RT4386: Add sanity checks for BN_new()
RT4384: Missing Sanity Checks for RSA_new_method()
RT4384: Missing Sanity Check plus potential NULL pointer deref
RT4382: Missing Sanity Check(s) for BUF_strdup()
RT4380: Missing Sanity Checks for EVP_PKEY_new()
RT4377: Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference
RT4375: Missing sanity checks for OPENSSL_malloc()
RT4374: Potential for NULL pointer dereferences
RT4371: Missing Sanity Check for malloc()
RT4370: Potential for NULL pointer dereferences
Also expand tabs, make update, typo fix (rsalz)
Minor tweak by Paul Dale.
Some minor internal review feedback.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.
A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
we also reject the new record.
If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
is in line with the newly received sequence number.
Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
currently in a handshake/renegotiation.
This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
dropped causing a denial of service.
A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
issue isn't addressed here though.
This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.
CVE-2016-2181
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Injects a record from epoch 1 during epoch 0 handshake, with a record
sequence number in the future, to test that the record replay protection
feature works as expected. This is described more fully in the next commit.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.
Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
buffered records if we've not got any data left.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add a test to inject a record from the next epoch during the handshake and
make sure it doesn't get processed immediately.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Apply a limit to the maximum blob length which can be read in do_d2i_bio()
to avoid excessive allocation.
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 66bcba1457)
If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause
BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting
in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing.
Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes
don't overflow buffer.
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
CVE-2016-2182
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07bed46f33)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_print.c
Thanks to Hanno Böck for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 39a4328031)
Conflicts:
crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c
Fix error path leaks in a2i_ASN1_STRING(), a2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and
a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED().
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting these issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20fc103f78)
Conflicts:
include/openssl/ts.h
Because proxy certificates typically come without any CRL information,
trying to check revocation on them will fail. Better not to try
checking such information for them at all.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 790555d675)
Use correct length in old ASN.1 indefinite length sequence decoder
(only used by SSL_SESSION).
This bug was discovered by Hanno Böck using libfuzzer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e032117db2)
If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.
RT#4615
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 626aa24849)
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acce3)
There are two failure cases for OCSP_request_add_id():
1. OCSP_ONEREQ_new() failure, where |cid| is not freed
2. sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_push() failure, where |cid| is freed
This changes makes the error behavior consistent, such that |cid| is
not freed when sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_push() fails. OpenSSL only takes
ownership of |cid| when the function succeeds.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1289)
(cherry picked from commit 415e7c488e)
The ASN.1 BIGNUM type needs to be handled in a custom way as it is
not a generic ASN1_STRING type.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3cea73a7fc)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
We shouldn't allow both "-tls1" and "-tls1_2", or "-tls1" and "-no_tls1_2".
The only time multiple flags are allowed is where they are all "-no_<prot>".
This fixes Github Issue #1268
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
cryptodev engine is initialized together with the other engines in
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines. The initialization done through
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms is redundant.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
We calculate the size required for the ServerKeyExchange message and then
call BUF_MEM_grow_clean() on the buffer. However we fail to take account of
2 bytes required for the signature algorithm and 2 bytes for the signature
length, i.e. we could overflow by 4 bytes. In reality this won't happen
because the buffer is pre-allocated to a large size that means it should be
big enough anyway.
Addresses an OCAP Audit issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
