EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec61
and
7b3ba508af
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.
This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.
Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363)
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)
If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.
For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:
openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
CVE-2015-0285
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e1b568dd24)
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 1.0.2 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c84351)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b15f876964)
The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange.
This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old
client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way,
version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work
around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS.
(From BoringSSL)
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec1af3c419)
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0ede)
The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2c7504eb)
The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 980bc1ec61)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
The same change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
9eaeef81fa2d4fd6246dc02b6203fa936a5eaf67
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3ba508af)
This ensures that it's zeroed even if the SSL object is reused
(as in ssltest.c). It also ensures that it applies to DTLS, too.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a06cd5d056)
When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.
When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.
We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3881d8106d)
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d663df2399)
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff9)
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.
OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.
This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.
(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732)
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.
PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag.
(cherry picked from commit 953c592572e8811b7956cc09fbd8e98037068b58)
Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
(cherry picked from commit bc8923b1ec)
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.
Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit ac20719d99)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
(cherry picked from commit 36086186a9)
Conflicts:
Configure
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.
This is a forward-port of commits:
4af793036ff4c93b46ed3da721dac92583270191
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
Make DTLS behave like TLS when negotiating version: record layer has
DTLS 1.0, message version is 1.2.
Tolerate different version numbers if version hasn't been negotiated
yet.
(cherry picked from commit 40088d8b81)
Check for Suite B support using method flags instead of version numbers:
anything supporting TLS 1.2 cipher suites will also support Suite B.
Return an error if an attempt to use DTLS 1.0 is made in Suite B mode.
(cherry picked from commit 4544f0a691)
Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.
As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
(cherry picked from commit c6913eeb76)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Add correct flags for DTLS 1.2, update s_server and s_client to handle
DTLS 1.2 methods.
Currently no support for version negotiation: i.e. if client/server selects
DTLS 1.2 it is that or nothing.
(cherry picked from commit c3b344e36a)
Conflicts:
apps/s_server.c
Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
(cherry picked from commit cbd64894ec)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the
DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and
sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code.
Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like
this:
some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH;
... Record creation stuff ...
set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len);
...
write_handshake_message(ssl);
Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or
in some cases has very minor differences.
By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags
and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the
code can cope with both cases.
(cherry picked from commit 173e72e64c)
