Commit graph

82 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pauli
f1b12b8713 DSA mod inverse fix
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of
the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm.  This change takes advantage of the
primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse
without leaking information.

Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7487)

(cherry picked from commit 415c335635)
2018-10-29 06:51:55 +10:00
Matt Caswell
1212818eb0 Update copyright year
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)
2018-09-11 13:45:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7f9822a482 Add blinding to a DSA signature
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too.

This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC
Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA.

Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates:

s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order

In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.

As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:

s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order

Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.

This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is
only removed at the last possible step.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
2018-06-21 10:15:57 +01:00
Pauli
c0caa945f6 Address a timing side channel whereby it is possible to determine some
information about the length of a value used in DSA operations from
a large number of signatures.

This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
  more information.

* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
  to leak a small amount of information.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4576)
2017-11-01 15:47:28 +00:00
KaoruToda
26a7d938c9 Remove parentheses of return.
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
2017-10-18 16:05:06 +01:00
Rich Salz
e3713c365c Remove email addresses from source code.
Names were not removed.
Some comments were updated.
Replace Andy's address with openssl.org

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4516)
2017-10-13 10:06:59 -04:00
KaoruToda
208fb891e3 Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
- return (0); -> return 0;
- return (1); -> return 1;
- return (-1); -> return -1;

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4500)
2017-10-09 13:17:09 +01:00
Rich Salz
ddc6a5c8f5 Add RAND_priv_bytes() for private keys
Add a new global DRBG for private keys used by RAND_priv_bytes.

Add BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() which use RAND_priv_bytes().
Change callers to use the appropriate BN_priv... function.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4076)
2017-08-03 10:45:17 -04:00
Rich Salz
076fc55527 Make default_method mostly compile-time
Document thread-safety issues
Have RSA_null return NULL (always fails)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2244)
2017-04-07 12:19:46 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8cc44d970c Don't allocate r/s in DSA_SIG and ECDSA_SIG
To avoid having to immediately free up r/s when setting them
don't allocate them automatically in DSA_SIG_new() and ECDSA_SIG_new().

RT#4590

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-20 14:02:54 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
9267c11bb5 Make DSA_SIG and ECDSA_SIG getters const.
Reorder arguments to follow convention.

Also allow r/s to be NULL in DSA_SIG_get0, similarly to ECDSA_SIG_get0.

This complements GH1193 which adds non-const setters.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-06-20 14:58:36 +02:00
FdaSilvaYY
823146d65f Useless header include of openssl/rand.h
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1168)
2016-06-18 16:30:24 -04:00
Cesar Pereida
47ae05ba62 Set flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME earlier
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-06-07 15:26:57 +01:00
Cesar Pereida
033dc8fad0 Remove kq and set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME in k for BN_mod_inverse
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-06-07 15:26:57 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5584f65a10 Deprecate the flags that switch off constant time
The flags RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME and
DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME which previously provided the ability to switch
off the constant time implementation for RSA, DSA and DH have been made
no-ops and deprecated.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-06-06 11:09:06 +01:00
Matt Caswell
f943e640ef Simplify dsa_ossl.c
The dsa_ossl.c file defined a couple of multi-line macros, but then only
used each one once. The macros just serve to complicate the code and make
it more difficult to understand what is really going on. Hence they are
removed.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-06-06 11:08:15 +01:00
Cesar Pereida
399944622d Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.

CVE-2016-2178

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-06-06 11:08:15 +01:00
Rich Salz
d2e9e32018 Copyright consolidation 07/10
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-05-17 14:51:26 -04:00
Matt Caswell
10a57adc60 Remove some dead code
Commit e1d9f1ab39 left some dead code behind. This removes it.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2016-04-29 09:23:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1258396d73 Make the DSA structure opaque
Move the dsa_st structure out of the public header file. Add some accessor
functions to enable access to the internal fields, and update all internal
usage to use the new functions.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2016-04-03 00:23:56 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
706a13f112 Make DSA_SIG opaque.
This adds a new accessor function DSA_SIG_get0.
The customisation of DSA_SIG structure initialisation has been removed this
means that the 'r' and 's' components are automatically allocated when
DSA_SIG_new() is called. Update documentation.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-03-08 17:02:16 +00:00
Alessandro Ghedini
d188a53617 Convert CRYPTO_LOCK_{DH,DSA,RSA} to new multi-threading API
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-03-08 09:07:32 -05:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e1d9f1ab39 Remove kinv/r fields from DSA structure.
The kinv/r fields in the DSA structure are not used by OpenSSL internally
and should not be used in general.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-03-07 22:15:04 +00:00
Rich Salz
349807608f Remove /* foo.c */ comments
This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-01-26 16:40:43 -05:00
David Benjamin
679d87515d Fix memory leak in DSA redo case.
Found by clang scan-build.

