By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER is only set if the fips module is being built
(as opposed to being used). Since the fips module wont be built in
master this is redundant.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Update ecdsatest to use ECDSA_sign_setup and ECDSA_sign_ex, this
avoids the nonce generation which would otherwise break the test.
Reinstate ecdsatest.
This change updates 8a99cb29 to make the generation of (EC)DSA nonces
using the message digest the default. It also reverts the changes to
(EC)DSA_METHOD structure.
In addition to making it the default, removing the flag from EC_KEY
means that FIPS modules will no longer have an ABI mismatch.
This change adds the option to calculate (EC)DSA nonces by hashing the
message and private key along with entropy to avoid leaking the private
key if the PRNG fails.
Submitted by: "Andrzej Chmielowiec" <achmielowiec@enigma.com.pl>, steve@openssl.org
Approved by: steve@openssl.org
Truncate hash if it is too large: as required by FIPS 186-3.
knock-on work than expected - they've been extracted into a patch
series that can be completed elsewhere, or in a different branch,
before merging back to HEAD.
deprecate the original (numeric-only) scheme, and replace with the
CRYPTO_THREADID object. This hides the platform-specifics and should reduce
the possibility for programming errors (where failing to explicitly check
both thread ID forms could create subtle, platform-specific bugs).
Thanks to Bodo, for invaluable review and feedback.
to 'unsigned long' (ie. odd platforms/compilers), so a pointer-typed
version was added but it required portable code to check *both* modes to
determine equality. This commit maintains the availability of both thread
ID types, but deprecates the type-specific accessor APIs that invoke the
callbacks - instead a single type-independent API is used. This simplifies
software that calls into this interface, and should also make it less
error-prone - as forgetting to call and compare *both* thread ID accessors
could have led to hard-to-debug/infrequent bugs (that might only affect
certain platforms or thread implementations). As the CHANGES note says,
there were corresponding deprecations and replacements in the
thread-related functions for BN_BLINDING and ERR too.
