2016-05-17 18:18:30 +00:00
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/*
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2018-01-19 09:49:22 +00:00
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* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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2017-06-15 14:16:46 +00:00
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* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
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2017-06-20 14:14:36 +00:00
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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2000-12-14 17:36:59 +00:00
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*
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2016-05-17 18:18:30 +00:00
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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2000-12-14 17:36:59 +00:00
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*/
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2016-05-17 18:18:30 +00:00
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
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2017-08-31 22:50:03 +00:00
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# include "e_os.h" /* struct timeval for DTLS */
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# include <stdlib.h>
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# include <time.h>
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# include <string.h>
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# include <errno.h>
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# include <openssl/buffer.h>
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2016-03-18 18:30:20 +00:00
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# include <openssl/comp.h>
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# include <openssl/bio.h>
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2016-03-18 18:30:20 +00:00
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# include <openssl/rsa.h>
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# include <openssl/dsa.h>
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# include <openssl/err.h>
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# include <openssl/ssl.h>
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2015-02-13 23:28:49 +00:00
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# include <openssl/async.h>
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
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2016-03-18 18:30:20 +00:00
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# include <openssl/ct.h>
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2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
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# include "record/record.h"
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# include "statem/statem.h"
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# include "packet_locl.h"
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# include "internal/dane.h"
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2016-08-27 14:01:08 +00:00
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# include "internal/refcount.h"
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2018-07-29 12:12:53 +00:00
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# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
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2015-01-30 13:46:43 +00:00
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
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# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
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# define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
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# endif
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2000-12-31 00:23:17 +00:00
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \
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l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
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l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \
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l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24))
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
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c+=n; \
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l1=l2=0; \
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switch (n) { \
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case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
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case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
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case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
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case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
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case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
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case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
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case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
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case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
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} \
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}
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# define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff))
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# define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
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l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
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l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
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l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
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2016-08-05 09:58:52 +00:00
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# define n2l8(c,l) (l =((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<56, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<48, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
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l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++))))
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
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# define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
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# define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
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*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
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c+=n; \
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switch (n) { \
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case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
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case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
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case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
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case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \
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case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
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case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
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case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
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case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \
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} \
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}
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2016-07-07 14:51:17 +00:00
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# define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)((c)[0]))<< 8)| \
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(((unsigned int)((c)[1])) )),(c)+=2)
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# define s2n(s,c) (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
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(c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),(c)+=2)
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# define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)((c)[0]))<<16)| \
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(((unsigned long)((c)[1]))<< 8)| \
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(((unsigned long)((c)[2])) )),(c)+=3)
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# define l2n3(l,c) (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
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(c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
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(c)[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),(c)+=3)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
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/*
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* DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except for
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* DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest.
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*/
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# define dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) (((v1) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 0xff00 : (v1))
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# define DTLS_VERSION_GT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) < dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
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# define DTLS_VERSION_GE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) <= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
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# define DTLS_VERSION_LT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) > dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
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# define DTLS_VERSION_LE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) >= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2))
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2015-12-06 16:56:41 +00:00
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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2000-01-22 03:17:06 +00:00
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/*
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* Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms.
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* This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers
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* etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information
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* is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms
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* can be publicly accessed.
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* Use the according functions for cipher management instead.
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*
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2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
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* The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in
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2000-01-22 03:17:06 +00:00
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* ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting
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2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
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* that the different entities within are mutually exclusive:
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2000-01-22 03:17:06 +00:00
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* ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME.
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*/
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2007-02-17 06:45:38 +00:00
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/* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* RSA key exchange */
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2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
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# define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* tmp DH key no DH cert */
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2015-12-15 23:57:18 +00:00
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# define SSL_kDHE 0x00000002U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* synonym */
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define SSL_kEDH SSL_kDHE
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* ephemeral ECDH */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_kECDHE 0x00000004U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* synonym */
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define SSL_kEECDH SSL_kECDHE
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* PSK */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_kPSK 0x00000008U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* GOST key exchange */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_kGOST 0x00000010U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* SRP */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_kSRP 0x00000020U
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2007-02-17 06:45:38 +00:00
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_kRSAPSK 0x00000040U
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# define SSL_kECDHEPSK 0x00000080U
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# define SSL_kDHEPSK 0x00000100U
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2015-06-28 15:52:40 +00:00
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/* all PSK */
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2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
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# define SSL_PSK (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK)
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2015-06-28 15:52:40 +00:00
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2017-02-04 03:17:32 +00:00
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/* Any appropriate key exchange algorithm (for TLS 1.3 ciphersuites) */
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# define SSL_kANY 0x00000000U
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2007-02-17 06:45:38 +00:00
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/* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* RSA auth */
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2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
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# define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* DSS auth */
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2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
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# define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */
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2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
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# define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* ECDSA auth*/
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000008U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* PSK auth */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_aPSK 0x00000010U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000020U
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2015-01-21 19:18:47 +00:00
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/* SRP auth */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_aSRP 0x00000040U
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2015-11-17 15:32:30 +00:00
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/* GOST R 34.10-2012 signature auth */
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2016-02-11 18:19:27 +00:00
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# define SSL_aGOST12 0x00000080U
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2017-02-04 03:17:32 +00:00
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/* Any appropriate signature auth (for TLS 1.3 ciphersuites) */
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# define SSL_aANY 0x00000000U
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2017-06-30 17:57:42 +00:00
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/* All bits requiring a certificate */
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#define SSL_aCERT \
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(SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA | SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)
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2007-02-17 06:45:38 +00:00
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/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
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2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
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# define SSL_DES 0x00000001U
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# define SSL_3DES 0x00000002U
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# define SSL_RC4 0x00000004U
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# define SSL_RC2 0x00000008U
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# define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010U
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# define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020U
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# define SSL_AES128 0x00000040U
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# define SSL_AES256 0x00000080U
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# define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100U
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# define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200U
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# define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400U
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# define SSL_SEED 0x00000800U
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# define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000U
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# define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000U
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# define SSL_AES128CCM 0x00004000U
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# define SSL_AES256CCM 0x00008000U
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# define SSL_AES128CCM8 0x00010000U
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# define SSL_AES256CCM8 0x00020000U
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2015-11-17 15:32:30 +00:00
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# define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 0x00040000U
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2015-12-09 20:47:00 +00:00
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# define SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 0x00080000U
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2017-08-21 23:56:13 +00:00
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# define SSL_ARIA128GCM 0x00100000U
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# define SSL_ARIA256GCM 0x00200000U
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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2016-03-03 18:50:03 +00:00
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# define SSL_AESGCM (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)
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# define SSL_AESCCM (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)
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# define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AESGCM|SSL_AESCCM)
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
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2015-12-28 14:41:52 +00:00
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# define SSL_CHACHA20 (SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305)
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2017-08-21 23:56:13 +00:00
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# define SSL_ARIAGCM (SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM)
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# define SSL_ARIA (SSL_ARIAGCM)
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2007-02-17 06:45:38 +00:00
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/* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
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2011-08-03 15:37:22 +00:00
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2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
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# define SSL_MD5 0x00000001U
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# define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002U
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# define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004U
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# define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008U
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# define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010U
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# define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020U
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2011-08-03 15:37:22 +00:00
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|
/* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */
|
2015-11-07 13:22:54 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040U
|
2015-11-17 15:32:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_GOST12_256 0x00000080U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_GOST89MAC12 0x00000100U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_GOST12_512 0x00000200U
|
2007-02-17 06:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-11-17 15:32:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSL_MD_NUM_IDX make
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* sure to update this constant too
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-11-25 18:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9
|
2015-11-29 16:54:27 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 12
|
2015-11-25 18:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Bits 0-7 are handshake MAC */
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK 0xFF
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1 SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_512 SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Bits 8-15 bits are PRF */
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 8
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_SHA1_MD5 (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 (SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_512 (SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
|
|
|
# define TLS1_PRF (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
|
2007-09-21 06:54:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also
|
|
|
|
* goes into algorithm2)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-11-25 18:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
# define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x10000
|
2007-09-21 06:54:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-21 17:02:36 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x0000001FU
|
2015-12-05 01:04:41 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_DEFAULT_MASK 0X00000020U
|
2015-09-29 10:14:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-05 01:04:41 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000001U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_LOW 0x00000002U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000004U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_HIGH 0x00000008U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_FIPS 0x00000010U
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000020U
|
2000-01-22 03:17:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-05 01:04:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* we have used 0000003f - 26 bits left to go */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-27 11:58:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Flag used on OpenSSL ciphersuite ids to indicate they are for SSLv3+ */
|
|
|
|
# define SSL3_CK_CIPHERSUITE_FLAG 0x03000000
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-08 16:45:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check if an SSL structure is using DTLS */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)
|
2016-11-09 14:43:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we are using TLSv1.3 */
|
2016-11-21 13:24:50 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_IS_TLS13(s) (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) \
|
|
|
|
&& (s)->method->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION \
|
|
|
|
&& (s)->method->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION)
|
2016-11-09 14:43:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 09:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) \
|
2017-11-13 16:12:35 +00:00
|
|
|
(SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING \
|
|
|
|
|| (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY \
|
|
|
|
|| (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING \
|
2017-11-30 15:49:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|| (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY \
|
|
|
|
|| (s)->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
|
2017-02-21 09:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-07 16:36:51 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(S) ((s)->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 \
|
|
|
|
|| (s)->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0)
|
2017-01-10 23:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-13 15:33:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* See if we need explicit IV */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) \
|
|
|
|
(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See if we use signature algorithms extension and signature algorithm
|
|
|
|
* before signatures.
