We need to ensure that the min-max version range we use when constructing
the ClientHello is the same range we use when we validate the version
selected by the ServerHello. Otherwise this may appear as a fallback or
downgrade.
Fixes#6964
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
The TLS-1.3 ciphersuites must not be blocked by @SECLEVEL=3 even
though they are not explicitly marked as using DH/ECDH.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6959)
We already have SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). This just adds the SSL_CTX
equivalent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes#6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
A client that has fallen back could detect an inappropriate fallback if
the TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinels are present.
Fixes#6756
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6894)
At certain points in the handshake we could receive either a plaintext or
an encrypted alert from the client. We should tolerate both where
appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
If we sent early_data and then received back an HRR, the enc_write_ctx
was stale resulting in errors if an alert needed to be sent.
Thanks to Quarkslab for reporting this.
In any case it makes little sense to encrypt alerts using the
client_early_traffic_secret, so we add special handling for alerts sent
after early_data. All such alerts are sent in plaintext.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6887)
Under certain error conditions a call to SSLfatal could accidently be
missed.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6872)
In some cases it's about redundant check for return value, in some
cases it's about replacing check for -1 with comparison to 0.
Otherwise compiler might generate redundant check for <-1. [Even
formatting and readability fixes.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6860)
In some scenarios the connection could fail without an alert being sent.
This causes a later assertion failure.
Thanks to Quarkslab for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6852)
Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes#6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
Commit 1c4aa31d79 changed how we process
and store SNI information during the handshake, so that a hostname is
only saved in the SSL_SESSION structure if that SNI value has actually
been negotiated. SSL_get_servername() was adjusted to match, with a new
conditional being added to handle the case when the handshake processing
is ongoing, and a different location should be consulted for the offered
SNI value. This was done in an attempt to preserve the historical
behavior of SSL_get_servername(), a function whose behavior only mostly
matches its documentation, and whose documentation is both lacking and
does not necessarily reflect the actual desired behavior for such an
API. Unfortunately, sweeping changes that would bring more sanity to
this space are not possible until OpenSSL 1.2.0, for ABI compatibility
reasons, so we must attempt to maintain the existing behavior to the
extent possible.
The above-mentioned commit did not take into account the behavior
of SSL_get_servername() during resumption handshakes for TLS 1.2 and
prior, where no SNI negotiation is performed. In that case we would
not properly parse the incoming SNI and erroneously return NULL as
the servername, when instead the logical session is associated with
the SNI value cached in the SSL_SESSION. (Note that in some cases an
SNI callback may not need to do anything in a TLS 1.2 or prior resumption
flow, but we are calling the callbacks and did not provide any guidance
that they should no-op if the connection is being resumed, so we must
handle this case in a usable fashion.) Update our behavior accordingly to
return the session's cached value during the handshake, when resuming.
This fixes the boringssl tests.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6792)
The API used to set what SNI value to send in the ClientHello
can also be used on server SSL objects, with undocumented and
un-useful behavior. Unfortunately, when generic SSL_METHODs
are used, s->server is still set, prior to the start of the
handshake, so we cannot prevent this nonsensical usage at the
present time. Leave a note to revisit this when ABI-breaking
changes are permitted.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
In particular, adhere to the rule that we must not modify any
property of an SSL_SESSION object once it is (or might be) in
a session cache. Such modifications are thread-unsafe and have
been observed to cause crashes at runtime.
To effect this change, standardize on the property that
SSL_SESSION->ext.hostname is set only when that SNI value
has been negotiated by both parties for use with that session.
For session resumption this is trivially the case, so only new
handshakes are affected.
On the client, the new semantics are that the SSL->ext.hostname is
for storing the value configured by the caller, and this value is
used when constructing the ClientHello. On the server, SSL->ext.hostname
is used to hold the value received from the client. Only if the
SNI negotiation is successful will the hostname be stored into the
session object; the server can do this after it sends the ServerHello,
and the client after it has received and processed the ServerHello.
