Allow for encryption overhead in early DTLS size check
and send overflow if validated record is too long
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11096)
(cherry picked from commit cc0663f697b05ed121a728241f0502250429802d)
If one of the perlasm xlate drivers crashes, OpenSSL's build will
currently swallow the error and silently truncate the output to however
far the driver got. This will hopefully fail to build, but better to
check such things.
Handle this by checking for errors when closing STDOUT (which is a pipe
to the xlate driver).
This is the OpenSSL 1.1.1 version of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930.
Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10931)
Signature algorithms not using an MD weren't checked that they're
allowed by the security level.
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
GH: #11062
Create a whole chain of Ed488 certificates so that we can use it at security
level 4 (192 bit). We had an 2048 bit RSA (112 bit, level 2) root sign the
Ed488 certificate using SHA256 (128 bit, level 3).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
(cherry picked from commit 77c4d3972400adf1bcb76ceea359f5453cc3e8e4)
The BIO_f_buffer() documentation tells in enough detail how it affects
BIO_gets(), but not how it affects BIO_read_ex(). This change
remedies that.
Fixes#10859
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10890)
(cherry picked from commit 9a4fd80ee0ad1833879b6a55c9c4673eeb8446a3)
The future style that's coming with OpenSSL 3.0 was used, we need to
revert that back to "traditional" style.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11088)
Backport of improvements from #9982 to 1.1.1 branch.
Adds some more exclusions which were previously missed.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11059)
The hostname_cb in sslapitest.c was originally only defined if TLSv1.3
was enabled. A recently added test now uses this unconditionally, so we
move the function implementation earlier in the file, and always compile
it in.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11014)
(cherry picked from commit 104a733df65dfd8c3dd110de9bd56f6ebfc8f2f6)
Default image was currently "Visual Studio 2015"
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10327)
(cherry picked from commit b03de7a9207645c72e22627b10709f15eed211bf)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10816)
(cherry picked from commit adc9086beb21a91ca59aaf0c619b38b82c223f9b)
Prepend missing ossl_unused in front of lh_type_new to make the compiler
happy.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10946)
(cherry picked from commit 7b6a746721170a21519c38798041be8101e7361f)
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10841)
(cherry picked from commit 099a398268a298557be784528ac1d94f0f44c97c)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10810)
(cherry picked from commit 924d041fe0c650a79449217f81880a6384ff06b2)
Running any statement after Configure means we lose its exit code
Fixes#10951
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10953)
(cherry picked from commit 4bf3e989fef9268507ba02744e7f71ee5637681c)
If the servername cb decides to send back a warning alert then the
handshake continues, but we should not signal to the client that the
servername has been accepted.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
(cherry picked from commit cd624ccd41ac3ac779c1c7a7a1e63427ce9588dd)
The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() is quite complicated and depends on
numerous factors such as whether it is called on the client or the server,
whether it is called before or after the handshake, what protocol version
was negotiated, and whether a resumption was attempted or was successful.
We attempt to document the behavior more clearly.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
(cherry picked from commit 0dc7c8e8314f27ac093b2d7bc8f13d0dfd302bdb)
Test this on both the client and the server after a normal handshake,
and after a resumption handshake. We also test what happens if an
inconsistent SNI is set between the original handshake and the resumption
handshake. Finally all of this is also tested in TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
(cherry picked from commit 49ef3d0719f132629ab76d4bcb4ab0c1e016277a)
The SNI behaviour for TLSv1.3 and the behaviour of SSL_get_servername()
was not quite right, and not entirely consistent with the RFC.
The TLSv1.3 RFC explicitly says that SNI is negotiated on each handshake
and the server is not required to associate it with the session. This was
not quite reflected in the code so we fix that.
Additionally there were some additional checks around early_data checking
that the SNI between the original session and this session were
consistent. In fact the RFC does not require any such checks, so they are
removed.
Finally the behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The
behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes,
and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. We clarify the
behaviour in various scenarios and also attempt to make it match historical
behaviour as closely as possible.
Fixes#8822
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
(cherry picked from commit 7955c1f16e72dc944677fd1dbf4b1300e75f1c84)
Because there was a bug in File::Spec::Unix' abs2rel when it was given
relative paths as both PATH and BASE arguments, the directories we
deal with were made to be all absolute. Unfortunately, this meant
getting paths in our verbose test output which are difficult to use
anywhere else (such as a separate test build made for comparison), due
to the constant need to edit all the paths all the time.
We're therefore getting back the relative paths, by doing an extra
abs2rel() in __srctop_file, __srctop_dir, __bldtop_file and
__bldtop_dir, with a 'Cwd::getcwd' call as BASE argument.
Fixes#10628
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10913)
(cherry picked from commit 612539e8a678c6099131dfd0e5e4b85fa774eb1a)
TLS < 1.2 has fixed signature algorithms: MD5+SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for the
others. TLS 1.2 sends a list of supported ciphers, but allows not sending
it in which case SHA1 is used. TLS 1.3 makes sending the list mandatory.
When we didn't receive a list from the client, we always used the
defaults without checking that they are allowed by the configuration.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #10784
(cherry picked from commit b0031e5dc2c8c99a6c04bc7625aa00d3d20a59a5)
It replaces apps/server.pem that used a sha1 signature with a copy of
test/certs/servercert.pem that is uses sha256.