|
2013-03-13 15:33:24 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) \
|
|
|
|
(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may
|
|
|
|
* apply to others in future.
|
2013-03-27 19:54:48 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \
|
|
|
|
(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine if a client can use TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: can't rely on method
|
2013-04-04 17:19:18 +00:00
|
|
|
* flags because it may not be set to correct version yet.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) || \
|
|
|
|
(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(s->client_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)))
|
2016-03-06 00:49:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine if a client should send signature algorithms extension:
|
|
|
|
* as with TLS1.2 cipher we can't rely on method flags.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s) \
|
|
|
|
SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-05 16:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
# define IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value) \
|
|
|
|
(((value) >= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512) && \
|
|
|
|
((value) <= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096))
|
|
|
|
# define USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(session) \
|
|
|
|
IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
|
|
|
|
# define GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(session) \
|
|
|
|
(512U << (session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode - 1))
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 14:06:20 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_READ_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ)
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE)
|
2013-03-22 17:12:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
|
2017-02-10 04:23:53 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_RSA 0
|
2017-09-13 12:53:03 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN 1
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_ECC 3
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 4
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 5
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 6
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_ED25519 7
|
2018-02-27 10:12:02 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_ED448 8
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_PKEY_NUM 9
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-28 02:48:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
2015-12-05 01:04:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN)
|
2013-12-19 20:11:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* SSL_kDHE <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN
|
|
|
|
* SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-16 14:43:29 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#define CERT_INVALID 0
|
|
|
|
#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1
|
|
|
|
#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Post-Handshake Authentication state */
|
|
|
|
typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
SSL_PHA_NONE = 0,
|
|
|
|
SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT, /* client-side only: extension sent */
|
|
|
|
SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED, /* server-side only: extension received */
|
|
|
|
SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING, /* server-side only: request pending */
|
|
|
|
SSL_PHA_REQUESTED /* request received by client, or sent by server */
|
|
|
|
} SSL_PHA_STATE;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-18 13:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/* CipherSuite length. SSLv3 and all TLS versions. */
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# define TLS_CIPHER_LEN 2
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_st {
|
2015-11-05 16:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t valid;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *name; /* text name */
|
2017-06-29 19:06:19 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *stdname; /* RFC name */
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-11-05 16:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* changed in 1.0.0: these four used to be portions of a single value
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* 'algorithms'
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */
|
|
|
|
int min_tls; /* minimum SSL/TLS protocol version */
|
|
|
|
int max_tls; /* maximum SSL/TLS protocol version */
|
|
|
|
int min_dtls; /* minimum DTLS protocol version */
|
|
|
|
int max_dtls; /* maximum DTLS protocol version */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t algorithm2; /* Extra flags */
|
|
|
|
int32_t strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-29 14:50:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Used to hold SSL/TLS functions */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ssl_method_st {
|
|
|
|
int version;
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned flags;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long mask;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s);
|
2017-05-22 11:33:42 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s);
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s);
|
2016-10-26 09:43:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes);
|
|
|
|
int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes);
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t len, size_t *written);
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s);
|
2017-01-10 23:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s, int);
|
2015-05-11 08:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
|
2016-09-06 11:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int peek,
|
2016-10-26 09:43:34 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t *readbytes);
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
size_t *written);
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
|
|
|
|
long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr);
|
2016-09-05 16:34:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, WPACKET *pkt,
|
2016-08-03 19:57:52 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t *len);
|
2016-10-06 18:17:54 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s);
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*num_ciphers) (void);
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher);
|
|
|
|
long (*get_timeout) (void);
|
|
|
|
const struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */
|
|
|
|
int (*ssl_version) (void);
|
|
|
|
long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
|
|
|
|
long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-24 11:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Matches the length of PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN. We keep it the same value for
|
|
|
|
* consistency, even in the event of OPENSSL_NO_PSK being defined.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
# define TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH 256
|
2018-06-01 15:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
|
|
|
|
* SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
|
|
* version INTEGER, -- structure version number
|
|
|
|
* SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number
|
|
|
|
* Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID
|
|
|
|
* Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID
|
|
|
|
* Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key
|
|
|
|
* Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument
|
|
|
|
* Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time
|
|
|
|
* Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds
|
|
|
|
* Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate
|
|
|
|
* Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context
|
|
|
|
* Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
|
|
|
|
* HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension
|
|
|
|
* PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
|
|
|
|
* PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity
|
|
|
|
* Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket
|
|
|
|
* Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only)
|
|
|
|
* Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method
|
|
|
|
* SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username
|
2015-01-23 02:29:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* flags [ 13 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER -- optional flags
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* }
|
|
|
|
* Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
|
|
|
|
* I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_session_st {
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being kept
|
|
|
|
* in here? */
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t master_key_length;
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-12 12:30:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLSv1.3 early_secret used for external PSKs */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For <=TLS1.2 this is the master_key. For TLS1.3 this is the resumption
|
2018-06-01 15:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* PSK
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-06-01 15:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char master_key[TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH];
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* session_id - valid? */
|
2016-10-04 19:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t session_id_length;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the
|
|
|
|
* appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via
|
|
|
|
* SSL_new
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-10-04 19:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t sid_ctx_length;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
|
|
char *psk_identity_hint;
|
|
|
|
char *psk_identity;
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications
|
|
|
|
* can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb
|
|
|
|
* to disable session caching and tickets.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int not_resumable;
|
2015-06-21 18:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/* This is the cert and type for the other end. */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
X509 *peer;
|
2015-06-21 18:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
int peer_type;
|
2017-03-13 15:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Certificate chain peer sent. */
|
2015-06-21 18:34:33 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *peer_chain;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's
|
|
|
|
* certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
long verify_result; /* only for servers */
|
2016-08-27 14:01:08 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
long timeout;
|
|
|
|
long time;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used to
|
|
|
|
* load the 'cipher' structure */
|
2018-04-27 10:24:01 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* ciphers offered by the client */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
|
|
|
|
* implement a maximum cache size.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
char *hostname;
|
2015-05-15 09:49:56 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t ecpointformats_len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *ecpointformats; /* peer's list */
|
2017-10-11 12:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t supportedgroups_len;
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *supportedgroups; /* peer's list */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* RFC4507 info */
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *tick; /* Session ticket */
|
|
|
|
size_t ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
|
|
|
|
/* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
|
|
|
|
unsigned long tick_lifetime_hint;
|
2017-01-17 10:43:37 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t tick_age_add;
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
int tick_identity;
|
2017-02-20 14:56:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Max number of bytes that can be sent as early data */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t max_early_data;
|
2017-02-24 12:45:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The ALPN protocol selected for this session */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *alpn_selected;
|
|
|
|
size_t alpn_selected_len;
|
2017-11-05 16:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Maximum Fragment Length as per RFC 4366.
|
|
|
|
* If this value does not contain RFC 4366 allowed values (1-4) then
|
|
|
|
* either the Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation failed or was not
|
|
|
|
* performed at all.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
} ext;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
|
|
char *srp_username;
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-03-15 17:25:55 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *ticket_appdata;
|
|
|
|
size_t ticket_appdata_len;
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t flags;
|
2016-02-29 17:26:07 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-23 02:29:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Extended master secret support */
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS 0x1
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct srp_ctx_st {
|
|
|
|
/* param for all the callbacks */
|
|
|
|
void *SRP_cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
/* set client Hello login callback */
|
|
|
|
int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
|
|
|
|
/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
|
|
|
|
int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *);
|
|
|
|
/* set SRP client passwd callback */
|
|
|
|
char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *);
|
|
|
|
char *login;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *a, *b, *v;
|
|
|
|
char *info;
|
|
|
|
int strength;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long srp_Mask;
|
|
|
|
} SRP_CTX;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 09:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE = 0,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING,
|
2017-11-27 15:20:06 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH,
|
2017-03-02 15:49:33 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING,
|
2017-02-21 17:14:42 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING,
|
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
|
2017-02-21 09:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
} SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-23 14:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We check that the amount of unreadable early data doesn't exceed
|
|
|
|
* max_early_data. max_early_data is given in plaintext bytes. However if it is
|
|
|
|
* unreadable then we only know the number of ciphertext bytes. We also don't
|
|
|
|
* know how much the overhead should be because it depends on the ciphersuite.