This obviates the need to remove the hostname from the session object
in case of failed negotiation (a change that was introduced in commit
9fb6cb810b in order to allow TLS 1.3
early data when SNI was present in the ClientHello but not the session
being resumed), which was modifying cached sessions in certain cases.
(In TLS 1.3 we always produce a new SSL_SESSION object for new
connections, even in the case of resumption, so no TLS 1.3 handshakes
were affected.)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
These tiny functions only read from the input SSL, and we are
about to use them from functions that only have a const SSL* available,
so propagate const a bit further.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.
Fixes#6600
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)
Using the rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 sig alg should imply that the key OID is
rsaEncryption. Similarly rsa_pss_pss_sha256 implies the key OID is
rsassaPss. However we did not check this and incorrectly tolerated a key
OID that did not match the sig alg sent by the peer.
Fixes#6611
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6732)
If we issue new tickets due to post-handshake authentication there is no
reason to remove previous tickets from the cache. The code that did that
only removed the last session anyway - so if more than one ticket got
issued then those other tickets are still valid.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6722)
Check that we are either configured for PSK, or that we have a TLSv1.3
capable certificate type. DSA certs can't be used in TLSv1.3 and we
don't (currently) allow GOST ones either (owing to the lack of standard
sig algs).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6650)
Previoulsy we just had max_early_data which controlled both the value of
max early_data that we advertise in tickets *and* the amount of early_data
that we are willing to receive from clients. This doesn't work too well in
the case where we want to reduce a previously advertised max_early_data
value. In that case clients with old, stale tickets may attempt to send us
more early data than we are willing to receive. Instead of rejecting the
early data we abort the connection if that happens.
To avoid this we introduce a new "recv_max_early_data" value. The old
max_early_data becomes the value that is advertised in tickets while
recv_max_early_data is the maximum we will tolerate from clients.
Fixes#6647
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6655)
In TLSv1.2 and below we should remove an old session from the client
session cache in the event that we receive a new session ticket from the
server.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6601)
This also adds the ability to control this through s_server
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6469)
We need to check the provided SSL_SESSION* for NULL before
attempting to derference it to see if it's a TLS 1.3 session.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6622)
Currently if you encounter application data while waiting for a
close_notify from the peer, and you have called SSL_shutdown() then
you will get a -1 return (fatal error) and SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL from
SSL_get_error(). This isn't accurate (it should be SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
isn't persistent (you can call SSL_shutdown() again and it might then work).
We change this into a proper fatal error that is persistent.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
In the case where we are shutdown for writing and awaiting a close_notify
back from a subsequent SSL_shutdown() call we skip over handshake data
that is received. This should not be treated as an error - instead it
should be signalled with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
If we've sent a close_notify and we're waiting for one back we drop
incoming records until we see the close_notify we're looking for. If
SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is on, then we should immediately try and read the
next record.
Fixes#6262
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
During anti-replay we cache the ticket anyway, so there is no point in
using a full stateless ticket.
Fixes#6391
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Separate out as a new function the code to write out data which is specific
to a stateless ticket.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Sessions should be immutable once they are in the cache because they could
be shared with other threads. If you change them then this can cause
corruptions and races
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6561)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
An alpn_selected value containing NUL bytes in it will result in
ext.alpn_selected_len having a larger value than the number of bytes
allocated in ext.alpn_selected.
Issue found by OSS-fuzz.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6507)
Commit 4aa5a5669 accidentally missed off the catch all case of ignoring all
warning alerts that are otherwise unhandled. This breaks the SSLv3 tests
which send a "no certificate" warning alert.
Fixes#6496
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6509)
TLSv1.3 ignores the alert level, so we should suppress sending of
warning only alerts.
