In keygen, return KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL not INVALID_KEYBITS.
** I also increased the minimum from 256 to 512, which is now
documented in CHANGES file. **
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b8)
Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
(cherry picked from commit 34628967f1)
Based on a suggested workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771):
if the TLS Client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less
that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512.
To enable it use an unused extension number (for example 0x4242) using
e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_wtf=0x4242
WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x10 for the test server)
using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x10
For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
effect.
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
Add support for key wrap algorithms via EVP interface.
Generalise AES wrap algorithm and add to modes, making existing
AES wrap algorithm a special case.
Move test code to evptests.txt
Extend OAEP support. Generalise the OAEP padding functions to support
arbitrary digests. Extend EVP_PKEY RSA method to handle the new OAEP
padding functions and add ctrls to set the additional parameters.
Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.
As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
Contributed by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Fixes to X509 hostname and email address checking. Wildcard matching support.
New test program and manual page.
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
comparison.
Print out results of checks for each candidate chain tested in
s_server/s_client.
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
details in s_client.
Also add ctrl to set client certificate types. If not used sensible values
will be included based on supported signature algorithms: for example if
we don't include any DSA signing algorithms the DSA certificate type is
omitted.
Fix restriction in old code where certificate types would be truncated
if it exceeded TLS_CT_NUMBER.
the permitted signature algorithms for server and client authentication
are the same but it is now possible to set different algorithms for client
authentication only.
is required by client or server. An application can decide which
certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
certificate callback: for example you can now clear existing certificates
and specify the whole chain.
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
Only store encoded versions of peer and configured signature algorithms.
Determine shared signature algorithms and cache the result along with NID
equivalents of each algorithm.
TLS v1.2. These are sent as an extension for clients and during a certificate
request for servers.
TODO: add support for shared signature algorithms, respect shared algorithms
when deciding which ciphersuites and certificates to permit.
Reported by: Phil Pennock <openssl-dev@spodhuis.org>
Make renegotiation work for TLS 1.2, 1.1 by not using a lower record
version client hello workaround if renegotiating.
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client
ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient.
Document workarounds in CHANGES.
enabled instead of requiring an application to hard code a (possibly
inappropriate) parameter set and delve into EC internals we just
automatically use the preferred curve.
Tidy some code up.
Don't allocate a structure to handle ECC extensions when it is used for
default values.
Make supported curves configurable.
Add ctrls to retrieve shared curves: not fully integrated with rest of
ECC code yet.
signatures and MDC2 using EVP or RSA_sign. This has become more apparent
when the dgst utility in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later switched to using the
EVP_DigestSign functions which call RSA_sign.
This means that the signature format OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later used with
dgst -sign and MDC2 is incompatible with previous versions.
Add detection in RSA_verify so either format works.
Note: MDC2 is disabled by default in OpenSSL and very rarely used in practice.
structure.
Before this the only way to add a custom chain was in the parent SSL_CTX
(which is shared by all key types and SSL structures) or rely on auto
chain building (which is performed on each handshake) from the trust store.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
The cipher definitions of these ciphersuites have been around since SSLeay
but were always disabled. Now OpenSSL supports DH certificates they can be
finally enabled.
Various additional changes were needed to make them work properly: many
unused fixed DH sections of code were untested.
using OBJ xref utilities instead of string comparison with OID name.
This removes the arbitrary restriction on using SHA1 only with some ECC
ciphersuites.
into 1.0.1 should not be listed as "changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.0".
This makes the OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable and HEAD versions of this file
consistent with each other (the HEAD version has the additional 1.1.0
section, but doesn't otherwise differ).
Parse certificate request message and set digests appropriately.
Generate new TLS v1.2 format certificate verify message.
Keep handshake caches around for longer as they are needed for client auth.
algorithms extension (including everything we support). Swicth to new
signature format where needed and relax ECC restrictions.
Not TLS v1.2 client certifcate support yet but client will handle case
where a certificate is requested and we don't have one.
signature algorithms extension and correct signature format for
server key exchange.
All ciphersuites should now work on the server but no client support and
no client certificate support yet.
checking added, SHA256 PRF support added.
At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2 as the
new signature format is not yet implemented.
OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN all ssl related structures are opaque
and internals cannot be directly accessed. Many applications
will need some modification to support this and most likely some
additional functions added to OpenSSL.
The advantage of this option is that any application supporting
it will still be binary compatible if SSL structures change.
now use an internal RAND_METHOD. All dependencies to OpenSSL standard
PRNG are now removed: it is the applications resposibility to setup
the FIPS PRNG and initalise it.
Initial OpenSSL RAND_init_fips() function that will setup the DRBG
for the "FIPS capable OpenSSL".
this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
SSL_[CTX_]set_not_resumable_session_callback.
Submitted by: Emilia Kasper (Google)
[A part of this change affecting ssl/s3_lib.c was accidentally commited
separately, together with a compilation fix for that file;
see s3_lib.c CVS revision 1.133 (http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=19855).]
this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
directly by SSL/TLS SHA2 certificates are becoming more common and
applications that only call SSL_library_init() and not
OpenSSL_add_all_alrgorithms() will fail when verifying certificates.
Update docs.
Also, add missing CHANGES entry for CVE-2009-3245 (code changes submitted to this branch on 23 Feb 2010),
and further harmonize this version of CHANGES with the versions in the current branches.
now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful information.
Sample DSA version included that prints out the signature parameters r, s.
[Note EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD is an application opaque structure so adding
new fields in the middle has no compatibility issues]
certificate is explicitly trusted (using -addtrust option to x509 utility
for example) the verification is sucessful even if the chain is not complete.
initial connection to unpatched servers. There are no additional security
concerns in doing this as clients don't see renegotiation during an
attack anyway.
Submitted by: steve@openssl.org
More robust fix and workaround for PR#1949. Don't try to work out if there
is any write pending data as this can be unreliable: always flush.
Although it will be many years before TLS v2.0 or later appears old versions
of servers have a habit of hanging around for a considerable time so best
if we handle this properly now.
work in SSLv3: initial handshake has no extensions but includes MCSV, if
server indicates RI support then renegotiation handshakes include RI.
NB: current MCSV value is bogus for testing only, will be updated when we
have an official value.
Change mismatch alerts to handshake_failure as required by spec.
Also have some debugging fprintfs so we can clearly see what is going on
if OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG is set.
The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), EVP_PKEY_sign(),
CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fix
so the return code is checked correctly.