|
|
|
|
* We make a small allowance. We assume 5 records of actual data plus the end
|
|
|
|
* of early data alert record. Each record has a tag and a content type byte.
|
|
|
|
* The longest tag length we know of is EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN. We don't count the
|
|
|
|
* content of the alert record either which is 2 bytes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
# define EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD ((6 * (EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN + 1)) + 2)
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-24 09:30:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The allowance we have between the client's calculated ticket age and our own.
|
|
|
|
* We allow for 10 seconds (units are in ms). If a ticket is presented and the
|
|
|
|
* client's age calculation is different by more than this than our own then we
|
|
|
|
* do not allow that ticket for early_data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
# define TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE (10 * 1000)
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-23 23:00:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#define MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE 255
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ssl_comp_st {
|
|
|
|
int id;
|
|
|
|
const char *name;
|
|
|
|
COMP_METHOD *method;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-23 23:00:47 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct raw_extension_st {
|
|
|
|
/* Raw packet data for the extension */
|
|
|
|
PACKET data;
|
|
|
|
/* Set to 1 if the extension is present or 0 otherwise */
|
|
|
|
int present;
|
|
|
|
/* Set to 1 if we have already parsed the extension or 0 otherwise */
|
|
|
|
int parsed;
|
|
|
|
/* The type of this extension, i.e. a TLSEXT_TYPE_* value */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int type;
|
2017-03-16 22:17:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Track what order extensions are received in (0-based). */
|
|
|
|
size_t received_order;
|
2017-01-23 23:00:47 +00:00
|
|
|
} RAW_EXTENSION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int isv2;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int legacy_version;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
size_t session_id_len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
size_t dtls_cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char dtls_cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
PACKET ciphersuites;
|
|
|
|
size_t compressions_len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char compressions[MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
PACKET extensions;
|
|
|
|
size_t pre_proc_exts_len;
|
|
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *pre_proc_exts;
|
|
|
|
} CLIENTHELLO_MSG;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-09 12:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Extension index values NOTE: Any updates to these defines should be mirrored
|
|
|
|
* with equivalent updates to ext_defs in extensions.c
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef enum tlsext_index_en {
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_renegotiate,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_server_name,
|
2017-11-05 16:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_max_fragment_length,
|
2017-05-09 12:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_srp,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_ec_point_formats,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_supported_groups,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_status_request,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_next_proto_neg,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_use_srtp,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_encrypt_then_mac,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_signed_certificate_timestamp,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
|
Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
2018-01-11 17:47:12 +00:00
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_signature_algorithms_cert,
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_post_handshake_auth,
|
2017-08-18 13:32:29 +00:00
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_signature_algorithms,
|
2017-05-09 12:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_key_share,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_cookie,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_cryptopro_bug,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_early_data,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_certificate_authorities,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_padding,
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
|
|
|
|
/* Dummy index - must always be the last entry */
|
|
|
|
TLSEXT_IDX_num_builtins
|
|
|
|
} TLSEXT_INDEX;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-11 15:22:30 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
|
2016-02-11 18:44:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Needed in ssl_cert.c */
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME);
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-19 14:50:51 +00:00
|
|
|
# define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16
|
|
|
|
# define TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH 32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct ssl_ctx_ext_secure_st {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char tick_hmac_key[TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char tick_aes_key[TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
} SSL_CTX_EXT_SECURE;
|
2016-03-02 13:39:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ssl_ctx_st {
|
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *method;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
|
|
|
|
/* same as above but sorted for lookup */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
|
2018-02-16 11:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLSv1.3 specific ciphersuites */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store;
|
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
|
|
|
|
* SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-10-04 20:04:03 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t session_cache_size;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head;
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
|
|
|
|
* SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which
|
2017-12-08 13:13:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* means only SSL_accept will cache SSL_SESSIONS.
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t session_cache_mode;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when
|
|
|
|
* SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set
|
|
|
|
* things up
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
long session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id
|
|
|
|
* is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the
|
|
|
|
* callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If
|
|
|
|
* remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is
|
|
|
|
* removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will
|
|
|
|
* SSL_SESSION_free() it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
|
|
|
|
void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
|
2016-02-01 14:26:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *data, int len,
|
|
|
|
int *copy);
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
2018-07-29 12:12:53 +00:00
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */
|
|
|
|
TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in
|
|
|
|
* the cache was passed back via
|
|
|
|
* the callback. This indicates
|
|
|
|
* that the application is
|
|
|
|
* supplying session-id's from
|
|
|
|
* other processes - spooky
|
|
|
|
* :-) */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
} stats;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-27 14:01:08 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */
|
|
|
|
int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *);
|
|
|
|
void *app_verify_arg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored
|
|
|
|
* ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Default password callback. */
|
|
|
|
pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Default password callback user data. */
|
|
|
|
void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get client cert callback */
|
|
|
|
int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* cookie generate callback */
|
|
|
|
int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int *cookie_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* verify cookie callback */
|
2015-10-06 15:20:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int cookie_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-26 02:39:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS1.3 app-controlled cookie generate callback */
|
|
|
|
int (*gen_stateless_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
|
|
size_t *cookie_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* TLS1.3 verify app-controlled cookie callback */
|
|
|
|
int (*verify_stateless_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
|
|
size_t cookie_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */
|
|
|
|
void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-13 15:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* What we put in certificate_authorities extension for TLS 1.3
|
|
|
|
* (ClientHello and CertificateRequest) or just client cert requests for
|
2018-10-26 10:43:19 +00:00
|
|
|
* earlier versions. If client_ca_names is populated then it is only used
|
|
|
|
* for client cert requests, and in preference to ca_names.
|
2017-03-13 15:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
|
2018-10-26 10:43:19 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
|
|
|
|
* SSL_new)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t options;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t mode;
|
2015-12-06 16:56:41 +00:00
|
|
|
int min_proto_version;
|
|
|
|
int max_proto_version;
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_cert_list;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
|
|
|
|
int read_ahead;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
|
|
|
|
void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
|
|
|
|
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *msg_callback_arg;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t verify_mode;
|
2016-10-04 19:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t sid_ctx_length;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
/* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
|
|
|
|
int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Default generate session ID callback. */
|
|
|
|
GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int quiet_shutdown;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
|
|
|
CTLOG_STORE *ctlog_store; /* CT Log Store */
|
2016-03-03 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient.
|
|
|
|
* If they are not, the connection should be aborted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-04-07 18:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback;
|
2016-03-03 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
void *ct_validation_callback_arg;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2016-03-03 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data
|
|
|
|
* up between the pipes?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t split_send_fragment;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can
|
|
|
|
* be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_send_fragment;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_pipelines;
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-13 14:20:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The default read buffer length to use (0 means not set) */
|
|
|
|
size_t default_read_buf_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Engine to pass requests for client certs to
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-07 22:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ClientHello callback. Mostly for extensions, but not entirely. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_client_hello_cb_fn client_hello_cb;
|
|
|
|
void *client_hello_cb_arg;
|
Add SSL_CTX early callback
Provide a callback interface that gives the application the ability
to adjust the nascent SSL object at the earliest stage of ClientHello
processing, immediately after extensions have been collected but
before they have been processed.
This is akin to BoringSSL's "select_certificate_cb" (though it is not
API compatible), and as the name indicates, one major use is to examine
the supplied server name indication and select what certificate to
present to the client. However, it can also be used to make more
sweeping configuration changes to the SSL object according to the
selected server identity and configuration. That may include adjusting
the permitted TLS versions, swapping out the SSL_CTX object (as is
traditionally done in a tlsext_servername_callback), changing the
server's cipher list, and more.
We also wish to allow an early callback to indicate that it needs to perform
additional work asynchronously and resume processing later. To that effect,
refactor the second half of tls_process_client_hello() into a subroutine to be
called at the post-processing stage (including the early callback itself), to
allow the callback to result in remaining in the same work stage for a later
call to succeed. This requires allocating for and storing the CLIENTHELLO_MSG
in the SSL object to be preserved across such calls, but the storage is
reclaimed after ClientHello processing finishes.
