If a server receives an unexpected ClientHello then we may or may not
accept it. Make sure all such decisions are made in the state machine
and not in the record layer. This also removes a disparity between the
TLS and the DTLS code. The TLS code was making this decision in the
record layer, while the DTLS code was making it later.
Finally it also solves a problem where a warning alert was being sent
during tls_setup_handshake() and the function was returning a failure
return code. This is problematic because it can be called from a
transition function - which we only allow fatal errors to occur in.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5190)
The latest TLS 1.3 draft split the RSA-PSS signature schemes into
two versions that indicate the OID of the RSA key being used.
This forced us to rename the preprocessor defines for the sigalg
values, and the ssl-trace code was not adopted to match, since
it was not enabled int the default build.
Belatedly update the ssl_sigalg_tbl in the trace code to match.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5174)
The check for a duplicate value was reading one entry past
where it was supposed to, getting an uninitialized value.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5172)
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Our historical SSL{,_CTX}_set_sigalgs() APIs take an array of
NID pairs (hash and signature), and our parser for manually
specifying unified sigalgs (that do not necessarily correspond
to an actual signature+hash pair) was transiting via (the implementation
of) this historical API. The TLS 1.3 draft-23 has introduced
signature schemes that have identical signature type and hash type,
differing only in the (RSA) public key OID, which prevents
the rsa_pss_pss_* schemes from being properly identified and
sent on the wire.
To fix the issue, parse sigalg strings directly into SIGALG_LOOKUP
objects, and pass around an array of uint16 wire protocol values
instead of NID pairs. The old interface is retained for API
compatibility but will become less and less useful with time.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
We now have a split in the signature algorithms codepoint space for
whether the certificate's key is for rsaEncryption or a PSS-specific
key, which should let us get rid of some special-casing that we
previously needed to try to coax rsaEncryption keys into performing PSS.
(This will be done in a subsequent commit.)
Send the new PSS-with-PSS-specific key first in our list, so that
we prefer the new technology to the old one.
We need to update the expected certificate type in one test,
since the "RSA-PSS+SHA256" form now corresponds to a public key
of type rsaEncryption, so we should expect the server certificate
type to be just "RSA". If we want to get a server certificate
type of "RSA-PSS", we need to use a new signature algorithm
that cannot be represented as signature+hash, so add a test for that
as well.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Probably this is the CCS between the first and second ClientHellos. It
should be ignored.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
This enables sending and receiving of the TLSv1.3 cookie on the server side
as appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
This just adds the various extension functions. More changes will be
required to actually use them.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
The data argument of SSL_dane_tlsa_add is used read-only, so it
should be const.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5056)
In the case of a protocol version alert being sent by a peer the record
version number may not be what we are expecting. In DTLS records with an
unexpected version number are silently discarded. This probably isn't
appropriate for alerts, so we tolerate a mismatch in the minor version
number.
This resolves an issue reported on openssl-users where an OpenSSL server
chose DTLS1.0 but the client was DTLS1.2 only and sent a protocol_version
alert with a 1.2 record number. This was silently ignored by the server.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5018)
This avoids situations where third party client is unable to recognize
that the client certificate was issued by the same CA with name differring
only by case or insignificant characters.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4731)
Extract the RSA key using EVP_PKEY_get0. Type is checked externally to be either EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS or EVP_PKEY_RSA.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4389)
Although this is forbidden by all three(!) relevant specifications,
there seem to be multiple server implementations in the wild that
send it. Since we didn't check for unexpected extensions in any
given message type until TLS 1.3 support was added, our previous
behavior was to silently accept these extensions and pass them over
to the custom extension callback (if any). In order to avoid
regression of functionality, relax the check for "extension in
unexpected context" for this specific case, but leave the protocol
enforcment mechanism unchanged for other extensions and in other
extension contexts.
Leave a detailed comment to indicate what is going on.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4463)
A TLSv1.3 Certificate Request message was issuing a "Message length parse
error" using the -trace option to s_server/s_client.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5008)
Similar to commit 17b602802114d53017ff7894319498934a580b17(
"Remove extra `the` in SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod"), this commit removes
typos where additional 'the' have been added.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4999)
We don't keep track of the number of bytes written between in the
SSL_write_ex() call and the subsequent flush. If the flush needs to be
retried then we will have forgotten how many bytes actually got written.