Fixes#6211
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6370)
In TLSv1.3 we should ignore the severity level of an alert according to
the spec.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6370)
If the remove_session_cb accesses the session's data (for instance,
via SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version), a potential use after free
can occur. For this, consider the following scenario when adding
a new session via SSL_CTX_add_session:
- The session cache is full
(SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
- Only the session cache has a reference to ctx->session_cache_tail
(that is, ctx->session_cache_tail->references == 1)
Since the cache is full, remove_session_lock is called to remove
ctx->session_cache_tail from the cache. That is, it
SSL_SESSION_free()s the session, which free()s the data. Afterwards,
the free()d session is passed to the remove_session_cb. If the callback
accesses the session's data, we have a use after free.
The free before calling the callback behavior was introduced in
commit e4612d02c5 ("Remove sessions
from external cache, even if internal cache not used.").
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6222)
We generate the secrets based on the nonce immediately so there is no
need to keep the nonce.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6415)
All tickets on a connection need to have a unique nonce. When this was
originally implemented we only ever sent one ticket on the conneciton so
this didn't matter. We were just using the value 0. Now we can get multiple
tickets to we need to start doing the ticket nonce properly.
Fixes#6387
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6415)
The TLSv1.3 spec requires us to use the client application traffic secret
during generation of the Finished message following a post handshake
authentication.
Fixes#6263
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6297)
Because TLS 1.3 sends more non-application data records some clients run
into problems because they don't expect SSL_read() to return and set
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ after processing it.
This can cause problems for clients that use blocking I/O and use
select() to see if data is available. It can be cleared using
SSL_CTX_clear_mode().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #6260
NULL-check for cipher is redundant, instead check if cipher->name is NULL
While here fix formatting of BIO_printf calls as suggested by Andy Polyakov.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6282)
In TLSv1.2 and below we always cache new sessions by default on the server
side in the internal cache (even when we're using session tickets). This is
in order to support resumption from a session id.
In TLSv1.3 there is no session id. It is only possible to resume using the
ticket. Therefore, in the default case, there is no point in caching the
session in the internal store.
There is still a reason to call the external cache new session callback
because applications may be using the callbacks just to know about when
sessions are created (and not necessarily implementing a full cache). If
the application also implements the remove session callback then we are
forced to also store it in the internal cache so that we can create
timeout events. Otherwise the external cache could just fill up
indefinitely.
This mostly addresses the issue described in #5628. That issue also proposes
having an option to not create full stateless tickets when using the
internal cache. That aspect hasn't been addressed yet.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6293)
Also allows the apps to set it.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5227)
We send a session ticket automatically in TLSv1.3 at the end of the
handshake. This commit provides the ability to set how many tickets should
be sent. By default this is one.
Fixes#4978
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5227)
In DTLS if we have buffered a fragment for a zero length message (e.g.
ServerHelloDone) then, when we unbuffered the fragment, we were attempting
to memcpy the contents of the fragment which is zero length and a NULL
pointer. This is undefined behaviour. We should check first whether we
have a zero length fragment.
Fixes a travis issue.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6223)
Don't call the decrypt ticket callback if we've already encountered a
fatal error. Do call it if we have an empty ticket present.
Change the return code to have 5 distinct returns codes and separate it
from the input status value.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The return value from the ticket_key callback was not properly handled in
TLSv1.3, so that a ticket was *always* renewed even if the callback
requested that it should not be.
Also the ticket decrypt callback was not being called at all in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
When a server call SSL_write_early_data() to write to an unauthenticated
client the buffering BIO is still in place, so we should ensure we flush
the write.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The TLS code marks records as read when its finished using a record. The DTLS code did
not do that. However SSL_has_pending() relies on it. So we should make DTLS consistent.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6159)
If we have no certificate and we are using "old style" PSKs then we will
always default to using SHA-256 for that PSK. However we may have selected
a ciphersuite that is not based on SHA-256. Therefore if we see that there
are no certificates and we have been configured for "old style" PSKs then
we should prefer SHA-256 based ciphersuites during the selection process.
