Previously TLSProxy would detect a successful handshake once it saw the
server Finished message. This causes problems with abbreviated handshakes,
or if the client fails to process a message from the last server flight.
This change additionally sends some application data and finishes when the
client sends a CloseNotify.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
A DTLS client will abort a handshake if the server attempts to renew the
session ticket. This is caused by a state machine discrepancy between DTLS
and TLS discovered during the state machine rewrite work.
The bug can be demonstrated as follows:
Start a DTLS s_server instance:
openssl s_server -dtls
Start a client and obtain a session but no ticket:
openssl s_client -dtls -sess_out session.pem -no_ticket
Now start a client reusing the session, but allow a ticket:
openssl s_client -dtls -sess_in session.pem
The client will abort the handshake.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add DSA tests.
Add tests to verify signatures against public keys. This will also check
that a public key is read in correctly.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
L<foo|foo> is sub-optimal If the xref is the same as the title,
which is what we do, then you only need L<foo>. This fixes all
1457 occurrences in 349 files. Approximately. (And pod used to
need both.)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Commit 9ceb2426b0 (PACKETise ClientHello) broke session tickets by failing
to detect the session ticket extension in an incoming ClientHello. This
commit fixes the bug.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
- select an actual file handle for devnull
- do not declare $msgdata twice
- SKE records sometimes seem to come without sig
- in SKE parsing, use and use $pub_key_len when parsing $pub_key
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Enhance the PACKET code readability, and fix a stale comment. Thanks
to Ben Kaduk (bkaduk@akamai.com) for pointing this out.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
This was obsolete in 2001. This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When config'd with "sctp" running "make test" causes a seg fault. This is
actually due to the way ssltest works - it dives under the covers and frees
up BIOs manually and so some BIOs are NULL when the SCTP code does not
expect it. The simplest fix is just to add some sanity checks to make sure
the BIOs aren't NULL before we use them.
This problem occurs in master and 1.0.2. The fix has also been applied to
1.0.1 to keep the code in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
There are some missing return value checks in the SCTP code. In master this
was causing a compilation failure when config'd with
"--strict-warnings sctp".
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Use a dynamic engine for ossltest engine so that we can build it without
subsequently deploying it during install. We do not want people accidentally
using this engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add ServerHello parsing to TLSProxy.
Also add some (very) limited ServerKeyExchange parsing.
Add the capability to set client and server cipher lists
Fix a bug with fragment lengths
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Two tests are added: one is a simple version tolerance test; the second is
a test to ensure that OpenSSL operates correctly in the case of a zero
length extensions block. The latter was broken inadvertently (now fixed)
and it would have been helpful to have a test case for it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit provides a set of perl modules that support the testing of
libssl. The test harness operates as a man-in-the-middle proxy between
s_server and s_client. Both s_server and s_client must be started using the
"-testmode" option which loads the new OSSLTEST engine.
The test harness enables scripts to be written that can examine the packets
sent during a handshake, as well as (potentially) modifying them so that
otherwise illegal handshake messages can be sent.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