The simplest solution is to just disable it for this scenario.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4802)
We'd like the first bit of early_data and the ClientHello to go in the
same TCP packet if at all possible to enable things like TCP Fast Open.
Also, if you're only going to send one block of early data then you also
don't need to worry about TCP_NODELAY.
Fixes#4783
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4802)
Variables n, d, p are no longer there.
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4894)
A third shared DRBG is added, the so called master DRBG. Its sole purpose
is to reseed the two other shared DRBGs, the public and the private DRBG.
The randomness for the master DRBG is either pulled from the os entropy
sources, or added by the application using the RAND_add() call.
The master DRBG reseeds itself automatically after a given number of generate
requests, but can also be reseeded using RAND_seed() or RAND_add().
A reseeding of the master DRBG is automatically propagated to the public
and private DRBG. This construction fixes the problem, that up to now
the randomness provided by RAND_add() was added only to the public and
not to the private DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
This commit adds comments to bio_method_st definitions where the
function pointers are defined as NULL. Most of the structs have comments
but some where missing and not all consitent.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4881)
This fixes a bug where some CCS records were written with the wrong TLS
record version.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
Flush following the CCS after an HRR. Only flush the HRR if middlebox
compat is turned off.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
Normally we flush immediately after writing the ClientHello. However if
we are going to write a CCS immediately because we've got early_data to
come, then we should move the flush until after the CCS.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
The CCS may be sent at different times based on whether or not we
sent an HRR earlier. In order to make that decision this commit
also updates things to make sure we remember whether an HRR was
used or not.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
Since we no longer do version negotiation during the processing of an HRR
we do not need the TLSv1.3 specific write transition for ClientHello
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
The new ServerHello format is essentially now the same as the old TLSv1.2
one, but it must additionally include supported_versions. The version
field is fixed at TLSv1.2, and the version negotiation happens solely via
supported_versions.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
I noticed that some of the BIO_METHOD structs are placing the name on
the same line as the type and some don't. This commit places the name
on a separate line for consistency (which looks like what the majority
do)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4878)
IF OPENSSL_init_ssl() is called with the option flag
OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, any SSL config will be handled wrongly
(i.e. there will be an attempt to load libssl_conf.so or whatever
corresponds to that on non-Unix platforms). Therefore, at least
SSL_add_ssl_module() MUST be called before OPENSSL_init_crypto() is
called. The base ssl init does that, plus adds all kinds of ciphers
and digests, which is harmless.
Fixes#4788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4792)
The check_fatal macro is supposed to only be called if we are already
expecting to be in the fatal state. The macro asserts that we are and
puts us into the fatal state if not.
This issue combined with the problem fixed in the previous commit meant
that the fuzzer detected a crash at a point in the processing when we
should have already been in the fatal state.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4847)
The recent SSL error overhaul left a case where an error occurs but
SSLfatal() is not called.
Credit to OSSfuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4847)
The most likely explanation for us ending up at this point in the code
is that we were called by the user application incorrectly - so use an
appropriate error code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Follow up from the conversion to use SSLfatal() in the state machine to
clean things up a bit more.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
We shouldn't call SSLfatal() multiple times for the same error condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Sometimes at the top level of the state machine code we know we are
supposed to be in a fatal error condition. This commit adds some sanity
checks to ensure that SSLfatal() has been called.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
This is an initial step towards using SSLfatal() everywhere. Initially in
this commit and in subsequent commits we focus on the state machine code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Typically if a fatal error occurs three things need to happen:
- Put an error on the error queue
- Send an alert
- Put the state machine into the error state
Although all 3 of these things need to be done every time we hit a fatal
error the responsibilities for doing this are distributed throughout the
code. The place where the error goes on the queue, where the alert gets
sent and where the state machine goes into the error state are almost
invariably different. It has been a common pattern to pass alert codes up
and down the stack to get the alert information from the point in the code
where the error is detected to the point in the code where the alert gets
sent.
