An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
Due to the dynamic allocation that was added to rand_pool_add_begin
this function could now return a null pointer where it was previously
guaranteed to succeed. But the return value of this function does
not need to be checked by design.
Move rand_pool_grow from rand_pool_add_begin to rand_pool_bytes_needed.
Make an allocation error persistent to avoid falling back to less secure
or blocking entropy sources.
Fixes: a6a66e4511 ("Make rand_pool buffers more dynamic in their sizing.")
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9687)
(cherry picked from commit fa3eb248e29ca8031e6a14e8a2c6f3cd58b5450e)
There was a warning about unused variables in this config:
./config --strict-warnings --with-rand-seed=rdcpu
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9687)
(cherry picked from commit e301c147a763f67dcc5ba63eb7e2ae40d83a68aa)
Since commit 7c226dfc43 a chained DRBG does not add additional
data anymore when reseeding from its parent. The reason is that
the size of the additional data exceeded the allowed size when
no derivation function was used.
This commit provides an alternative fix: instead of adding the
entire DRBG's complete state, we just add the DRBG's address
in memory, thereby providing some distinction between the different
DRBG instances.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
Provides a little extra fork-safety on UNIX systems, adding to the
fact that all DRBGs reseed automatically when the fork_id changes.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd0, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.
This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.
To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.
CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
so results were undefined.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9796)
(cherry picked from commit 2b95e8efcf8b99892106070d9ac745a0a369f503)
For for G=2 and 5 DH_generate_parameters will continue to generate
the order 2q subgroup for compatibility with previous versions.
For G=3 DH_generate_parameters generates an order q subgroup, but it
will not pass the check in DH_check with previous OpenSSL versions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9820)
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
While gcc ignores unknown options of the type '-Wno-xxx', clang by default issues
a warning [-Wunknown-warning-option] (see [3]), which together with '-Werror'
causes the build to fail. This turned out to be a problem on the 1.0.2 stable branch
in the case of the '-Wextended-offsetof' option, which was removed in version 6.0.0,
but needs to be kept here in order to support older clang versions, too (see #9446).
Incidentally, master and 1.1.1 branch already contained the -Wno-unknown-warning-option
option. Due to its special role and its importance, this commit adds an explaining
commit message and moves the option to the front.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9447)
(cherry picked from commit 03e5668343078b963cc6544ad7270743de13e514)
This leaves VPAES and AESNI support.
The VPAES performance is comparable but BSAES is not
completely constant time. There are table lookups
using secret key data in AES_set_encrypt/decrypt_key
and in ctr mode short data uses the non-constant
time AES_encrypt function instead of bit-slicing.
Furthermore the AES_ASM is by far outperformed
by recent GCC versions.
Since BSAES calls back to AES_ASM for short
data blocks the performance on those is also
worse than the pure software implementaion.
Fixes: #9640
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9675)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9781)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9781)
The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA
mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls
back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present.
This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all
curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more
SCA-robust code.
This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form,
where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent.
It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed
programatically with explicit parameters, then calling
EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero).
The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to
local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results
suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock
timing attacks.
CVE-2019-1547
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9781)
Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific
BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_lebin2bn().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
(cherry picked from commit e0b660c27d8d97b4ad9e2098cc957de26872c0ef)
This issue was partially addressed by commit
972c87dfc7, which hardened its callee
BN_num_bits_word() to avoid leaking the most-significant word of its
argument via branching and memory access pattern.
The commit message also reported:
> There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where
> the bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those
> cases as we still only look at the top word.
BN_num_bits() is called directly or indirectly (e.g., through
BN_num_bytes() or BN_bn2binpad() ) in various parts of the `crypto/ec`
code, notably in all the currently supported implementations of scalar
multiplication (in the generic path through ec_scalar_mul_ladder() as
well as in dedicated methods like ecp_nistp{224,256,521}.c and
ecp_nistz256.c).
Under the right conditions, a motivated SCA attacker could retrieve the
secret bitlength of a secret nonce through this vulnerability,
potentially leading, ultimately, to recover a long-term secret key.
With this commit, exclusively for BIGNUMs that are flagged with
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, instead of accessing only bn->top, all the limbs of
the BIGNUM are accessed up to bn->dmax and bitwise masking is used to
avoid branching.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this should be already done at the top level
alongside setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
(cherry picked from commit 8b44198b916015f77bef1befa26edb48ad8a0238)
BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the
processed BIGNUM.
