Currently the Configure command only supports passing UNIX style
options (`-opt`) to the compiler. Passing Windows style options
(`/opt`) yields an error. Fortunately, the compiler accepts both
types of options, nevertheless this commit fixes that discrimination
of Windows users.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9961)
(cherry picked from commit f246f54f18d380791cc60be4aea0fbc7253a9a20)
On systems with undefined AI_ADDRCONFIG and AI_NUMERICHOST:
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -I. -Icrypto/include -Iinclude -m64 -Wall -O3 -fno-ident ...
crypto/bio/b_addr.c: In function 'BIO_lookup_ex':
crypto/bio/b_addr.c:699:7: warning: label 'retry' defined but not used [-Wunused-label]
retry:
^~~~~
Regression from: 3f91ede9ae
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9856)
(cherry picked from commit be66a15cc1a4c3cc68fa854ceea321ca57f96304)
Fixes#9869
CLA:trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9878)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10101)
(cherry picked from commit 120cc034271e9ab52f92840a16784228e50564f9)
The decryption failed alert was deprecated a long time ago. It can
provide an attacker too much information to be able to distinguish between
MAC failures and decryption failures and can lead to oracle attacks.
Instead we should always use the bad_record_mac alert for these issues.
This fixes one instance that still exists. It does not represent a
security issue in this case because it is only ever sent if the record is
publicly invalid, i.e. we have detected it is invalid without using any
secret material.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10093)
(cherry picked from commit 37133290832ac2d1389926eba7325125fdacbe8d)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10105)
(cherry picked from commit 89e5aaa1d72058404d3ea06bfaeff5334aba202d)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9653)
(cherry picked from commit e7c27a6c3716843f8412fd96311b70ac84b785f9)
Because we have cases where basic assembler support isn't present, but
AESNI asssembler support is, we need a separate macro that indicates
that, and use it.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10080)
Suggested by Matt Hart
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10084)
(cherry picked from commit f1d1903dd3dd1d68a5eae190b8c2a88bfe0a68ac)
Mention that EVP_DigestInit() also clears all flags.
Fixes: 10031
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10032)
(cherry picked from commit 091aab66a6dbc3a3ecee7684aa30811b342f04e7)
According to RFC8446 CertificateEntry in Certificate message contains
extensions that were not present in the Certificate message in RFC5246.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9994)
(cherry picked from commit 65c76cd2c9e8da9468dd490b334e56c51dbef582)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10029)
(cherry picked from commit 648b53b88ea55b4c2f2c8c57d041075731db5f95)
Although the synopsis used the correct function names, the description did
not. Also the description of the equivalent DTLSv1_listen() callbacks was
missing, so these have been added.
Fixes#10030
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10033)
(cherry picked from commit 84f471ecab76a16281a16c53d259bbcae358816f)
Several EVP_PKEY_xxxx functions return 0 and a negative value for
indicating errors. Some places call these functions with a zero return
value check only, which misses the check for the negative scenarios.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10055)
(cherry picked from commit 7e3ae24832e0705583b1471febf3dc0eb1cc021f)
Those functions returns less than and equal to 0 to indicate an error
occured.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10054)
(cherry picked from commit 94bd168a9e31d1ab4986e94056dfae71ec5f051f)
This script contains all adjustments to header files which were made
during the reorganization of the header files. It is meant as an aid
for other contributors which encounter preprocessor #include errors
after rebasing over this pull request. Simply running
util/fix-includes
from the root of the source directory should hopefully fix the problem.
Note: such #include errors are expected only for pull requests which
add a lot of new code, in particular new compilation modules.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below
The public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory) are not changed
in 1.1.1, because it is a stable release.
For the private header files files, the guard names try to match the path
specified in the include directives, with all letters converted to upper case
and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. An extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
They were documented to take an EVP_MD pointer, when they really take
an EVP_MD_CTX pointer.
Fixes#9993
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9997)
Found by OSS-Fuzz
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #9959
(cherry picked from commit a6105ef40d65b35818f2b8ae8ca9e57ca6956d1d)
Currently the pkcs12 app will only ever print the first value of a multi-value
attribute. This is OK for some attributes (e.g. friendlyName, localKeyId) but
may miss values for other attributes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9751)
(cherry picked from commit dbcc7b45670483cc89428afe1d3c363ef83d76df)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9894)
(cherry picked from commit 64c1e74572f16a3e7c225f66fe85a3451ad39e68)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9812)
(cherry picked from commit bd9faf117db1e53b2ad2ee9cbfe8def8c98ecb7b)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9833)
(cherry picked from commit f28bc7d386b25fb75625d0c62c6b2e6d21de0d09)
There can be data to write in output buffer and data to read that were
not yet read in the input stream.
Fixes#9866
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9877)
(cherry picked from commit 6beb8b39ba8e4cb005c1fcd2586ba19e17f04b95)
An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
Due to the dynamic allocation that was added to rand_pool_add_begin
this function could now return a null pointer where it was previously
guaranteed to succeed. But the return value of this function does
not need to be checked by design.
Move rand_pool_grow from rand_pool_add_begin to rand_pool_bytes_needed.
Make an allocation error persistent to avoid falling back to less secure
or blocking entropy sources.
Fixes: a6a66e4511 ("Make rand_pool buffers more dynamic in their sizing.")
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9687)
(cherry picked from commit fa3eb248e29ca8031e6a14e8a2c6f3cd58b5450e)
There was a warning about unused variables in this config:
./config --strict-warnings --with-rand-seed=rdcpu
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9687)
(cherry picked from commit e301c147a763f67dcc5ba63eb7e2ae40d83a68aa)
Since commit 7c226dfc43 a chained DRBG does not add additional
data anymore when reseeding from its parent. The reason is that
the size of the additional data exceeded the allowed size when
no derivation function was used.
This commit provides an alternative fix: instead of adding the
entire DRBG's complete state, we just add the DRBG's address
in memory, thereby providing some distinction between the different
DRBG instances.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
Provides a little extra fork-safety on UNIX systems, adding to the
fact that all DRBGs reseed automatically when the fork_id changes.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd0, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.
This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.
To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.
CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