This caused the dtlstest to start failing. It's testing connection
sbetween a dtls client and server. In particular it was checking that if
we drop a record that the handshake recovers and still completes
successfully. The test iterates a number of times. The first time
through it drops the first record. The second time it drops the second
one, and so on. In order to do this it has a hard-coded value for the
expected number of records it should see in a handshake. That's ok
because we completely control both sides of the handshake and know what
records we expect to see. Small changes in message size would be
tolerated because that is unlikely to have an impact on the number of
records. Larger changes in message size however could increase or
decrease the number of records and hence cause the test to fail.
This particular test uses a mem bio which doesn't have all the CTRLs
that the dgram BIO has. When we are using a dgram BIO we query that BIO
to determine the MTU size. The smaller the MTU the more fragmented
handshakes become. Since the mem BIO doesn't report an MTU we use a
rather small default value and get quite a lot of records in our
handshake. This has the tendency to increase the likelihood of the
number of records changing in the test if the message size changes.
It so happens that the new server certificate is smaller than the old
one. AFAICT this is probably because the DNs for the Subject and Issuer
are significantly shorter than previously. The result is that the number
of records used to transmit the Certificate message is one less than it
was before. This actually has a knock on impact for subsequent messages
and how we fragment them resulting in one less ServerKeyExchange record
too (the actual size of the ServerKeyExchange message hasn't changed,
but where in that message it gets fragmented has). In total the number
of records used in the handshake has decreased by 2 with the new
server.pem file.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #10784
(cherry picked from commit 5fd72d96a592c3c4ef28ff11c6ef334a856b0cd1)
Provide a "simple" example for affecting the systemwide default behavior
of libssl. The large number of mandatory nested sections makes this
less simple than the main description might suggest.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10937)
(cherry picked from commit 3472082b4b6d73e0803a7c47f03e96ec0a69f77b)
Configure creates an empty crypto/include which
gets not cleaned up with make distclean.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10893)
Move .cfi_startproc to the right place for RC4. Add missing
.cfi_startproc and .cfi_endproc to RC4_options.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10872)
(cherry picked from commit 967ef73013becef2aec3439f8c45204b24121018)
The existing documentation for the new-session callback was unclear
about the requirements on the callback with respect to reference-handling
of the session object being created. Be more explicit about the
(non-)requirements on the callback code for "success" (1) and "ignore"
(0) return values.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10848)
(cherry picked from commit 188d4ec82a9b0085ac5841cce3eda95efb94f2b4)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10794)
(cherry picked from commit 6a165fab239ec5b00b3cd68169a63b509207177d)
This regexp was used a bit too uncontrolled, which had it split flag
values where it should not have.
Fixes#10792
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10793)
(cherry picked from commit bbe486cf6154df3d3aaedbae6c5b82d4ed31a5f8)
When performing a pkeyutl -verifyrecover operation the input file is not
a hash - it is the signature itself. Therefore don't do the check to make
sure it looks like a hash.
Fixes#9658
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9731)
(cherry picked from commit 5ffc33244cd4d66e47dfa66ce89cb38d0f3074cc)
This reverts commit 7b18d1a53f, which moved the
DEVRANDOM and DEVRANDOM_EGD defines into rand_unix.c. That change introduced
the regression that the compiler complains about missing declarations in
apps/version.c when OpenSSL is configured using `--with-rand-seed=devrandom`
(resp. `--with-rand-seed=egd`):
apps/version.c:173:42: error: 'DEVRANDOM' undeclared
static const char *dev[] = { DEVRANDOM, NULL };
^~~~~~~~~
Fixes#10759
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10764)
The HMAC_CTX structure stores the original key in case the ctx is reused
without changing the key.
However, HMAC_Init_ex() checks its parameters such that the only code path
where the stored key is ever used is in the case where HMAC_Init_ex is
called with a NULL key and an explicit md is provided which is the same as
the md that was provided previously. But in that case we can actually reuse
the pre-digested key that we calculated last time, so we can refactor the
code not to use the stored key at all.
With that refactor done it is no longer necessary to store the key in the
ctx at all. This means that long running ctx's will not keep the key in
memory for any longer than required. Note though that the digested key
*is* still kept in memory for the duration of the life of the ctx.
Fixes#10743
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10763)
ECDSA_do_verify() is a function that verifies a ECDSA signature given a hash and a public EC key. The function is supposed to return 1 on valid signature, 0 on invalid signature and -1 on error. Previously, we returned 0 if the key did not have a verify_sig method. This is actually an error case and not an invalid signature. Consequently, this patch updates the return code to -1.
Fixes#8766
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10693)
(cherry picked from commit 26583f6aa8dc28e3598e61db66e54e2fdf8b195f)
This came from f3fdfbf78c6b. run = 1 should be done in pkey_print_message
as well, otherwise other tests printed with pkey_print_message won't run.
Change-Id: I0ba0b05256ad6509ada4735b26d10f8a73fd89ec
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10710)
(cherry picked from commit 6e49b514067a2b6a30d064d2ae1fdfd8050c184b)
This change addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in
the internals of nistz256 low level operations for armv8.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
(cherry picked from commit f5a659b6dfcc735a62c712dcca64d116d2289b97)
This is only used if configured with
./config -DECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
(cherry picked from commit 7d4716648e8348dea862e198b9395478fae01907)
This commit addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the
internals of some elliptic curve low level operations.
The side-channel leakage appears to be tiny, so the severity of this
issue is rather low.
The issue was reported by David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
(cherry picked from commit 3cb914c463ed1c9e32cfb773d816139a61b6ad5f)
