Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 8bfd4c659f)
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681)
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bcc)
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a)
Reported by: Phil Pennock <openssl-dev@spodhuis.org>
Make renegotiation work for TLS 1.2, 1.1 by not using a lower record
version client hello workaround if renegotiating.
Some servers hang when presented with a client hello record length exceeding
255 bytes but will work with longer client hellos if the TLS record version
in client hello does not exceed TLS v1.0. Unfortunately this doesn't fix all
cases...
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Setting SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS should be ignored for DTLS, but instead causes
the program to crash. This is due to missing version checks and is fixed with
this patch.
checking added, SHA256 PRF support added.
At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2 as the
new signature format is not yet implemented.
Also, add missing CHANGES entry for CVE-2009-3245 (code changes submitted to this branch on 23 Feb 2010),
and further harmonize this version of CHANGES with the versions in the current branches.
Submitted by: steve@openssl.org
More robust fix and workaround for PR#1949. Don't try to work out if there
is any write pending data as this can be unreliable: always flush.
offending record queued as 'pending'. The DTLS code doesn't expect this,
and we end up hitting an OPENSSL_assert() in do_dtls1_write().
The simple fix is just _not_ to leave it queued. In DTLS, dropping
packets is perfectly acceptable -- and even preferable. If we wanted a
service with retries and guaranteed delivery, we'd be using TCP.
PR: #1703
Submitted by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Also, get rid of compile-time switch OPENSSL_NO_RELEASE_BUFFERS
because it was rather pointless (the new behavior has to be explicitly
requested by setting SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS anyway).
during "make errors" and thus during "make update".
Fix lots of bugs that util/ck_errf.pl can detect automatically.
Various others of these are still left to fix; that's why
"make update" will complain loudly when run now.