Information about the CliehtHello is available to the callback by means of
accessor functions that can only be used from the early callback. This allows
extensions to make use of the existing internal parsing machinery without
exposing structure internals (e.g., of PACKET), so that applications do not
have to write fragile parsing code.
Applications are encouraged to utilize an early callback and not use
a servername_callback, in order to avoid unexpected behavior that
occurs due to the relative order of processing between things like
session resumption and the historical servername callback.
Also tidy up nearby style by removing unnecessary braces around one-line
conditional bodies.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
2017-01-23 23:03:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS extensions. */
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
/* TLS extensions servername callback */
|
|
|
|
int (*servername_cb) (SSL *, int *, void *);
|
|
|
|
void *servername_arg;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
|
2018-03-19 14:50:51 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_EXT_SECURE *secure;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
|
|
|
|
int (*ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv,
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* certificate status request info */
|
|
|
|
/* Callback for status request */
|
|
|
|
int (*status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *status_arg;
|
|
|
|
/* ext status type used for CSR extension (OCSP Stapling) */
|
|
|
|
int status_type;
|
2017-11-05 16:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/* RFC 4366 Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
|
|
/* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */
|
|
|
|
size_t ecpointformats_len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *ecpointformats;
|
|
|
|
size_t supportedgroups_len;
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *supportedgroups;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
|
|
|
|
* ALPN.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the
|
|
|
|
* server to select the protocol for the connection.
|
|
|
|
* out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol
|
|
|
|
* name (without the length prefix).
|
|
|
|
* outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|.
|
|
|
|
* in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in
|
|
|
|
* wire-format.
|
|
|
|
* inlen: the length of |in|.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*alpn_select_cb) (SSL *s,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char **out,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *outlen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *in,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int inlen, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *alpn_select_cb_arg;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
|
|
|
|
* format.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *alpn;
|
|
|
|
size_t alpn_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-11 10:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Next protocol negotiation information */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
|
|
|
|
* advertised protocols can be provided.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-12-11 20:01:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_npn_advertised_cb_func npn_advertised_cb;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
void *npn_advertised_cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next
|
|
|
|
* protocol from the list provided by the server.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-12-11 20:01:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_npn_select_cb_func npn_select_cb;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
void *npn_select_cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-09-11 14:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char cookie_hmac_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
} ext;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
2016-12-11 20:01:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_psk_client_cb_func psk_client_callback;
|
|
|
|
SSL_psk_server_cb_func psk_server_callback;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-06-12 08:18:24 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func psk_find_session_cb;
|
2017-06-12 12:30:21 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func psk_use_session_cb;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
|
|
SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-29 18:28:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Shared DANE context */
|
|
|
|
struct dane_ctx_st dane;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-21 20:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
|
2018-03-21 20:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session
|
|
|
|
* basis, depending on the chosen cipher.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure);
|
2014-12-02 20:44:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-29 17:26:07 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
|
2017-01-20 16:22:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Callback for logging key material for use with debugging tools like
|
|
|
|
* Wireshark. The callback should log `line` followed by a newline.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func keylog_callback;
|
2017-02-17 16:52:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-05 13:40:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The maximum number of bytes advertised in session tickets that can be
|
|
|
|
* sent as early data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-02-17 16:52:12 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t max_early_data;
|
2017-04-05 16:35:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-05 13:40:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The maximum number of bytes of early data that a server will tolerate
|
|
|
|
* (which should be at least as much as max_early_data).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t recv_max_early_data;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-05 16:35:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS1.3 padding callback */
|
|
|
|
size_t (*record_padding_cb)(SSL *s, int type, size_t len, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *record_padding_arg;
|
|
|
|
size_t block_padding;
|
2017-03-15 17:25:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Session ticket appdata */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_generate_session_ticket_fn generate_ticket_cb;
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_decrypt_session_ticket_fn decrypt_ticket_cb;
|
|
|
|
void *ticket_cb_data;
|
2018-01-31 17:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The number of TLS1.3 tickets to automatically send */
|
|
|
|
size_t num_tickets;
|
2018-06-07 14:14:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Callback to determine if early_data is acceptable or not */
|
|
|
|
SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn allow_early_data_cb;
|
|
|
|
void *allow_early_data_cb_data;
|
2018-08-13 14:53:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do we advertise Post-handshake auth support? */
|
|
|
|
int pha_enabled;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_st {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION,
|
|
|
|
* DTLS1_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int version;
|
|
|
|
/* SSLv3 */
|
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *method;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This
|
|
|
|
* is so data can be read and written to different handlers
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* used by SSL_read */
|
|
|
|
BIO *rbio;
|
|
|
|
/* used by SSL_write */
|
|
|
|
BIO *wbio;
|
|
|
|
/* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */
|
|
|
|
BIO *bbio;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1
|
|
|
|
* is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what
|
|
|
|
* request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int rwstate;
|
|
|
|
int (*handshake_func) (SSL *);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon
|
|
|
|
* as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so
|
|
|
|
* that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as
|
|
|
|
* handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an
|
|
|
|
* "init" member.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-09-10 08:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* are we the server side? */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int server;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Generate a new session or reuse an old one.
|
|
|
|
* NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
|
|
|
|
* cached session or even the previous session unless
|
|
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int new_session;
|
|
|
|
/* don't send shutdown packets */
|
|
|
|
int quiet_shutdown;
|
|
|
|
/* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */
|
|
|
|
int shutdown;
|
|
|
|
/* where we are */
|
2015-10-05 09:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
OSSL_STATEM statem;
|
2017-02-21 09:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE early_data_state;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */
|
|
|
|
void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by
|
|
|
|
* ssl3_get_message() */
|
2016-09-06 11:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t init_num; /* amount read/written */
|
|
|
|
size_t init_off; /* amount read/written */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */
|
|
|
|
struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
|
|
|
|
/* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
|
|
|
|
void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
|
|
|
|
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *msg_callback_arg;
|
|
|
|
int hit; /* reusing a previous session */
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
|
2015-12-29 18:28:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Per connection DANE state */
|
2016-04-08 13:10:06 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_DANE dane;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* crypto */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
|
2018-02-16 11:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLSv1.3 specific ciphersuites */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to
|
|
|
|
* be 'copied' into these ones
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t mac_flags;
|
2016-11-08 10:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-06-01 15:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* The TLS1.3 secrets.
|
2016-11-08 10:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char handshake_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2018-06-01 15:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char resumption_master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2016-11-11 00:20:19 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char client_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char server_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2016-12-29 17:11:27 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char server_finished_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2017-02-22 14:09:42 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char handshake_traffic_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2017-02-10 17:43:09 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char client_app_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char server_app_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2017-06-27 13:57:15 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char exporter_master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2018-02-04 03:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
|
2016-11-17 18:00:17 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char read_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* TLSv1.3 static read IV */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */
|
2015-05-08 16:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
|
2016-11-17 18:00:17 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char write_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* TLSv1.3 static write IV */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
|
|
|
|
/* session info */
|
|
|
|
/* client cert? */
|
|
|
|
/* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
|
|
|
|
struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
|
2016-12-05 17:04:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The hash of all messages prior to the CertificateVerify, and the length
|
|
|
|
* of that hash.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char cert_verify_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
size_t cert_verify_hash_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-30 16:16:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Flag to indicate whether we should send a HelloRetryRequest or not */
|
2017-11-13 11:24:51 +00:00
|
|
|
enum {SSL_HRR_NONE = 0, SSL_HRR_PENDING, SSL_HRR_COMPLETE}
|
|
|
|
hello_retry_request;
|
2017-01-30 16:16:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in
|
|
|
|
* the appropriate context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-10-04 19:31:19 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t sid_ctx_length;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
/* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session;
|
2017-06-12 12:30:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLSv1.3 PSK session */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *psksession;
|
2017-07-05 19:53:03 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *psksession_id;
|
|
|
|
size_t psksession_id_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Default generate session ID callback. */
|
|
|
|
GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
|
2017-11-07 10:45:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The temporary TLSv1.3 session id. This isn't really a session id at all
|
|
|
|
* but is a random value sent in the legacy session id field.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char tmp_session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
size_t tmp_session_id_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Used in SSL3 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* 0 don't care about verify failure.
