Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add INSTALLDIRS variable, list of directories where things get
installed. Change install_html_docs to use perl mkdir-p script.
Add uninstall, uninstall_sw, uninstall_docs, uninstall_html_docs
to Makefile.org. The actions of these targets were figured out
by "inverting" the install target.
Recurse into subdirs to do uninstall as needed. Added uninstall
targets whose actions were similarly figured out by "inverting"
the install target.
Also remove some 'space before tab' complaints in Makefile.org
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange.
This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old
client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way,
version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work
around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS.
(From BoringSSL)
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Exported headers shouldn't be included as "foo.h" by code from the same
module, it should only do so for module-internal headers. This is
because the symlinking of exported headers (from include/openssl/foo.h
to crypto/foo/foo.h) is being removed, and the exported headers are
being moved to the include/openssl/ directory instead.
Change-Id: I4c1d80849544713308ddc6999a549848afc25f94
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Odd-length lists should be rejected everywhere upon parsing. Nevertheless,
be extra careful and add guards against off-by-one reads.
Also, drive-by replace inexplicable double-negation with an explicit comparison.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves
of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length
lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds
read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released
versions of OpenSSL are not affected.
Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Always use goto err on failure and call ssl_cert_free() on the error path so all
fields and "ret" itself are freed
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the
minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but
instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we
have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query
checks consistent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead.
Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit
replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the
underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This
happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the
MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state
being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A").
This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections
that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because
their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required
for the retry code path.
Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh).
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This ensures that it's zeroed even if the SSL object is reused
(as in ssltest.c). It also ensures that it applies to DTLS, too.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.
When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.
We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Don't send or parse any extensions other than RI (which is needed
to handle secure renegotation) for SSLv3.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The supported signature algorithms extension needs to be processed before
the certificate to use is decided and before a cipher is selected (as the
set of shared signature algorithms supported may impact the choice).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56e8dc542b)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_err.c
Print out more details of the conection in ssltest specifically:
server certificate curve name for EC, server temporary key (if any)
and peer signing digest.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add command line support for SSL_CONF: server side arguments are
prefixed by -s_ (e.g. -s_no_ssl3) and client side with -c_.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
SSL_set_SSL_CTX is used to change the SSL_CTX for SNI, keep the
supported signature algorithms and raw cipherlist.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d. Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.
CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CVE-2014-3513
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The following #ifdef tests were all removed:
__MWERKS__
MAC_OS_pre_X
MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE
MAC_OS_pre_X
OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC
OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX_RHAPSODY
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.
OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.
This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.
(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix comments in ssltest.c: return value of 0 now means extension is
omitted and add_cb is not called for servers if the corresponding
extension is absent in ClientHello.
Test add_cb is not called if extension is not received.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Instead of SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_srv_ext
use SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext and SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Support separate parse and add callback arguments.
Add new callback so an application can free extension data.
Change return value for send functions so < 0 is an error 0
omits extension and > 0 includes it. This is more consistent
with the behaviour of other functions in OpenSSL.
Modify parse_cb handling so <= 0 is an error.
Make SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext argument
order consistent.
NOTE: these changes WILL break existing code.
Remove (now inaccurate) in line documentation.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Use "parse" and "add" for function and callback names instead of
"first" and "second".
Change arguments to callback so the extension type is unsigned int
and the buffer length is size_t. Note: this *will* break existing code.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reject attempts to use extensions handled internally.
Add flags to each extension structure to indicate if an extension
has been sent or received. Enforce RFC5246 compliance by rejecting
duplicate extensions and unsolicited extensions and only send a
server extension if we have sent the corresponding client extension.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Use the same structure for client and server custom extensions.
Add utility functions in new file t1_ext.c.
Use new utility functions to handle custom server and client extensions
and remove a lot of code duplication.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Use existing error code SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL for too many empty records.
For ease of backporting the patch to release branches.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
Add a dozen more const declarations where appropriate.
These are from Justin; while adding his patch, I noticed
ASN1_BIT_STRING_check could be fixed, too.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
While RFC6367 focuses on Camellia-GCM cipher suites, it also adds a few
cipher suites that use SHA-2 based HMAC that can be very easily
added.
Tested against gnutls 3.3.5
PR#3443
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Move custom extension structures from SSL_CTX to CERT structure.
This change means the form can be revised in future without binary
compatibility issues. Also since CERT is part of SSL structures
so per-SSL custom extensions could be supported in future as well as
per SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