This commit provides an SSLfatal() macro (backed by an ossl_statem_fatal
function) that does all 3 of the above error tasks. This is largely a drop
in replacement for SSLerr, but takes a couple of extra parameters (the SSL
object, and an alert code).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
This is a specific 1.1.1 change; do not squash if the chacha
prioritization code is to be backported
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)
IFF the client has ChaCha first, and server cipher priority is used,
and the new SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA_FOR_MOBILE option is used,
then reprioritize ChaCha above everything else. This way, A matching
ChaCha cipher will be selected if there is a match. If no ChaCha ciphers
match, then the other ciphers are used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)
These functions needed updates for the various state machine states that
have been added for TLSv1.3.
Fixes#4795
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4801)
SNI needs to be consistent before we accept early_data. However a
server may choose to not acknowledge SNI. In that case we have to
expect that a client may send it anyway. We change the consistency
checks so that not acknowledging is treated more a like a "wild card",
accepting any SNI as being consistent.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)
We can only send early_data if the SNI is consistent. However it is valid
for the client to set SNI and the server to not use it. This would still be
counted as consistent. OpenSSL client was being overzealous in this check
and disallowing this scenario.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
[Keep this commit separate as reminder for time overhaul.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
If SSL_read() is called with a zero length buffer, and we read a zero length
record then we should mark that record as read.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4685)
We currently increment the SSL_CTX stats.sess_accept field in
tls_setup_handshake(), which is invoked from the state machine well
before ClientHello processing would have had a chance to switch
the SSL_CTX attached to the SSL object due to a provided SNI value.
However, stats.sess_accept_good is incremented in tls_finish_handshake(),
and uses the s->ctx.stats field (i.e., the new SSL_CTX that was switched
to as a result of SNI processing). This leads to the confusing
(nonsensical) situation where stats.sess_accept_good is larger than
stats.sess_accept, as the "sess_accept" value was counted on the
s->session_ctx.
In order to provide some more useful numbers, increment
s->ctx.stats.sess_accept after SNI processing if the SNI processing
changed s->ctx to differ from s->session_ctx. To preserve the
property that any given accept is counted only once, make the
corresponding decrement to s->session_ctx.stats.sess_accept when
doing so.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
For client SSL objects and before any callbacks have had a chance
to be called, we can write the stats accesses using the session_ctx,
which makes sense given that these values are all prefixed with
"sess_".
For servers after a client_hello or servername callback has been
called, retain the existing behavior of modifying the statistics
for the current (non-session) context. This has some value,
in that it allows the statistics to be viewed on a per-vhost level.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
It is expected that SSL_CTX objects are shared across threads,
and as such we are responsible for ensuring coherent data accesses.
Aligned integer accesses ought to be atomic already on all supported
architectures, but we can be formally correct.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)
Use the newly introduced sk_TYPE_new_reserve API to simplify the
reservation of stack as creating it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4592)
Add a check for NULL return in t1_lib.c.
Since return type of ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx is pointer and unify coding
style, I changed from zero to NULL in ssl_cert.c.
Remove unnecessary space for ++.
Fix incorrect condition
Expression is always false because 'else if' condition matches previous
condition. SInce the next line of 'else if' condition has substituted
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2, the 'else if'
condition should compare with NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4562)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
The drbg's lock must be held across calls to RAND_DRBG_generate()
to prevent simultaneous modification of internal state.
This was observed in practice with simultaneous SSL_new() calls attempting
to seed the (separate) per-SSL RAND_DRBG instances from the global
rand_drbg instance; this eventually led to simultaneous calls to
ctr_BCC_update() attempting to increment drbg->bltmp_pos for their
respective partial final block, violating the invariant that bltmp_pos < 16.
The AES operations performed in ctr_BCC_blocks() makes the race window
quite easy to trigger. A value of bltmp_pos greater than 16 induces
catastrophic failure in ctr_BCC_final(), with subtraction overflowing
and leading to an attempt to memset() to zero a very large range,
which eventually reaches an unmapped page and segfaults.