The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and
ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the
internal fixed length representation.
This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce
while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations.
The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack
varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the
ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the
size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM
representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture).
To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with BN_bn2binpad(), bounding the
output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this
length is public.
Internally the final implementation of both BN_bn2binpad() and
BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top
through memory access patterns.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside
setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
Finally, the internal implementation of BN_bn2binpad() indirectly calls
BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of
BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed
in the next commit.
Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
(cherry picked from commit 805315d3a20f7274195eed75b06c391dacf3b197)
This commit addresses multiple side-channel vulnerabilities present
during RSA key validation.
Private key parameters are re-computed using variable-time functions.
This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9779)
We also use this in test_tls13messages to check that the extensions we
expect to see in a CertificateRequest are there.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9780)
(cherry picked from commit dc5bcb88d819de55eb37460c122e02fec91c6d86)
If a TLSv1.3 server configured to respond to the status_request extension
also attempted to send a CertificateRequest then it was incorrectly
inserting a non zero length status_request extension into that message.
The TLSv1.3 RFC does allow that extension in that message but it must
always be zero length.
In fact we should not be sending the extension at all in that message
because we don't support it.
Fixes#9767
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9780)
(cherry picked from commit debb64a0ca43969eb3f043aa8895a4faa7f12b6e)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9639)
(cherry picked from commit c70e2ec33943d3bd46d3d9950f774307feda832b)
This will never be the case for 1.1.1 so removed.
Fixes: comment 1 of #9757
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9762)
Fixes#9080
Signed-off-by: Billy Brawner <billy@wbrawner.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9710)
(cherry picked from commit 1e8e75d18be8856e753a57771754b9926c3f4264)
In commit 6aca8d1a5 ("Honour mandatory digest on private key in
has_usable_cert()") I added two checks for the capabilities of the
EVP_PKEY being used. One of them was wrong, as it should only be
checking the signature of the X.509 cert (by its issuer) against the
sigalgs given in a TLS v1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension.
Remove it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9705)
It lacks exposure of the `shm*` functions and should prefer the GETRANDOM
source.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9735)
(cherry picked from commit 280cc0180862ae6664b88d5ea12cb5f599000d36)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9734)
(cherry picked from commit 46a9cc9451213039fd53f62733b2ccd04e853bb2)
This commit addresses a side-channel vulnerability present when
PVK and MSBLOB key formats are loaded into OpenSSL.
The public key was not computed using a constant-time exponentiation
function.
This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9587)
(cherry picked from commit 724339ff44)
There is a problem in the rand_unix.c code when the random seed fd is greater
than or equal to FD_SETSIZE and the FDSET overruns its limit and walks the
stack.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9686)
(cherry picked from commit e1f8584d47)
Parsing functions are at liberty to return:
1: when parsing on processing of the parsed value succeeded
0: when the parsed keyword is unknown
-1: when the parsed value processing failed
Some parsing functions didn't do this quite right, they returned 0
when they should have returned -1, causing a message like this:
Line 123: unknown keyword PeerKey
When this message (which is displayed when the parsing function
returns -1) would have been more appropriate:
Line 123: error processing keyword PeerKey = ffdhe2048-2-pub
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9682)
(cherry picked from commit f42c225d7f)
The input reading loop in 'openssl dgst' and 'openssl enc' doesn't
check for end of input, and because of the way BIO works, it thereby
won't detect that the end is reached before the read is an error.
With the FILE BIO, an error occurs when trying to read past EOF, which
is fairly much ok, except when the command is used interactively, at
least on Unix. The result in that case is that the user has to press
Ctrl-D twice for the command to terminate.
The issue is further complicated because both these commands use
filter BIOs on top of the FILE BIO, so a naïve attempt to check
BIO_eof() doesn't quite solve it, since that only checks the state of
the source/sink BIO, and the filter BIO may have some buffered data
that still needs to be read. Fortunately, there's BIO_pending() that
checks exactly that, if any filter BIO has pending data that needs to
be processed.
We end up having to check both BIO_pending() and BIO_eof().
Thanks to Zsigmond Lőrinczy for the initial effort and inspiration.
Fixes#9355
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9668)
(cherry picked from commit 8ed7bbb411)
Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed. Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.
This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions. However, this is no worse than the current situation.
An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence. Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process. Even one long running process will prevent this attack.
The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0. Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)
[manual merge]
Fixes#9622
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9627)
(cherry picked from commit faee6b2104)