Fixes#6197
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6215)
During a full handshake the server is the last one to "speak". The timer
should continue to run until we know that the client has received our last
flight (e.g. because we receive some application data).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6170)
The ciphers field in a session contains the stack of ciphers offered by
the client.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6113)
The function SSL_get_shared_ciphers() is supposed to return ciphers shared
by the client and the server. However it only ever returned the client
ciphers.
Fixes#5317
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6113)
Commit d316cdcf6d introduced some extra
checks into the session-cache update procedure, intended to prevent
the caching of sessions whose resumption would lead to a handshake
failure, since if the server is authenticating the client, there needs to
be an application-set "session id context" to match up to the authentication
context. While that change is effective for its stated purpose, there
was also some collatoral damage introduced along with the fix -- clients
that set SSL_VERIFY_PEER are not expected to set an sid_ctx, and so
their usage of session caching was erroneously denied.
Fix the scope of the original commit by limiting it to only acting
when the SSL is a server SSL.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5967)
SSL_kANY, and SSL_aANY were placed in the wrong fields. It makes no
functional difference since these macros evaluate to 0 anyway, which is
the correct value for these fields.
Fixes#6048
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6095)
The MAX_CURVELIST macro defines the total number of in-built SSL/TLS curves
that we support. However it has not been updated as new curves are added.
Fixes#5232
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6065)
In 1.0.2 and below we always send the same client_version in a reneg
ClientHello that we sent the first time around, regardless of what
version eventually gets negotiated. According to a comment in
statem_clnt.c this is a workaround for some buggy servers that choked if
we changed the version used in the RSA encrypted premaster secret.
In 1.1.0+ this behaviour no longer occurs. This restores the original
behaviour.
Fixes#1651
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6059)
The spec does not prohib certs form using compressed points. It only
requires that points in a key share are uncompressed. It says nothing
about point compression for certs, so we should not fail if a cert uses a
compressed point.
Fixes#5743
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6055)
This dead code should have been removed as part of #5874 but got missed.
Found by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6049)
In 1.0.2 you could configure automatic ecdh params by using the
ECDHParameters config directive and setting it to the value
"+Automatic" or just "Automatic". This is no longer required in 1.1.0+
but we still recognise the "+Automatic" keyword for backwards compatibility.
However we did not recognise just "Automatic" without the leading "+" which
is equally valid. This commit fixes that omission.
Fixes#4113
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6035)
DTLS was not correctly returning the number of pending bytes left in
a call to SSL_pending(). This makes the detection of truncated packets
almost impossible.
Fixes#5478
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6020)
In 1.1.0 and before calling SSL_in_init() from the info_callback
at SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE would return 0. This commit fixes it so
that it does again for 1.1.1. This broke Node.
Fixes#4574
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6019)
This will be necessary to enable Wireshark to decrypt QUIC 0-RTT data.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5702)
If SSL_set_bio() is called with a NULL wbio after a failed connection then
this can trigger an assertion failure. This should be valid behaviour and
the assertion is in fact invalid and can simply be removed.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5966)
The first session ticket sent by the server is actually tacked onto the
end of the first handshake from a state machine perspective. However in
reality this is a post-handshake message, and should be preceeded by a
handshake start event from an info callback perspective.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5874)
We cannot provide a certificate status on a resumption so we should
ignore this extension in that case.
Fixes#1662
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5896)
The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.
Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.
This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.
Fixes#5809
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)
We have been unable to trace the contributor of that code to gain their
agreement for the licence change so the code has to be removed.
This commit reverts that contribution. The contribution had no functional
impact so the original way of doing things is still valid. However the
surrounding code has changed significantly so that the exact code as it
was orignally cannot be used. This commit uses the original code as a basis,
but rewrites it to use the PACKET API.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5808)
We should use the old EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5808)
If a server has been configured to use an ECDSA certificate, we should
allow it regardless of whether the server's own supported groups list
includes the certificate's group.
Fixes#2033
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5601)
This removes some code because we cannot trace the original contributor
to get their agreement for the licence change (original commit e03ddfae).
After this change there will be numerous failures in the test cases until
someone rewrites the missing code.