Provide the needed locking in get_entropy_from_parent(), as well as
fixing a similar issue in RAND_priv_bytes(). There is also an
unlocked call to RAND_DRBG_generate() in ssl_randbytes(), but the
requisite serialization is already guaranteed by the requirements on
the application's usage of SSL objects, and no further locking is
needed for correct behavior. In that case, leave a comment noting
the apparent discrepancy and the reason for its safety (at present).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API
and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when
the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular,
RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed
on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API'
and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues,
introducing the following changes:
- Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which
facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback.
- Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the
get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by
RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG
in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current
state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller
provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding.
- Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll()
(namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based
on rand_drbg_restart().
- Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy
source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
The previous commit removed version negotiation on an HRR. However we should
still sanity check the contents of the version field.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4527)
Previously if a client received an HRR then we would do version negotiation
immediately - because we know we are going to get TLSv1.3. However this
causes a problem when we emit the 2nd ClientHello because we start changing
a whole load of stuff to ommit things that aren't relevant for < TLSv1.3.
The spec requires that the 2nd ClientHello is the same except for changes
required from the HRR. Therefore the simplest thing to do is to defer the
version negotiation until we receive the ServerHello.
Fixes#4292
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4527)
Now that we are moving to support named FFDH groups, these fields are not
ec-specific, so we need them to always be available.
This fixes the no-ec --strict-warnings build, since gcc
5.4.0-6ubuntu1~16.04.4 appears to always try to compile the static inline
functions from ssl_locl.h, even when they are not used in the current
compilation unit.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4518)
The function tls_check_curve is only called on clients and contains
almost identical functionaity to tls1_check_group_id when called from
a client. Merge the two.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4475)
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
Remove all stack headers from some includes that don't use them.
Avoid a genearic untyped stack use.
Update stack POD file to include the OPENSSL_sk_ API functions in the notes
section. They were mentioned in the name section but not defined anywhere.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4430)
Rename tls1_get_curvelist to tls1_get_grouplist, change to void as
it can never fail and remove unnecessary return value checks. Clean
up the code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Replace existing compression and groups check with two functions.
tls1_check_pkey_comp() checks a keys compression algorithms is consistent
with extensions.
tls1_check_group_id() checks is a group is consistent with extensions
and preferences.
Rename tls1_ec_nid2curve_id() to tls1_nid2group_id() and make it static.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Setup EVP_PKEY structure from a group ID in ssl_generate_param_group,
replace duplicate code with this function.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Replace tls1_ec_curve_id2nid() with tls_group_id_lookup() which returns
the TLS_GROUP_INFO for the group.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/=4412)
Instead of storing supported groups in on-the-wire format store
them as parsed uint16_t values. This simplifies handling of groups
as the values can be directly used instead of being converted.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4406)
Compilation failed due to -Werror=misleading-indentation.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4395)
Allo RSA certificate to be used for RSA-PSS signatures: this needs
to be explicit because RSA and RSA-PSS certificates are now distinct
types.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4368)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made SSL_CTX and SSL structs opaque and introduced a new
API to set the minimum and maximum protocol version for SSL_CTX with
TLS_method(). Add getters to introspect the configured versions:
int SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_get_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_get_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl);
NOTE: The getters do not resolv the version in case when the minimum or
maxium version are configured as '0' (meaning auto-select lowest and
highst version number).
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4364)
It is otherwise unclear what all the magic numbers mean.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
"Early callback" is a little ambiguous now that early data exists.
Perhaps "ClientHello callback"?
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
In OpenSSL 1.1.0, when there were no extensions added to the ServerHello,
we did not write the extension data length bytes to the end of the
ServerHello; this is needed for compatibility with old client implementations
that do not support TLS extensions (such as the default configuration of
OpenSSL 0.9.8). When ServerHello extension construction was converted
to the new extensions framework in commit
7da160b0f4, this behavior was inadvertently
limited to cases when SSLv3 was negotiated (and similarly for ClientHellos),
presumably since extensions are not defined at all for SSLv3. However,
extensions for TLS prior to TLS 1.3 have been defined in separate
RFCs (6066, 4366, and 3546) from the TLS protocol specifications, and as such
should be considered an optional protocol feature in those cases.