|
|
|
|
* 1 fail if verify fails
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t verify_mode;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* fail if callback returns 0 */
|
|
|
|
int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* optional informational callback */
|
|
|
|
void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
|
|
|
|
/* error bytes to be written */
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
/* actual code */
|
|
|
|
int error_code;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
2016-12-11 20:01:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_psk_client_cb_func psk_client_callback;
|
|
|
|
SSL_psk_server_cb_func psk_server_callback;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-06-12 08:18:24 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func psk_find_session_cb;
|
2017-06-12 12:30:21 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func psk_use_session_cb;
|
2018-06-07 08:11:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
2016-02-06 03:17:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Verified chain of peer */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
long verify_result;
|
2016-02-06 03:17:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* extra application data */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
|
2018-10-26 10:43:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* What we put in certificate_authorities extension for TLS 1.3
|
|
|
|
* (ClientHello and CertificateRequest) or just client cert requests for
|
|
|
|
* earlier versions. If client_ca_names is populated then it is only used
|
|
|
|
* for client cert requests, and in preference to ca_names.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-13 15:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
|
2018-10-26 10:43:19 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names;
|
2016-08-27 14:01:08 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* protocol behaviour */
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t options;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* API behaviour */
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t mode;
|
2015-12-06 16:56:41 +00:00
|
|
|
int min_proto_version;
|
|
|
|
int max_proto_version;
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_cert_list;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int first_packet;
|
2016-11-23 13:56:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* What was passed in ClientHello.legacy_version. Used for RSA pre-master
|
|
|
|
* secret and SSLv3/TLS (<=1.2) rollback check
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int client_version;
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data
|
|
|
|
* up between the pipes?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t split_send_fragment;
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can
|
|
|
|
* be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_send_fragment;
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t max_pipelines;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
2017-05-09 12:44:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Built-in extension flags */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t extflags[TLSEXT_IDX_num_builtins];
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS extension debug callback */
|
2017-01-09 17:42:15 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*debug_cb)(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
void *debug_arg;
|
|
|
|
char *hostname;
|
|
|
|
/* certificate status request info */
|
|
|
|
/* Status type or -1 if no status type */
|
|
|
|
int status_type;
|
|
|
|
/* Raw extension data, if seen */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *scts;
|
|
|
|
/* Length of raw extension data, if seen */
|
|
|
|
uint16_t scts_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */
|
|
|
|
int status_expected;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
/* OCSP status request only */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids;
|
|
|
|
X509_EXTENSIONS *exts;
|
|
|
|
/* OCSP response received or to be sent */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *resp;
|
|
|
|
size_t resp_len;
|
|
|
|
} ocsp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
|
|
|
|
int ticket_expected;
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
|
|
size_t ecpointformats_len;
|
|
|
|
/* our list */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *ecpointformats;
|
2017-10-11 12:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t supportedgroups_len;
|
|
|
|
/* our list */
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *supportedgroups;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
|
|
|
|
TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *session_ticket;
|
|
|
|
/* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
|
|
|
|
tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn session_ticket_cb;
|
|
|
|
void *session_ticket_cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
/* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */
|
|
|
|
tls_session_secret_cb_fn session_secret_cb;
|
|
|
|
void *session_secret_cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
|
|
|
|
* format.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *alpn;
|
|
|
|
size_t alpn_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
|
|
|
|
* we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
|
|
|
|
* extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
|
|
|
|
* NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before
|
|
|
|
* the Finished message.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *npn;
|
|
|
|
size_t npn_len;
|
2017-01-12 15:28:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-19 12:12:35 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The available PSK key exchange modes */
|
2017-01-12 15:28:48 +00:00
|
|
|
int psk_kex_mode;
|
2017-02-03 14:06:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set to one if we have negotiated ETM */
|
|
|
|
int use_etm;
|
2017-02-20 16:35:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-22 13:01:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Are we expecting to receive early data? */
|
|
|
|
int early_data;
|
2017-02-24 09:30:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Is the session suitable for early data? */
|
|
|
|
int early_data_ok;
|
2017-03-02 17:37:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* May be sent by a server in HRR. Must be echoed back in ClientHello */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *tls13_cookie;
|
|
|
|
size_t tls13_cookie_len;
|
2017-09-13 13:50:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Have we received a cookie from the client? */
|
|
|
|
int cookieok;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-05 16:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Maximum Fragment Length as per RFC 4366.
|
|
|
|
* If this member contains one of the allowed values (1-4)
|
|
|
|
* then we should include Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation
|
|
|
|
* extension in Client Hello.
|
|
|
|
* Please note that value of this member does not have direct
|
|
|
|
* effect. The actual (binding) value is stored in SSL_SESSION,
|
|
|
|
* as this extension is optional on server side.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode;
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
} ext;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-07 22:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Parsed form of the ClientHello, kept around across client_hello_cb
|
|
|
|
* calls.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Add SSL_CTX early callback
Provide a callback interface that gives the application the ability
to adjust the nascent SSL object at the earliest stage of ClientHello
processing, immediately after extensions have been collected but
before they have been processed.
This is akin to BoringSSL's "select_certificate_cb" (though it is not
API compatible), and as the name indicates, one major use is to examine
the supplied server name indication and select what certificate to
present to the client. However, it can also be used to make more
sweeping configuration changes to the SSL object according to the
selected server identity and configuration. That may include adjusting
the permitted TLS versions, swapping out the SSL_CTX object (as is
traditionally done in a tlsext_servername_callback), changing the
server's cipher list, and more.
We also wish to allow an early callback to indicate that it needs to perform
additional work asynchronously and resume processing later. To that effect,
refactor the second half of tls_process_client_hello() into a subroutine to be
called at the post-processing stage (including the early callback itself), to
allow the callback to result in remaining in the same work stage for a later
call to succeed. This requires allocating for and storing the CLIENTHELLO_MSG
in the SSL object to be preserved across such calls, but the storage is
reclaimed after ClientHello processing finishes.
Information about the CliehtHello is available to the callback by means of
accessor functions that can only be used from the early callback. This allows
extensions to make use of the existing internal parsing machinery without
exposing structure internals (e.g., of PACKET), so that applications do not
have to write fragile parsing code.
Applications are encouraged to utilize an early callback and not use
a servername_callback, in order to avoid unexpected behavior that
occurs due to the relative order of processing between things like
session resumption and the historical servername callback.
Also tidy up nearby style by removing unnecessary braces around one-line
conditional bodies.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
2017-01-23 23:03:16 +00:00
|
|
|
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* no further mod of servername
|
|
|
|
* 0 : call the servername extension callback.
|
|
|
|
* 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback.
|
|
|
|
* 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int servername_done;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
2016-03-03 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient.
|
|
|
|
* If they are not, the connection should be aborted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-04-07 18:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback;
|
2016-11-17 22:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/* User-supplied argument that is passed to the ct_validation_callback */
|
2016-03-03 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
void *ct_validation_callback_arg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Consolidated stack of SCTs from all sources.
|
|
|
|
* Lazily populated by CT_get_peer_scts(SSL*)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SCT) *scts;
|
|
|
|
/* Have we attempted to find/parse SCTs yet? */
|
|
|
|
int scts_parsed;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-01-31 20:32:50 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *session_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
|
2018-03-21 20:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* What we'll do */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
|
|
|
|
/* What's been chosen */
|
|
|
|
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile;
|
2018-03-21 20:01:24 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* 1 if we are renegotiating.
