This engine is for testing purposes only. It provides crippled crypto
implementations and therefore must not be used in any instance where
security is required.
This will be used by the forthcoming libssl test harness which will operate
as a man-in-the-middle proxy. The test harness will be able to modify
TLS packets and read their contents. By using this test engine packets are
not encrypted and MAC codes always verify.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The function BN_MONT_CTX_set was assuming that the modulus was non-zero
and therefore that |mod->top| > 0. In an error situation that may not be
the case and could cause a seg fault.
This is a follow on from CVE-2015-1794.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)
The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.
CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
make errors wants things in a different order to the way things are
currently defined in the header files. The easiest fix is to just let it
reorder it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add Host Header in OCSP query if no host header is set via -header
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
We could just initialize it, but to be consistent with the rest of the file
it seemed to make more sense to just drop.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This reverts commit 704563f04a.
Reverting in favour of the next commit which removes the underlying cause
of the warning.
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
--strict-warnings started showing warnings for this today...
Surely an error should be raised if these reads fail?
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The -use_srtp s_client/s_server option is supposed to take a colon
separated string as an argument. In master this was incorrectly set to
expect a filename.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Some of the PACKET functions were returning incorrect data. An unfortunate
choice of test data in the unit test was masking the failure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates was using some variables that only
apply if OPENSSL_NO_EC2M is not defined.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The move of CCS into the state machine introduced a bug in ssl3_read_bytes.
The value of |recvd_type| was not being set if we are satisfying the request
from handshake fragment storage. This can occur, for example, with
renegotiation and causes the handshake to fail.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Continuing on from the previous commit this moves the processing of DTLS
CCS messages out of the record layer and into the state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Provide more robust (inline) functions to replace n2s, n2l, etc. These
functions do the same thing as the previous macros, but also keep track
of the amount of data remaining and return an error if we try to read more
data than we've got.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Commit e481f9b90b removed OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT from the code.
Previously if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT *was not* defined then the server random was
filled during getting of the ClientHello. If it *was* defined then the
server random would be filled in ssl3_send_server_hello(). Unfortunately in
commit e481f9b90b the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT guards were removed but *both*
server random fillings were left in. This could cause problems for session
ticket callbacks.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Thanks folks:
348 Benjamin Kaduk
317 Christian Brueffer
254 Erik Tews
253 Erik Tews
219 Carl Mehner
155 (ghost)
95 mancha
51 DominikNeubauer
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
