The aes code has been refactored into generic and algorithn specific parts,
so that most of the code can be shared.
The cipher related files have been broken up into smaller parts.
Add chunked variant of mode ciphers - aria uses this (many other ciphers will use this new code instead of the
generic code used by aes).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9451)
If these were passed NULL, the crashed with a SIGSEGV, when they
should do like all other freeing functions and become a no-op.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9650)
If ossl_method_store_add() gets called with a method that already exists
(i.e. the store has one with matching provider, nid and properties), that
method should not be stored. We do this check inside ossl_method_store_add()
because it has all the locking required to do so safely.
Fixes#9561
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9650)
Because this function affects the reference count on failure (the call
to impl_free() does this), it may as well handle incrementing it as
well to indicate the extra reference in the method store.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9650)
ossl_param_bld_push_{utf8,octet}_string() saved the constant string
pointer to a non-constant structure field, so we change that field to
a pointer to a constant. We also modify param_bld_convert() to
pretend the resulting pointer for PTR types points to a constant as
well.
Completes #9649
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9651)
Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed. Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.
This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions. However, this is no worse than the current situation.
An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence. Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process. Even one long running process will prevent this attack.
The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0. Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)
Added some missing #ifdef NO_XXX around some of the digest functions.
Renamed core_mkdigest.h to digestcommon.h
Added ERR_raise() to set/get params for digest.
Moved common code for get_params/gettable_params into digest_common.c
Renamed #defines in digestcommon.
Removed null_prov.c (It should not be needed)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9625)
Add Cleanups for gcm - based on the changes to ccm.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9280)
Avoid using functions deprecated in some libcs (e.g. uClibc-ng).
Fixes#9557
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9628)
The macros are defined in include/openssl/core_names.h and follow the
naming standard OSSL_{OPNAME}_NAME_{ALGONAME}, where {OPNAME} is the
name of the operation (such as MAC) and {ALGONAME} is the name of the
algorithm. Example: OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9635)
Fixes#9622
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9627)
When openssl/macros.h is included without openssl/opensslv.h, it can't
define OPENSSL_API_4 properly (with sufficient warnings enabled, the
compiler will complain about OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR not being defined).
The quick fix could have been to include openssl/opensslv.h in
openssl/macros.h, but that would create a nasty include loop, since
openssl/opensslv.h includes openssl/opensslconf.h, which includes
openssl/macros.h, in an order that leads back to macro check errors.
The objective is to make these headers more independent:
- openssl/opensslconf.h should really be completely independent, as it
only defines macros for configuration values. However, it needs to
include openssl/macros.h for backward compatibility reasons. We do
this at the very end, under inclusion guards.
- openssl/macros.h is changed to include openssl/opensslconf.h, so it
gets necessary configuration values to build some macros. This will
not cause an endless inclusion loop, since opensslconf.h's inclusion
of macros.h is under guard.
- openssl/opensslv.h is changed to include openssl/macros.h instead of
openssl/opensslconf.h.
Only one last piece needs to be done to make openssl/macros.h
independent from openssl/opensslv.h. We can realise that the
definition of OPENSSL_API_4 doesn't need to depend on the current
version number. There's nothing in our configuration that would have
OPENSSL_API_4 defined to 1, and if the user sets OPENSSL_API_COMPAT or
OPENSSL_API_LEVEL to a high enough value, we consider that a
deliberate and knowledgable action on their part.
Fixes#7874Fixes#9601
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9626)
Add test to evp_test_extra for ciphers (that is similiar to the digest_fetch).
Move some of the aes and gcm methods that can be shared with other ciphers into ciphers_common.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9580)
More PR's related to self test will be derived from this PR.
Note: the code removed in core_get_params() was causing a freeze since the
fips module was being loaded from a config file, which then called core_get_params()
which then tried to init the config fle again...
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9596)
Also update find-doc-nits to reject "=head1 WARNING"
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9602)
And update find-doc-nits to complain if "=head1 EXAMPLE" is found.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9602)
The find-doc-nits script only looked for EXAMPLES, not EXAMPLE.
Fix the pattern and then fix the errors that resulted.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9602)
Appease -Wstring-plus-int.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9608)
Requesting zero bytes from shake previously led to out-of-bounds write
on some platforms.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9433)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9620)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9607)
Recently, we added dispatched functions to get parameter descriptions,
and those for operation context parameters ended up being called
something_gettable_ctx_params and something_settable_ctx_params.
The corresponding dispatched functions to actually perform parameter
transfers were previously called something_ctx_get_params and
something_ctx_set_params, which doesn't quite match, so we rename them
to something_get_ctx_params and something_set_ctx_params.
An argument in favor of this name change is English, where you'd
rather say something like "set the context parameters".
This only change the libcrypto <-> provider interface.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9612)
For information processing.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
This avoids getting them confused with the MAC implementations.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
BLAKE2 MACs came with a set of new reason codes. Those talking about
lengths are consistently called PROV_R_INVALID_FOO_LENGTH, for any
name FOO. The cipher messages were briefer. In the interest of
having more humanly readable messages, we adjust the reasons used by
the ciphers (that's just IV length and key length).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
CRMF, SSKDF, TLS1_PRF and SIV are affected by this.
This also forces the need to check MAC names, which leads to storing
the names in the created methods, which affects all EVP APIs, not just
EVP_MAC. We will want that kind of information anyway (for example
for 'openssl list')... Consequently, EVP_MAC_name() is re-implemented.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Now that all our MACs have moved to the default provider, we let it
take over completely
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Instead of using evp_keccak_kmac128() and evp_keccak_kmac256(), we refer
to the hash implementation by name, and fetch it, which should get us the
implementation from providers/common/digests/sha3_prov.c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
This also moves the remaining parts of BLAKE2 digests to the default
provider, and removes the legacy EVP implementation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Quite a few adaptations are needed, most prominently the added code
to allow provider based MACs.
As part of this, all the old information functions are gone, except
for EVP_MAC_name(). Some of them will reappear later, for example
EVP_MAC_do_all() in some form.
MACs by EVP_PKEY was particularly difficult to deal with, as they
need to allocate and deallocate EVP_MAC_CTXs "under the hood", and
thereby implicitly fetch the corresponding EVP_MAC. This means that
EVP_MACs can't be constant in a EVP_MAC_CTX, as their reference count
may need to be incremented and decremented as part of the allocation
or deallocation of the EVP_MAC_CTX. It may be that other provider
based EVP operation types may need to be handled in a similar manner.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