|
|
|
|
* 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
|
|
|
|
* (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int renegotiate;
|
2017-02-08 09:15:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If sending a KeyUpdate is pending */
|
2017-02-16 17:04:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int key_update;
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Post-handshake authentication state */
|
|
|
|
SSL_PHA_STATE post_handshake_auth;
|
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int pha_enabled;
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t* pha_context;
|
|
|
|
size_t pha_context_len;
|
|
|
|
int certreqs_sent;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *pha_dgst; /* this is just the digest through ClientFinished */
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ctx for SRP authentication */
|
|
|
|
SRP_CTX srp_ctx;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session
|
|
|
|
* basis, depending on the chosen cipher.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure);
|
2015-01-30 14:57:54 +00:00
|
|
|
RECORD_LAYER rlayer;
|
2015-11-09 14:38:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Default password callback. */
|
|
|
|
pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
|
|
|
|
/* Default password callback user data. */
|
|
|
|
void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
|
2015-02-13 23:28:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Async Job info */
|
|
|
|
ASYNC_JOB *job;
|
2016-01-25 15:28:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx;
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t asyncrw;
|
2016-09-06 11:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-05 13:40:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The maximum number of bytes advertised in session tickets that can be
|
|
|
|
* sent as early data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-02-17 16:52:12 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t max_early_data;
|
2018-07-05 13:40:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The maximum number of bytes of early data that a server will tolerate
|
|
|
|
* (which should be at least as much as max_early_data).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t recv_max_early_data;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-23 14:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The number of bytes of early data received so far. If we accepted early
|
|
|
|
* data then this is a count of the plaintext bytes. If we rejected it then
|
|
|
|
* this is a count of the ciphertext bytes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t early_data_count;
|
2017-02-17 16:52:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-05 16:35:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS1.3 padding callback */
|
|
|
|
size_t (*record_padding_cb)(SSL *s, int type, size_t len, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *record_padding_arg;
|
|
|
|
size_t block_padding;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-29 17:26:07 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
|
2018-01-31 17:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The number of TLS1.3 tickets to automatically send */
|
|
|
|
size_t num_tickets;
|
|
|
|
/* The number of TLS1.3 tickets actually sent so far */
|
|
|
|
size_t sent_tickets;
|
2018-06-01 15:52:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The next nonce value to use when we send a ticket on this connection */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t next_ticket_nonce;
|
2018-06-07 14:14:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Callback to determine if early_data is acceptable or not */
|
|
|
|
SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn allow_early_data_cb;
|
|
|
|
void *allow_early_data_cb_data;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Structure containing table entry of values associated with the signature
|
|
|
|
* algorithms (signature scheme) extension
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st {
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 signature scheme name */
|
|
|
|
const char *name;
|
|
|
|
/* Raw value used in extension */
|
|
|
|
uint16_t sigalg;
|
2017-05-24 20:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* NID of hash algorithm or NID_undef if no hash */
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int hash;
|
2017-05-24 20:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Index of hash algorithm or -1 if no hash algorithm */
|
2017-01-30 16:05:23 +00:00
|
|
|
int hash_idx;
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* NID of signature algorithm */
|
|
|
|
int sig;
|
2017-01-30 16:05:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Index of signature algorithm */
|
|
|
|
int sig_idx;
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Combined hash and signature NID, if any */
|
|
|
|
int sigandhash;
|
|
|
|
/* Required public key curve (ECDSA only) */
|
|
|
|
int curve;
|
|
|
|
} SIGALG_LOOKUP;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-22 22:47:54 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct tls_group_info_st {
|
|
|
|
int nid; /* Curve NID */
|
|
|
|
int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
|
|
|
|
uint16_t flags; /* Flags: currently just group type */
|
|
|
|
} TLS_GROUP_INFO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* flags values */
|
|
|
|
# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 /* Mask for group type */
|
|
|
|
# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
|
|
|
|
# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
|
|
|
|
# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-14 00:35:26 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct cert_pkey_st CERT_PKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-28 16:45:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Structure containing table entry of certificate info corresponding to
|
|
|
|
* CERT_PKEY entries
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
int nid; /* NID of pubic key algorithm */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t amask; /* authmask corresponding to key type */
|
|
|
|
} SSL_CERT_LOOKUP;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
|
|
|
|
long flags;
|
2016-10-03 21:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t read_mac_secret_size;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2016-10-03 21:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t write_mac_secret_size;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
/* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
|
|
|
|
int need_empty_fragments;
|
|
|
|
int empty_fragment_done;
|
|
|
|
/* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
|
|
|
|
BIO *handshake_buffer;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-11-25 18:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and
|
|
|
|
* freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here.
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-11-25 18:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
|
|
|
|
* Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
|
|
|
|
* Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int change_cipher_spec;
|
|
|
|
int warn_alert;
|
|
|
|
int fatal_alert;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
|
|
|
|
* alert via the warning alert
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int alert_dispatch;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char send_alert[2];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
|
|
|
|
* is no more data in the read or write buffers
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int renegotiate;
|
|
|
|
int total_renegotiations;
|
|
|
|
int num_renegotiations;
|
|
|
|
int in_read_app_data;
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
/* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t finish_md_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t peer_finish_md_len;
|
2016-09-06 11:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t message_size;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int message_type;
|
|
|
|
/* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* used for certificate requests */
|
|
|
|
int cert_req;
|
2017-02-23 22:12:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Certificate types in certificate request message. */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *ctype;
|
|
|
|
size_t ctype_len;
|
2017-03-13 15:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Certificate authorities list peer sent */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *peer_ca_names;
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t key_block_length;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *key_block;
|
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *new_hash;
|
|
|
|
int new_mac_pkey_type;
|
2016-10-03 21:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t new_mac_secret_size;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# else
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
char *new_compression;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int cert_request;
|
2015-05-12 16:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *ciphers_raw;
|
|
|
|
size_t ciphers_rawlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Temporary storage for premaster secret */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *pms;
|
|
|
|
size_t pmslen;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
2015-06-28 15:52:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Temporary storage for PSK key */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *psk;
|
|
|
|
size_t psklen;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-01-31 17:45:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Signature algorithm we actually use */
|
|
|
|
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
|
2017-02-14 00:35:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Pointer to certificate we use */
|
|
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cert;
|
2015-05-12 16:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature
|
|
|
|
* algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate
|
|
|
|
* request for client.
|
Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
2018-01-11 17:47:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Keep track of the algorithms for TLS and X.509 usage separately.
|
2015-05-12 16:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-01-25 14:33:55 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
|
Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
2018-01-11 17:47:12 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *peer_cert_sigalgs;
|
|
|
|
/* Size of above arrays */
|
2015-05-12 16:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t peer_sigalgslen;
|
Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
2018-01-11 17:47:12 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t peer_cert_sigalgslen;
|
2017-11-12 00:03:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Sigalg peer actually uses */
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *peer_sigalg;
|
2015-05-12 21:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current
|
|
|
|
* SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc.
|
|
|
|
* If zero it can't be used at all.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
|
2015-05-18 22:29:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms
|
|
|
|
* that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of
|
|
|
|
* *disabled* algorithms based on the current session.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-11-05 16:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t mask_k;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t mask_a;
|
2016-02-07 19:17:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or
|
|
|
|
* not. It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using
|
|
|
|
* based on what it knows so far.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int min_ver;
|
|
|
|
int max_ver;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
} tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t previous_client_finished_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t previous_server_finished_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-12-08 19:18:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int npn_seen;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
|
|
|
|
* ALPN.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
|
|
|
|
* ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
|
|
|
|
* that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *alpn_selected;
|
2016-03-05 13:47:55 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t alpn_selected_len;
|
|
|
|
/* used by the server to know what options were proposed */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *alpn_proposed;
|
|
|
|
size_t alpn_proposed_len;
|
|
|
|
/* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */
|
|
|
|
int alpn_sent;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
|
|
|
|
* running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
|
|
|
|
* 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char is_probably_safari;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
2015-06-21 15:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For clients: peer temporary key */
|
2015-12-17 01:07:46 +00:00
|
|
|
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
|
2016-11-01 13:24:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The group_id for the DH/ECDH key */
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
2015-12-14 00:33:33 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp;
|
2015-06-21 15:26:08 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
} SSL3_STATE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* DTLS structures */
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
# define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD 48
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 21:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Flag used in message reuse to indicate the buffer contains the record
|
2017-12-29 06:07:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* header as well as the handshake message header.