All *_free functions should accept a NULL parameter. After this change
the following *_free functions will fail if a NULL parameter is passed:
BIO_ACCEPT_free()
BIO_CONNECT_free()
BN_BLINDING_free()
BN_CTX_free()
BN_MONT_CTX_free()
BN_RECP_CTX_free()
BUF_MEM_free()
COMP_CTX_free()
ERR_STATE_free()
TXT_DB_free()
X509_STORE_free()
ssl3_free()
ssl_cert_free()
SSL_SESSION_free()
SSL_free()
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757)
The alpn_selected value in the session should be NULL before we first
populate it if this is a new session. We assert to make sure it is.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5715)
Add missing guards around STRP-related fields
Remove two unneeded global variables: my 2'cents to #4679
Merge definition and instantiation of srpsrvparm global.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4908)
For DTLS/SCTP we were waiting for a dry event during the call to
tls_finish_handshake(). This function just tidies up various internal
things, and after it completes the handshake is over. I can find no good
reason for waiting for a dry event here, and nothing in RFC6083 suggests
to me that we should need to. More importantly though it seems to be
wrong. It is perfectly possible for a peer to send app data/alerts/new
handshake while we are still cleaning up our handshake. If this happens
then we will never get the dry event and so we cannot continue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)
At a couple of points in a DTLS/SCTP handshake we need to wait for a dry
event before continuing. However if an alert has been sent by the peer
then we will never receive that dry event and an infinite loop results.
This commit changes things so that we attempt to read a message if we
are waiting for a dry event but haven't got one yet. This should never
succeed, but any alerts will be processed.
Fixes#4763
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)
Fixes regression from #5667.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5701)
The sid_ctx is something of a "certificate request context" or a
"session ID context" -- something from the application that gives
extra indication of what sort of thing this session is/was for/from.
Without a sid_ctx, we only know that there is a session that we
issued, but it could have come from a number of things, especially
with an external (shared) session cache. Accordingly, when resuming,
we will hard-error the handshake when presented with a session with
zero-length sid_ctx and SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set -- we simply have no
information about the peer to verify, so the verification must fail.
In order to prevent these future handshake failures, proactively
decline to add the problematic sessions to the session cache.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5175)
Place the session ticket AES and HMAC keys into secure memory.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2351)
When SSL_CTX is created preinitialize it with system default
configuration from system_default section.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4848)
Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
If the server is configured to allow early data then we check if the PSK
session presented by the client is available in the cache or not. If it
isn't then this may be a replay and we disallow it. If it is then we allow
it and remove the session from the cache. Note: the anti-replay protection
is not used for externally established PSKs.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
We should only update the session cache when we issue a NewSessionTicket.
These are issued automatically after processing a client certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
Conceptually in TLSv1.3 there can be multiple sessions associated with a
single connection. Each NewSessionTicket issued can be considered a
separate session. We can end up issuing multiple NewSessionTickets on a
single connection at the moment (e.g. in a post-handshake auth scenario).
Each of those issued tickets should have the new_session_cb called, it
should go into the session cache separately and it should have a unique
id associated with it (so that they can be found individually in the
cache).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
This commit adds a new api RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() which sets the
default type and flags for new DRBG instances. See also #5576.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5632)
Fixes#4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
Renamed to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()/EVP_new_raw_public_key() as per
feedback.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
In TLSv1.3 the session is not ready until after the end of the handshake
when we are constructing the NewSessionTicket.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5621)
With the current mechanism, old cipher strings that used to work in 1.1.0,
may inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites causing connections to
fail. This is confusing for users.
In reality TLSv1.3 are quite different to older ciphers. They are much
simpler and there are only a small number of them so, arguably, they don't
need the same level of control that the older ciphers have.
This change splits the configuration of TLSv1.3 ciphers from older ones.
By default the TLSv1.3 ciphers are on, so you cannot inadvertently disable
them through your existing config.
Fixes#5359
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5392)