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT: #4184, MR: #1496
2015-12-22 11:05:51 +01:00
Matt Caswell
90945fa31a Continue standardising malloc style for libcrypto
Continuing from previous commit ensure our style is consistent for malloc
return checks.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-11-09 22:48:41 +00:00
Richard Levitte
b39fc56061 Identify and move common internal libcrypto header files
There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules.  Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.

The header files that got moved are:

crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-14 17:21:40 +02:00
Rich Salz
23a1d5e97c free NULL cleanup 7
This gets BN_.*free:
    BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
    BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free

Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-30 21:37:06 -04:00
Viktor Dukhovni
61986d32f3 Code style: space after 'if'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-04-16 13:44:59 -04:00
Rich Salz
474e469bbd OPENSSL_NO_xxx cleanup: SHA
Remove support for SHA0 and DSS0 (they were broken), and remove
the ability to attempt to build without SHA (it didn't work).
For simplicity, remove the option of not building various SHA algorithms;
you could argue that SHA_224/256/384/512 should be kept, since they're
like crypto algorithms, but I decided to go the other way.
So these options are gone:
	GENUINE_DSA         OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
	OPENSSL_NO_SHA      OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
	OPENSSL_NO_SHA224   OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
	OPENSSL_NO_SHA384   OPENSSL_NO_SHA512

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-01-27 12:34:45 -05:00
Matt Caswell
0f113f3ee4 Run util/openssl-format-source -v -c .
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-22 09:20:09 +00:00
Tim Hudson
1d97c84351 mark all block comments that need format preserving so that
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-12-30 22:10:26 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c0d4390194 Implement internally opaque bn access from dsa
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-12-08 21:40:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
73e45b2dd1 remove OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-12-08 13:25:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
fce8311cae remove FIPS module code from crypto/dsa
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-12-08 13:25:38 +00:00
Matt Caswell
eb63bce040 RT3192: spurious error in DSA verify
This is funny; Ben commented in the source, Matt opend a ticket,
and Rich is doing the submit.  Need more code-review? :)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-09-09 17:10:15 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8d6a75dc3a Avoid need to change function code.
Keep original function names for nonce versions so we don't have to change
error function codes.
2013-07-17 21:45:00 +01:00
Adam Langley
190c615d43 Make `safe' (EC)DSA nonces the default.
This change updates 8a99cb29 to make the generation of (EC)DSA nonces
using the message digest the default. It also reverts the changes to
(EC)DSA_METHOD structure.

In addition to making it the default, removing the flag from EC_KEY
means that FIPS modules will no longer have an ABI mismatch.
2013-07-15 12:57:48 +01:00
Adam Langley
8a99cb29d1 Add secure DSA nonce flag.
This change adds the option to calculate (EC)DSA nonces by hashing the
message and private key along with entropy to avoid leaking the private
key if the PRNG fails.
2013-06-13 17:26:07 +01:00
Ben Laurie
71fa451343 Version skew reduction: trivia (I hope). 2012-06-03 22:00:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c2fd598994 Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode. Theses symbols will be defined in
the FIPS capable OpenSSL.
2011-05-11 14:43:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
69a80f7d5e More fixes for DSA FIPS overrides. 2011-04-23 21:59:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cac4fb58e0 Add PRNG security strength checking. 2011-04-23 19:55:55 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e990b4f838 Remove dependency of dsa_sign.o and dsa_vrf.o: new functions FIPS_dsa_sig_new
and FIPS_dsa_sig_free, reimplment DSA_SIG_new and DSA_SIG_free from ASN1
library.
2011-02-13 18:45:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
14ae26f2e4 Transfer error redirection to fips.h, add OPENSSL_FIPSAPI to source files
that use it.
2011-02-03 17:00:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7f64c26588 Since FIPS 186-3 specifies we use the leftmost bits of the digest
we shouldn't reject digest lengths larger than SHA256: the FIPS
algorithm tests include SHA384 and SHA512 tests.
2011-02-01 12:52:01 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
20818e00fd FIPS mode DSA changes:
Check for selftest failures.

Pairwise consistency test for RSA key generation.

Use some EVP macros instead of EVP functions.

Use minimal FIPS EVP where needed.

Key size restrictions.
2011-01-26 15:46:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
245a7eee17 recalculate DSA signature if r or s is zero (FIPS 186-3 requirement) 2011-01-25 16:01:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
776654adff PR: 2295
Submitted by: Alexei Khlebnikov <alexei.khlebnikov@opera.com>
Reviewed by: steve

OOM checking. Leak in OOM fix. Fall-through comment. Duplicate code
elimination.
2010-10-11 23:49:22 +00:00
Bodo Möller
bd31fb2145 Change to mitigate branch prediction attacks
Submitted by: Matthew D Wood
Reviewed by: Bodo Moeller
2007-03-28 00:15:28 +00:00