|
2015-09-14 21:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# define DTLS1_SKIP_RECORD_HEADER 2
|
2015-09-14 21:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dtls1_retransmit_state {
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
|
|
|
|
COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session;
|
|
|
|
unsigned short epoch;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char type;
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t msg_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned short seq;
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t frag_off;
|
|
|
|
size_t frag_len;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int is_ccs;
|
|
|
|
struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct dtls1_timeout_st {
|
|
|
|
/* Number of read timeouts so far */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int read_timeouts;
|
|
|
|
/* Number of write timeouts so far */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int write_timeouts;
|
|
|
|
/* Number of alerts received so far */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num_alerts;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct hm_fragment_st {
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st msg_header;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *fragment;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *reassembly;
|
|
|
|
} hm_fragment;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-22 19:54:01 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct pqueue_st pqueue;
|
|
|
|
typedef struct pitem_st pitem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct pitem_st {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char priority[8]; /* 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */
|
|
|
|
void *data;
|
|
|
|
pitem *next;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct pitem_st *piterator;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data);
|
|
|
|
void pitem_free(pitem *item);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
pqueue *pqueue_new(void);
|
2016-01-22 19:54:01 +00:00
|
|
|
void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq);
|
|
|
|
pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item);
|
|
|
|
pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq);
|
|
|
|
pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq);
|
|
|
|
pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be);
|
|
|
|
pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq);
|
|
|
|
pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *iter);
|
2016-10-06 18:17:54 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t pqueue_size(pqueue *pq);
|
2016-01-22 19:54:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct dtls1_state_st {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
|
2016-10-04 20:04:03 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t cookie_len;
|
2015-09-08 08:38:08 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int cookie_verified;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* handshake message numbers */
|
|
|
|
unsigned short handshake_write_seq;
|
|
|
|
unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq;
|
|
|
|
unsigned short handshake_read_seq;
|
|
|
|
/* Buffered handshake messages */
|
2016-01-22 19:54:01 +00:00
|
|
|
pqueue *buffered_messages;
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Buffered (sent) handshake records */
|
2016-01-22 19:54:01 +00:00
|
|
|
pqueue *sent_messages;
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */
|
|
|
|
size_t mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st r_msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-11-13 21:24:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* Indicates when the last handshake msg sent will timeout
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct timeval next_timeout;
|
|
|
|
/* Timeout duration */
|
2017-09-06 06:30:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int timeout_duration_us;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int retransmitting;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int shutdown_received;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-09-06 06:30:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DTLS_timer_cb timer_cb;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
|
|
|
} DTLS1_STATE;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters
|
2002-08-09 08:56:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1
|
|
|
|
# define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2
|
|
|
|
# define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3
|
|
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-14 00:35:26 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cert_pkey_st {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
X509 *x509;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
|
|
|
|
/* Chain for this certificate */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
|
2015-01-05 11:30:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* serverinfo data for this certificate. The data is in TLS Extension
|
|
|
|
* wire format, specifically it's a series of records like:
|
|
|
|
* uint16_t extension_type; // (RFC 5246, 7.4.1.4, Extension)
|
|
|
|
* uint16_t length;
|
|
|
|
* uint8_t data[length];
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *serverinfo;
|
|
|
|
size_t serverinfo_length;
|
2017-02-14 00:35:26 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
2012-08-15 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Retrieve Suite B flags */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define tls1_suiteb(s) (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
|
2012-08-15 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \
|
|
|
|
(SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-07 10:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
ENDPOINT_CLIENT = 0,
|
|
|
|
ENDPOINT_SERVER,
|
|
|
|
ENDPOINT_BOTH
|
|
|
|
} ENDPOINT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-05 14:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned short ext_type;
|
2017-04-07 10:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ENDPOINT role;
|
2017-04-05 10:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The context which this extension applies to */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int context;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Per-connection flags relating to this extension type: not used if
|
|
|
|
* part of an SSL_CTX structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t ext_flags;
|
2017-04-07 10:04:38 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb;
|
|
|
|
SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
void *add_arg;
|
2017-04-07 10:04:38 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
void *parse_arg;
|
2014-08-10 11:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
} custom_ext_method;
|
2014-08-05 14:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 13:25:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ext_flags values */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Indicates an extension has been received. Used to check for unsolicited or
|
|
|
|
* duplicate extensions.
|
2014-08-12 13:25:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED 0x1
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Indicates an extension has been sent: used to enable sending of
|
|
|
|
* corresponding ServerHello extension.
|
2014-08-12 13:25:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT 0x2
|
2014-08-12 13:25:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-05 14:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
custom_ext_method *meths;
|
|
|
|
size_t meths_count;
|
2014-08-10 11:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
} custom_ext_methods;
|
2014-08-05 14:21:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct cert_st {
|
|
|
|
/* Current active set */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
|
|
|
|
* Probably it would make more sense to store
|
|
|
|
* an index, not a pointer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
CERT_PKEY *key;
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
2015-12-17 00:05:26 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *dh_tmp;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
|
|
|
|
int dh_tmp_auto;
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
/* Flags related to certificates */
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t cert_flags;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
|
2017-02-23 22:12:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Custom certificate types sent in certificate request message. */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *ctype;
|
|
|
|
size_t ctype_len;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-08-05 17:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* supported signature algorithms. When set on a client this is sent in
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* the client hello as the supported signature algorithms extension. For
|
|
|
|
* servers it represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-01-25 14:33:55 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *conf_sigalgs;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Size of above array */
|
|
|
|
size_t conf_sigalgslen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Client authentication signature algorithms, if not set then uses
|
|
|
|
* conf_sigalgs. On servers these will be the signature algorithms sent
|
2016-11-17 22:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* to the client in a certificate request for TLS 1.2. On a client this
|
|
|
|
* represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use for client
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* authentication.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-01-25 14:33:55 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *client_sigalgs;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Size of above array */
|
|
|
|
size_t client_sigalgslen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Signature algorithms shared by client and server: cached because these
|
|
|
|
* are used most often.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-01-26 15:24:35 +00:00
|
|
|
const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shared_sigalgs;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t shared_sigalgslen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a certificate
|
|
|
|
* may be required (client or server). the callback can then examine any
|
|
|
|
* appropriate parameters and setup any certificates required. This
|
|
|
|
* allows advanced applications to select certificates on the fly: for
|
|
|
|
* example based on supported signature algorithms or curves.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int (*cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
void *cert_cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Optional X509_STORE for chain building or certificate validation If
|
|
|
|
* NULL the parent SSL_CTX store is used instead.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE *chain_store;
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE *verify_store;
|
2017-04-05 10:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Custom extensions */
|
|
|
|
custom_ext_methods custext;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Security callback */
|
2016-02-07 19:44:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*sec_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
void *other, void *ex);
|
|
|
|
/* Security level */
|
|
|
|
int sec_level;
|
|
|
|
void *sec_ex;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
2015-09-14 16:58:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If not NULL psk identity hint to use for servers */
|
|
|
|
char *psk_identity_hint;
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2016-08-27 14:01:08 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
|
2016-02-29 17:26:07 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
} CERT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit
|
|
|
|
* of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef struct ssl3_enc_method {
|
2016-10-03 21:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*enc) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, size_t, int);
|
2015-09-22 10:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mac) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *);
|
|
|
|
int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *,
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t, size_t *);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int);
|
2016-10-04 20:14:24 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, size_t, unsigned char *);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *client_finished_label;
|
2016-10-06 18:17:54 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t client_finished_label_len;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *server_finished_label;
|
2016-10-06 18:17:54 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t server_finished_label_len;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*alert_value) (int);
|
|
|
|
int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
|
|
|
|
const char *, size_t,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *, size_t,
|
|
|
|
int use_context);
|
|
|
|
/* Various flags indicating protocol version requirements */
|
2015-07-14 22:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
uint32_t enc_flags;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Set the handshake header */
|
2016-09-29 21:40:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*set_handshake_header) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int type);
|
2016-08-03 19:57:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Close construction of the handshake message */
|
2016-09-30 09:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*close_construct_packet) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Write out handshake message */
|
|
|
|
int (*do_write) (SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
} SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-29 21:40:15 +00:00
|
|
|
# define ssl_set_handshake_header(s, pkt, htype) \
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->set_handshake_header((s), (pkt), (htype))
|
2016-09-30 09:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
# define ssl_close_construct_packet(s, pkt, htype) \
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->close_construct_packet((s), (pkt), (htype))
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define ssl_do_write(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->do_write(s)
|
2013-03-11 15:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Values for enc_flags */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Uses explicit IV for CBC mode */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV 0x1
|
2013-03-11 15:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Uses signature algorithms extension */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS 0x2
|
2013-03-13 15:33:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Uses SHA256 default PRF */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 0x4
|
2013-03-11 15:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Is DTLS */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS 0x8
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may
|
|
|
|
* apply to others in future.
