An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.
Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.
User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2105
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.
Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.
The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()
i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.
The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.
Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.
It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.
CVE-2016-2106
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 15 15:19:44 2016 +0100
This commit updates the documentation of cms, ocsp, s_client,
s_server, and verify to reflect the new "-no_check_time"
option introduced in commit d35ff2c0ad
on 2015-07-31.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake,
but simply omit/skip that extension.
Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo
registration.
Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the
same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is used to indicate
that there's a local directory with extra configuration files.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Fix some of the variables to be (s)size_t, so that more than 1GB of
secure memory can be allocated. The arena has to be a power of 2, and
2GB fails because it ends up being a negative 32-bit signed number.
The |too_late| flag is not strictly necessary; it is easy to figure
out if something is secure memory by looking at the arena. As before,
secure memory allocations will not fail, but now they can be freed
correctly. Once initialized, secure memory can still be used, even if
allocations occured before initialization.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Usage of $ymm variable is a bit misleading here, it doesn't refer
to %ymm register bank, but rather to VEX instruction encoding,
which AMD XOP code path depends on.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The srp application created an uninitialised DB_ATTR object and then
passed it to the load_index function which attempted to read it. A
DB_ATTR object only contains a single field called "unique_subject".
AFAICT this attribute is unused in the SRP case, and therefore it would be
better to pass a NULL DB_ATTR to load_index (which handles that case
gracefully).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We should only copy parameters and keys if the group is set. Otherwise
they don't really make any sense. Previously we copied the private key
regardless of whether the group was set...but if it wasn't a NULL ptr
deref could occur. It's unclear whether we could ever get into that
situation, but since we were already checking it for the public key we
should be consistent.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The length is a long, so returning the difference does not quite work.
Thanks to Torbjörn Granlund for noticing.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The non-ascii version of this set of macros ensures that the "a" variable
is inside the expected range. This logic wasn't quite right for the
EBCDIC version.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Building with -DCHARSET_EBCDIC and using --strict-warnings resulted in
lots of miscellaneous errors. This fixes it.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
When compiling all other C files, rely on the compiler to
automatically pick up the name translation information from the header
files __DECC_INCLUDE_{PRO,EPI}LOGUE.H.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
With DEC C on VMS, you can use __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and
__DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H to include some DEC C specific features or
pragmas without having to touch the other header files.
It seems, however, that the current version of the compiler requires
the file names to be upcased, or it doesn't handle them quite right.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Currently we can get all block ciphers with
EVP_get_cipherbyname("<alg_name>-<block-mode-name>")
for example, by names "aes-128-ecb" or "des-ede-cbc".
I found a problem with des-ede-ecb and des-ede3-ecb ciphers as
they can be accessed only with names:
EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede")
EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede3")
It breaks the general concept.
In this patch I add aliases which allow to use names:
EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede-ecb")
EVP_get_cipherbyname("des-ede3-ecb")
in addition to the currently used names.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
