RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy
conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance
of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with
RAND_bytes().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
A common idiom in the codebase is:
if (p + len > limit)
{
return; /* Too long */
}
Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
limit == p + SIZE
"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
message).
The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
undefined behaviour.
For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2177
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur.
Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
It makes no sense to call the OCSP status callback if we are resuming a
session because no certificates will be sent.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ac6239955)
If a server sends the status_request extension then it may choose
to send the CertificateStatus message. However this is optional.
We were treating it as mandatory and the connection was failing.
Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.
RT#4120
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 905943af3b)
There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56d9134675)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Some extension handling functions were passing in a pointer to the start
of the data, plus the length in order to calculate the end, rather than
just passing in the end to start with. This change makes things a little
more readable.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable
|size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c89d29083)
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f8e4e4f52)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/e_des3.c
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 1.0.1 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
ssl/tls1.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c84351)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 47606dda67)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves
of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length
lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds
read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released
versions of OpenSSL are not affected.
Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33d5ba8629)
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0ede)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
ssl/s3_srvr.c
This ensures that it's zeroed even if the SSL object is reused
(as in ssltest.c). It also ensures that it applies to DTLS, too.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a06cd5d056)
CVE-2014-3513
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an origi
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the i
was performed by the OpenSSL team.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add TLS padding extension to SSL_OP_ALL so it is used with other
"bugs" options and can be turned off.
This replaces SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG which is an ancient
option referring to SSLv2 and SSLREF.
PR#3336
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
Since the TLS 1.2 supported signature algorithms extension is less
sophisticaed in OpenSSL 1.0.1 this has to be done in two stages.
RSA+MD5 is removed from supported signature algorithms extension:
any compliant implementation should never use RSA+MD5 as a result.
To cover the case of a broken implementation using RSA+MD5 anyway
disable lookup of MD5 algorithm in TLS 1.2.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
change the current certificate (in s->cert->key) to the one used and then
SSL_get_certificate and SSL_get_privatekey will automatically work.
Note for 1.0.1 and earlier also includes backport of the function
ssl_get_server_send_pkey.