Accordingly, be conservative in what we send, and skip the extensions block
when there are no extensions to be sent, regardless of the TLS/SSL version.
(TLS 1.3 requires extensions and can safely be treated differently.)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4296)
This is actually not all warnings, only return values.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4297)
Move struct timeval includes into e_os.h (where the Windows ones were).
Enaure that the include is guarded canonically.
Refer #4271
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4312)
SNI and ALPN must be set to be consistent with the PSK. Otherwise this is
an error.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)
The returned ID matches with what IANA specifies (or goes on the
wire anyway, IANA notwithstanding).
Doc is added.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4107)
cryptilib.h is the second.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).
Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.
Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
The one creating the DRBG should instantiate it, it's there that we
know which parameters we should use to instantiate it.
This splits the rand init in two parts to avoid a deadlock
because when the global drbg is created it wands to call
rand_add on the global rand method.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #4268
A condition was removed by commit 1053a6e2281d; presumably it was an
unintended change. Restore the previous behavior so the get_session_cb
won't be called with zero-length session ID.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4236)
Remove GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS and osslargused.
Move socket-related things to new file internal/sockets.h; this is now
only needed by four(!!!) files. Compiles should be a bit faster.
Remove USE_SOCKETS ifdef's
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4209)
Cast arguments to the various ctype functions to unsigned char to match their
documentation.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4203)
Force non-empty padding extension.
When enabled, force the padding extension to be at least 1 byte long.
WebSphere application server cannot handle having an empty
extension (e.g. EMS/EtM) as the last extension in a client hello.
This moves the SigAlgs extension last for TLSv1.2 to avoid this
issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3921)
The existing function SSL_get_current_cipher() queries the
current session for the ciphersuite in use, but there is no way
for application code to determine what ciphersuite has been
negotiated and will be used in the future, prior to ChangeCipherState
(or the TLS 1.3 equivalent) causing the new cipher to take effect and
become visible in the session information. Expose this information
to appropriate application callbacks to use during the handshake.
The name SSL_get_pending_cipher() was chosen for compatibility with
BoringSSL's routine of that name.
Improve the note on macro implementations in SSL_get_current_cipher.pod
while here.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4070)
Commit 02f0274e8c moved ALPN processing
into an extension finalization function, as the only documented ordering
requirement from previous commits was that ALPN processing occur after
SNI processing, and SNI processing is performed before the extension
finalization step. However, it is useful for applications'
alpn_select callbacks to run after ciphersuite selection as well -- at
least one application protocol specification (HTTP/2) imposes restrictions
on which ciphersuites are usable with that protocol. Since it is generally
more preferrable to have a successful TLS connection with a default application
protocol than to fail the TLS connection and not be able to have the preferred
application protocol, it is good to give the alpn_select callback information
about the ciphersuite to be used, so that appropriate restrctions can be
enforced in application code.
Accordingly, split the ALPN handling out into a separate tls_handl_alpn()
function akin to tls_handle_status_request(), called from
tls_post_process_client_hello(). This is an alternative to resuscitating
ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(), something of an awkwward name itself.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4070)
If s->hit is set, s->session corresponds to a session created on
a previous connection, and is a data structure that is potentially
shared across other SSL objects. As such, there are thread-safety
issues with modifying the structure without taking its lock (and
of course all corresponding read accesses would also need to take
the lock as well), which have been observed to cause double-frees.
Regardless of thread-safety, the resumed session object is intended
to reflect parameters of the connection that created the session,
and modifying it to reflect the parameters from the current connection
is confusing. So, modifications to the session object during
ClientHello processing should only be performed on new connections,
i.e., those where s->hit is not set.
The code mostly got this right, providing such checks when processing
SNI and EC point formats, but the supported groups (formerly
supported curves) extension was missing it, which is fixed by this commit.
