not specifying the digest both on command line and in the config file
will lead to response generation aborting with
140617514493760:error:2F098088:time stamp routines:ts_CONF_lookup_fail: \
cannot find config variable:crypto/ts/ts_conf.c:106:tsr_test::signer_digest
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8421)
(cherry picked from commit 29716a03e8)
constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend
on secret information.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8543)
(cherry picked from commit 9c0cf214e7)
So far, it only handled hash-and-algorithm pairs from TLS1.2,
now it also handles 'schemes' defined in TLS1.3 like 0x0807=ed25519 or
0x0809=rsa_pss_pss_sha256
Now it prints information in one of these formats:
... Algorithm scheme=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, security bits=128 ... TLS1.3
... Algorithm digest=SHA384, algorithm=DSA, security bits=192 ... TLS1.2
... Algorithm scheme=unknown(0x0e01), security bits=128 ... unhandled case
To implement this added three new lookup-tables: signature_tls13_scheme_list,
signature_tls12_alg_list, signature_tls12_hash_list.
Also minor changes in 'security_callback_debug', eg adding variable 'show_nm'
to indicate if we should show 'nm'.
Also coding-styles fixes from matcaswell
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8445)
(cherry picked from commit 861e45624f)
Great effort has been made to make initialization more configurable.
However, the behavior of OPENSSL_config() was lost in the process,
having it suddenly generate errors it didn't previously, which is not
how it's documented to behave.
A simple setting of default flags fixes this problem.
Fixes#8528
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8533)
(cherry picked from commit 905c9a72a7)
DSA can accept other digests other than SHA1. EC ignores the digest option
altogether.
Fixes#8425
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8432)
(cherry picked from commit 6a6d9ecd1d)
The ecdh_c array is allocated of the same size as ecdh_choices,
whose size depends on whether the support for binary curves is enabled
or not. (The same goes for ecdsa_c).
On systems without SIGALRM, ecdh_c is indexed by predefined constants
intended for representing the index of the ciphers in the ecdh_choices
array.
However, in case of NO_EC2M some of the #defined constants won't match
and would actually access the ecdh_c out-of-bounds.
Use enum instead of a macro to define the curve indexes so they're
within the bounds of the ecdh_c array.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8422)
(cherry picked from commit f5c9916742)
openssl speed doesn't take into account that the library could be
compiled without the support for the binary curves and happily uses
them, which results in EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() errors.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8422)
(cherry picked from commit d61f489b5a)
The indentation in the Configure file is currently very strange when
viewed in an editor with a tab width of four spaces, because it has
mixed tab-and-whitespace indentation, which was apparently done with
a tab width of eight spaces.
This commit converts all tabs to spaces using expand(1) with default
settings. To verify that there are only whitespace changes, use
git show --ignore-space-change <this commit>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8512)
There are some compiling errors for mips32r6 and mips64r6:
crypto/bn/bn-mips.S:56: Error: opcode not supported on this processor: mips2 (mips2) `mulu $1,$12,$7'
crypto/mips_arch.h: Assembler messages:
crypto/mips_arch.h:15: Error: junk at end of line, first unrecognized character is `&'
Signed-off-by: Hua Zhang <hua.zhang1974@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8464)
(cherry picked from commit 1b9c5f2e2f)
The secret point R can be recovered from S using the equation R = S - P.
The X and Z coordinates should be sufficient for that.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8504)
(cherry picked from commit 8a74bb5c7b)
There are two copy-paste errors in handling CTR mode. When dealing
with a 2 or 3 block tail, the code branches to the CBC decryption exit
path, rather than to the CTR exit path.
This can lead to data corruption: in the Linux kernel we have a copy
of this file, and the bug leads to corruption of the IV, which leads
to data corruption when we call the encryption function again later to
encrypt subsequent blocks.
Originally reported to the Linux kernel by Ondrej Mosnáček <omosnacek@gmail.com>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8510)
(cherry picked from commit f643deac41)
Also make various changes to bring the file into line with current coding
style.
Fixes#8456
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8457)
(cherry picked from commit 81cd023f1d)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8447)
(cherry picked from commit 3dcbb6c4a3)
The previous commit fixed an underflow that may occur in ecp_nistp521.c.
This commit adds a test for that condition. It is heavily based on an
original test harness by Billy Brumley.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
(cherry picked from commit 6855b496b2)
The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in|
from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p
(which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming
suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it
has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to
cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while
performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the
underflow is avoided.
It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the
underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow
demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve.
Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the
curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do
not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and
therefore no CVE has been assigned.
This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure
option.
With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant
help in investigating this issue.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
(cherry picked from commit 13fbce17fc)
Correctly describe the maximum IV length.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
(cherry picked from commit 27d5631236)
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected.
Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
CVE-2019-1543
Fixes#8345
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d5)
Sessions must be immutable once they can be shared with multiple threads.
We were breaking that rule by writing the ticket index into it during the
handshake. This can lead to incorrect behaviour, including failed
connections in multi-threaded environments.
Reported by David Benjamin.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8383)
(cherry picked from commit c96ce52ce2)
GNU strerror_r may return either a pointer to a string that the function
stores in buf, or a pointer to some (immutable) static string in which case
buf is unused.
In such a case we need to set buf manually.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8371)
(cherry picked from commit e3b35d2b29)
Use select to wait for /dev/random in readable state,
but do not actually read anything from /dev/random,
use /dev/urandom first.
Use linux define __NR_getrandom instead of the
glibc define SYS_getrandom, in case the kernel headers
are more current than the glibc headers.
Fixes#8215
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8251)
(cherry picked from commit 38023b87f0)
For C, -ansi is equivalent to -std=c90
For C++, -ansi is equivalent to -std=c++98
We also place -ansi in CPPFLAGS instead of the usual command line config,
to avoid getting it when linking (clang complains)
(cherry picked from commit 874f785988)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)
This makes `--strict-warnings` into a compiler pseudo-option, i.e. it
gets treated the same way as any other compiler option given on the
configuration command line, but is retroactively replaced by actual
compiler warning options, depending on what compiler is used.
This makes it easier to see in what order options are given to the
compiler from the configuration command line, i.e. this:
./config -Wall --strict-warnings
would give the compiler flags in the same order as they're given,
i.e.:
-Wall -Werror -Wno-whatever ...
instead of what we got previously:
-Werror -Wno-whatever ... -Wall
(cherry picked from commit fcee53948b)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8359)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8281)
(cherry picked from commit 54d00677f3)
Since the padlock code is an engine, the assembler is for a module,
not a library link to when building a program... there's a
distinction.
Fixes#2311
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8220)
(cherry picked from commit 88780b1c5f)
Currently SM2 shares the ameth with EC, so the current default digest
algorithm returned is SHA256. This fixes the default digest algorithm of
SM2 to SM3, which is the only valid digest algorithm for SM2 signature.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8186)
(cherry picked from commit e766f4a053)
