helps prevent
information leakage from the secure memory area.
Note: CRYPTO_secure_malloc is not guaranteed to return zeroed memory:
before the secure memory system is initialised or if it isn't implemented.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7011)
The EFD database does not state that the "ladd-2002-it-3" algorithm
assumes X1 != 0.
Consequently the current implementation, based on it, fails to compute
correctly if the affine x coordinate of the scalar multiplication input
point is 0.
We replace this implementation using the alternative algorithm based on
Eq. (9) and (10) from the same paper, which being derived from the
additive relation of (6) does not incur in this problem, but costs one
extra field multiplication.
The EFD entry for this algorithm is at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4
and the code to implement it was generated with tooling.
Regression tests add one positive test for each named curve that has
such a point. The `SharedSecret` was generated independently from the
OpenSSL codebase with sage.
This bug was originally reported by Dmitry Belyavsky on the
openssl-users maling list:
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008540.html
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7000)
We already have SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). This just adds the SSL_CTX
equivalent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes#6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
spurious output when checking for error conditions.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6899)
The TLSv1.4 tolerance test wasn't testing what we thought it was.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
Test that a server can handle an unecrypted alert when normally the next
message is encrypted.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
In 38eca7fed0 a new check for the pem_str member of the entries of the
ASN1 method table was introduced. Because the test condition was split
into two TEST_true(...) conditions, the test outputs error diagnostics
for all entries which have pem_str != NULL. This commit joins the two
test conditions into a single condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6888)
The CRYPTO_memcmp test isn't testing the test framework.
It would seem to better belong in the sanity tests.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6878)
Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes#6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
To start with, actually set an SNI callback (copied from bssl_shim); we
weren't actually testing much otherwise (and just happened to have been
passing due to buggy libssl behavior prior to
commit 1c4aa31d79).
Also use proper C++ code for handling C strings -- when a C API
(SSL_get_servername()) returns NULL instead of a string, special-case
that instead of blindly trying to compare NULL against a std::string,
and perform the comparsion using the std::string operators instead of
falling back to pointer comparison.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6792)
The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.
Fixes#6600
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)
The GOST ciphers are dynamically loaded via the GOST engine, so we must
be able to support that. The engine also uses DSA and CMS symbols, so we
skip the test on no-dsa or no-cms.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6730)
and catch corner cases better and earlier
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
Fix the NULL check lack in a different way that is more compatible with
non-NULL branch. Refer #6632
Also mark and pop the error stack instead of clearing all errors when something
goes awry in CONF_get_number.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6643)
The problematic case falls back to a NULL conf which returns the result
of getenv(2). If this returns NULL, everything was good. If this returns
a string an attempt to convert it to a number is made using the function
pointers from conf.
This fix uses the strtol(3) function instead, we don't have the
configuration settings and this behaves as the default would.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6632)
This also adds the ability to control this through s_server
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6469)
1. For every named curve, two "golden" keypair positive tests.
2. Also two "golden" stock ECDH positive tests.
3. For named curves with non-trivial cofactors, additionally two "golden"
ECC CDH positive tests.
4. For named curves with non-trivial cofactors, additionally two negative
tests.
There is some overlap with existing EVP tests, especially for the NIST
curves (for example, positive testing ECC CDH KATs for NIST curves).
"Golden" here means all the values are independent from OpenSSL's ECC
code. I used sage to calculate them. What comes from OpenSSL is:
1. The OIDs (parsed by tooling)
2. The curve parameters (parsing ecparam output with tooling)
The values inside the PEMs (private keys, public keys) and shared keys
are from sage. The PEMs themselves are the output of asn1parse, with
input taken from sage.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6608)
Currently if you encounter application data while waiting for a
close_notify from the peer, and you have called SSL_shutdown() then
you will get a -1 return (fatal error) and SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL from
SSL_get_error(). This isn't accurate (it should be SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
isn't persistent (you can call SSL_shutdown() again and it might then work).
We change this into a proper fatal error that is persistent.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
In the case where we are shutdown for writing and awaiting a close_notify
back from a subsequent SSL_shutdown() call we skip over handshake data
that is received. This should not be treated as an error - instead it
should be signalled with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Fix prototype warnings triggered by -Wstrict-prototypes when configuring
with `enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128`
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6556)
(introduced by commit 9186016582, which added -Wstrict-prototypes)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6555)
Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6443)