However, TLS 1.3 makes the suppported_groups extension mandatory
(when using (EC)DHE, which is the normal case), checking for the group
list in the key_share extension processing. But, TLS 1.3 only [0] supports
session tickets for session resumption, so the session object in question
is the output of d2i_SSL_SESSION(), and will not be shared across SSL
objects. Thus, it is safe to modify s->session for TLS 1.3 connections.
[0] A psk_find_session callback can also be used, but the restriction that
each callback execution must produce a distinct SSL_SESSION structure
can be documented when the psk_find_session callback documentation is
completed.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4123)
Give each SSL object it's own DRBG, chained to the parent global
DRBG which is used only as a source of randomness into the per-SSL
DRBG. This is used for all session, ticket, and pre-master secret keys.
It is NOT used for ECDH key generation which use only the global
DRBG. (Doing that without changing the API is tricky, if not impossible.)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4050)
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.
Re-order seeding and stop after first success.
Add RAND_poll_ex()
Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.
Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.
Various code cleanups:
-Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
-Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
-Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
-Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
-Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
implementation of NIST DRBG.
-Remove blocklength
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
Move the definition of ossl_assert() out of e_os.h which is intended for OS
specific things. Instead it is moved into internal/cryptlib.h.
This also changes the definition to remove the (int) cast.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4073)
The comment "The following should not return 1, otherwise, things
are very strange" is from the very first commit of OpenSSL. The
really meaning of the comment is if the identical session can be
found from internal cache after calling get_session_cb but not
found before calling get_session_cb, it is just strange.
The value 1 was originated from the old doc of SSLeay, reversed
from the actual return value of SSL_CTX_add_session().
Anyway either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() should not
interrupt the session resumption process. So the checking of
return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() is not necessary.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4014)
If a new_session_cb is set then it was only ever getting invoked if !s->hit
is true. This is sensible for <=TLSv1.2 but does not work for TLSv1.3.
Fixes#4045
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4068)
Some extensions were being displayed twice, before they were parsed, and
again after they were parsed.
The supported_versions extension was not being fully displayed, as it
was processed differently than other extensions.
Move the debug callback to where the extensions are first collected, to
catch all the extensions as they come in, so they are ordered correctly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3911)
TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO means "SSLv3/TLS read next proto"
Fix typo in the message for TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4054)
Remove the function prototypes for ssl_cert_get0_next_certificate, ssl_set_default_md, tls1_shared_list,
dtls1_send_newsession_ticket, tls1_ctrl, and tls1_callback_ctrl, all of which are not defined.
It also changed the signature of the function pqueue_next to `pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *item)` in
pqueue.c, making it match the prototype in ssl_locl.h. (`piterator *` is equivalent to `pitem **`.)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4049)
This patch removes the prototype of function RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence from record_locl.h, since this function is not defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4051)
Documentation and test cases are also updated
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3783)
OpenSSL already has the feature of SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS that can
be set to release the read or write buffers when data has finished
reading or writing. OpenSSL will automatically re-allocate the buffers
as needed. This can be quite aggressive in terms of memory allocation.
This provides a manual mechanism. SSL_free_buffers() will free
the data buffers if there's no pending data. SSL_alloc_buffers()
will realloc them; but this function is not strictly necessary, as it's
still done automatically in the state machine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2240)
Fixes: issue #3747
make SSL_CIPHER_standard_name globally available and introduce a new
function OPENSSL_cipher_name.
A new option '-convert' is also added to 'openssl ciphers' app.
Documentation and test cases are added.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3859)
We now allow a different protocol version when reusing a session so we can
unconditionally reset the SSL_METHOD if it has changed.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3954)
SSL_clear() does not reset the SSL_METHOD if a session already exists in
the SSL object. However, TLSv1.3 does not have an externally visible
version fixed method (only an internal one). The state machine assumes
that we are always starting from a version flexible method for TLSv1.3.
The simplest solution is to just fix SSL_clear() to always reset the method
if it is using the internal TLSv1.3 version fixed method.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3954)
TLSv1.3 draft-21 requires the ticket nonce to be at least 1 byte in length.
However NSS sends a zero length nonce. This is actually ok because the next
draft will allow zero length nonces anyway, so we should tolerate this.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3957)
The functiontls12_get_pkey_idx is only used to see if a certificate index is
enabled: call ssl_cert_is_disabled instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3858)
Add certificate table giving properties of each certificate index:
specifically the NID associated with the index and the the auth mask
value for any cipher the certificate can be used with.
This will be used to generalise certificate handling instead of hard coding
algorithm specific cases.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3858)
In most scenarios the length of the input data is the hashsize, or 0 if
the data is NULL. However with the new ticket_nonce changes the length can
be different.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3852)
This just adds the processing for sending and receiving the newly added
ticket_nonce field. It doesn't actually use it yet.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3852)
If the result of a SSL_{CTX_,}set_{min,max}_proto_version() call
leaves the min and max version identical, and support for that version
is compiled out of the library, return an error. Such an object has
no hope of successfully completing a handshake, and this error may
be easier to decipher than the resulting handshake failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3422)
We need to use the hashsize in generating the exportsecret not 0! Otherwise
we end up with random garbage for the secret.
It was pure chance that this passed the tests previously. It so happens
that, because we call SSL_export_keying_material() repeatedly for different
scenarios in the test, we end up in the tls13_export_keying_material() at
exactly the same position in the stack each time and therefore end up using
the same random garbage secret each time!
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3810)
There are no public TLSv1_3_*method() functions so
OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3_METHOD doesn't make any sense and should be removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3800)
Properly copy ext.alpn_session in ssl_session_dup()
Use OPENSSL_strndup() as that's used in ssl_asn1.c
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3770)
In draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 Appendix B we find that:
This section describes protocol types and constants. Values listed
as _RESERVED were used in previous versions of TLS and are listed
here for completeness. TLS 1.3 implementations MUST NOT send them
but might receive them from older TLS implementations.
Similarly, in section 4.2.3 we see:
Legacy algorithms Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated
because they use algorithms with known weaknesses, specifically
SHA-1 which is used in this context with either with RSA using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA. These values refer solely to
signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and
are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages.
Endpoints SHOULD NOT negotiate these algorithms but are permitted
to do so solely for backward compatibility. Clients offering
these values MUST list them as the lowest priority (listed after
all other algorithms in SignatureSchemeList). TLS 1.3 servers
MUST NOT offer a SHA-1 signed certificate unless no valid
certificate chain can be produced without it (see
Section 4.4.2.2).
However, we are currently sending the SHA2-based DSA signature schemes
and many SHA1-based schemes, which is in contradiction with the specification.
Because TLS 1.3 support will appear in OpenSSL 1.1, we are bound by
stability requirements to continue to offer the DSA signature schemes
and the deprecated hash algorithms. at least until OpenSSL 1.2.
However, for pure TLS 1.3 clients that do not offer lower TLS versions,
we can be compliant. Do so, and leave a note to revisit the issue when
we are permitted to break with sacred historical tradition.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3326)
Following on from the previous commit this fixes another instance where
we need to treat a -ve return from EVP_DigestVerify() as a bad signature.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3756)
Prior to 72ceb6a we treated all failures from the call to
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() as if it were a bad signature, and failures in
EVP_DigestUpdate() as an internal error. After that commit we replaced
this with the one-shot function EVP_DigestVerify() and treated a 0 return
as a bad signature and a negative return as an internal error. However,
some signature errors can be negative (e.g. according to the docs if the
form of the signature is wrong). Therefore we should treat all <=0
returns as a bad signature.
This fixes a boringssl test failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3756)
Per RFC 7905, the cipher suite names end in "_SHA256". The original
implementation targeted the -03 draft, but there was a -04 draft right
before the RFC was published to make the names consistent.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3748)
initialize some local variables
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3741)
The value of BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was clashing with the value for
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. In an SCTP enabled build
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE was used unconditionally with
the reasoning that it would be ignored if SCTP wasn't in use. Unfortunately
due to this clash, this wasn't the case. The BIO ended up going into peek
mode and was continually reading the same data over and over - throwing it
away as a replay.
Fixes#3723
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3724)