|
2013-03-27 19:54:48 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS 0x10
|
2013-03-11 15:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
1998-12-22 15:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct ssl3_comp_st {
|
|
|
|
int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression
|
|
|
|
* type */
|
|
|
|
char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */
|
|
|
|
COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */
|
|
|
|
} SSL3_COMP;
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 08:52:54 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef enum downgrade_en {
|
|
|
|
DOWNGRADE_NONE,
|
|
|
|
DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2,
|
|
|
|
DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
|
|
|
|
} DOWNGRADE;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-07 17:27:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Dummy status type for the status_type extension. Indicates no status type
|
|
|
|
* set
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing -1
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Sigalgs values */
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 0x0403
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 0x0503
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 0x0603
|
2017-06-08 16:15:45 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224 0x0303
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1 0x0203
|
2018-01-11 19:39:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 0x0804
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 0x0805
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 0x0806
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256 0x0809
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384 0x080a
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512 0x080b
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 0x0401
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 0x0501
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512 0x0601
|
2017-06-08 16:15:45 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224 0x0301
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1 0x0201
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256 0x0402
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384 0x0502
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512 0x0602
|
2017-06-08 16:15:45 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224 0x0302
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1 0x0202
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256 0xeeee
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 0xefef
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411 0xeded
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-24 20:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519 0x0807
|
2018-02-27 10:12:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448 0x0808
|
2017-05-24 20:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-12 15:28:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Known PSK key exchange modes */
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE 0x00
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE 0x01
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Internal representations of key exchange modes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE 0
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE 1
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE 2
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* An invalid index into the TLSv1.3 PSK identities */
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY -1
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#define SSL_USE_PSS(s) (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg != NULL && \
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
2017-01-03 10:01:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* A dummy signature value not valid for TLSv1.2 signature algs */
|
|
|
|
#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss 0x0101
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 09:57:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinel values */
|
|
|
|
extern const unsigned char tls11downgrade[8];
|
|
|
|
extern const unsigned char tls12downgrade[8];
|
2016-12-14 14:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-13 21:46:30 +00:00
|
|
|
extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
|
1999-05-13 11:37:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-02 21:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_client_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_client_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_client_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_client_method(void);
|
2016-10-21 16:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_3_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_3_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_3_client_method(void);
|
2016-03-02 21:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_client_method(void);
|
2016-07-25 17:03:27 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtls_bad_ver_client_method(void);
|
2016-03-02 21:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_server_method(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_client_method(void);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-29 21:13:31 +00:00
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
|
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data;
|
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data;
|
2016-10-21 16:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_3_enc_data;
|
2014-06-29 20:05:23 +00:00
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
|
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
|
|
|
|
extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data;
|
2005-08-05 23:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Flags for SSL methods
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS (1U<<0)
|
|
|
|
# define SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB (1U<<1)
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \
|
2016-03-11 14:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
s_connect, enc_data) \
|
2005-08-14 21:48:33 +00:00
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
|
|
|
|
version, \
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
flags, \
|
|
|
|
mask, \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
tls1_new, \
|
|
|
|
tls1_clear, \
|
|
|
|
tls1_free, \
|
|
|
|
s_accept, \
|
|
|
|
s_connect, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_read, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_peek, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_write, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_shutdown, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_read_bytes, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_write_bytes, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_pending, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_num_ciphers, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_get_cipher, \
|
|
|
|
tls1_default_timeout, \
|
|
|
|
&enc_data, \
|
|
|
|
ssl_undefined_void_function, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
return &func_name##_data; \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-11 14:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
# define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect) \
|
2005-08-14 21:48:33 +00:00
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
|
|
|
|
SSL3_VERSION, \
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS | SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, \
|
|
|
|
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl3_new, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_clear, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_free, \
|
|
|
|
s_accept, \
|
|
|
|
s_connect, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_read, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_peek, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_write, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_shutdown, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_read_bytes, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_write_bytes, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_pending, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_num_ciphers, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_get_cipher, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_default_timeout, \
|
|
|
|
&SSLv3_enc_data, \
|
|
|
|
ssl_undefined_void_function, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
return &func_name##_data; \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \
|
2016-03-11 14:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
s_connect, enc_data) \
|
2005-08-14 21:48:33 +00:00
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
|
|
|
|
version, \
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
flags, \
|
|
|
|
mask, \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
dtls1_new, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_clear, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_free, \
|
|
|
|
s_accept, \
|
|
|
|
s_connect, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_read, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_peek, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_write, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_shutdown, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_read_bytes, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_dispatch_alert, \
|
|
|
|
dtls1_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_pending, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_num_ciphers, \
|
2016-03-08 19:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl3_get_cipher, \
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
dtls1_default_timeout, \
|
|
|
|
&enc_data, \
|
|
|
|
ssl_undefined_void_function, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
return &func_name##_data; \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct openssl_ssl_test_functions {
|
2016-05-17 11:28:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-07 19:17:07 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version);
|
2016-02-07 19:56:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-13 15:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Returns true if certificate and private key for 'idx' are present */
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int ssl_has_cert(const SSL *s, int idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509 != NULL
|
|
|
|
&& s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey != NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-26 14:28:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static ossl_inline void tls1_get_peer_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
|
|
|
|
size_t *pgroupslen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*pgroups = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
|
|
|
|
*pgroupslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
|
2014-07-23 12:18:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-19 19:15:35 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_write_internal(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
|
2012-06-18 12:56:59 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
|
Session resume broken switching contexts
When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
2016-09-01 12:40:54 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_generate_session_id(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *ss);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
|
2018-06-13 14:57:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id,
|
|
|
|
size_t sess_id_len);
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello);
|
2015-05-18 15:27:48 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp);
|
2018-02-16 11:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *rule_str,
|
|
|
|
CERT *c);
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cache_cipherlist(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, int sslv2format);
|
2017-01-31 01:20:14 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs, int sslv2format,
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int fatal);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int use_etm);
|
2016-10-05 23:44:59 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead,
|
|
|
|
size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize,
|
|
|
|
size_t *ext_overhead);
|
2017-06-28 16:45:10 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_is_disabled(size_t idx);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl,
|
2017-02-06 17:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *ptr,
|
|
|
|
int all);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long arg);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg);
|
2012-01-31 14:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain,
|
|
|
|
int ref);
|
2013-12-15 13:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-07 19:44:27 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
|
|
|
|
void *other);
|
2013-12-15 13:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-17 15:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(int nid, size_t *pidx);
|
2017-06-28 16:45:10 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pk,
|
|
|
|
size_t *pidx);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(size_t idx);
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char **serverinfo,
|
|
|
|
size_t *serverinfo_length);
|
2016-02-17 15:39:25 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
|
2018-03-28 19:34:16 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_x509err2alert(int type);
|
2016-03-16 16:33:00 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void);
|
2017-05-19 08:35:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_load_ciphers(void);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field,
|
2017-03-22 08:52:54 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t len, DOWNGRADE dgrd);
|
2015-06-17 03:10:04 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
|
|
|
|
int free_pms);
|
2016-08-15 13:07:33 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm);
|
2016-11-02 15:03:56 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
|
|
|
|
int genmaster);
|
2015-12-18 15:58:28 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh);
|
2017-11-05 16:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur unsigned int ssl_get_max_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl);
|
|
|
|
__owur unsigned int ssl_get_split_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(uint32_t id);
|
2017-06-29 19:06:19 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(const char *stdname);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
|
2016-09-05 16:34:04 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, WPACKET *pkt,
|
2016-08-03 19:57:52 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t *len);
|
2016-06-03 10:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
size_t *secret_size);
|
2016-09-29 13:25:52 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_num_ciphers(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl);
|
2017-01-10 23:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl, int initok);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
|
2016-10-04 20:14:24 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur size_t ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, size_t slen,
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p);
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
2007-08-31 12:42:53 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
|
2016-09-29 22:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk);
|
2015-12-23 00:47:28 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr);
|
2015-06-16 13:44:29 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_new(SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl3_free(SSL *s);
|
2016-10-26 09:43:34 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes);
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t len, size_t *written);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s);
|
2017-05-22 11:33:42 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_clear(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
|
|
|
|
__owur long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
|
|
|
|
__owur long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
|
|
|
|
__owur long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
|
|
|
|
__owur long ssl3_default_timeout(void);
|
2005-08-05 23:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-29 21:40:15 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype);
|
2016-09-30 09:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype);
|
2017-01-10 23:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s);
|
2016-09-29 21:40:15 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype);
|
2016-09-30 09:38:32 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-04 15:02:20 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version,
|
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD **meth);
|
2016-03-11 14:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound);
|
2017-03-22 08:52:54 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
|
|
|
|
DOWNGRADE *dgrd);
|
2017-11-03 16:38:48 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version,
|
|
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions);
|
2018-02-09 18:03:08 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
|
2018-08-20 14:12:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int *max_version, int *real_max);
|
2015-12-29 08:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur long tls1_default_timeout(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
|
2016-02-14 03:33:56 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char mt,
|
2016-10-04 20:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t len,
|
|
|
|
size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
size_t *written);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
|
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
|
2016-02-14 03:33:56 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
|
2015-03-24 15:10:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
|
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.
The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.
However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.
Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.
So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.
An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.
I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.
A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.
The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.
Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.
As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.
Issue reported by Quan Luo.
CVE-2016-2179
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-06-30 12:17:08 +00:00
|
|
|
void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data,
|
|
|
|
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
|
|
|
|
__owur struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft);
|
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
|
2009-05-16 11:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
|
2009-05-16 11:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
|
2016-09-21 10:26:47 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
|
2016-10-04 20:04:03 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t cookie_len);
|
2016-09-07 10:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur size_t dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
|
2014-11-25 13:36:00 +00:00
|
|
|
void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
|
2015-09-11 09:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s);
|
2005-04-26 18:18:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_new(SSL *s);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
void tls1_free(SSL *s);
|
2017-05-22 11:33:42 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_clear(SSL *s);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_new(SSL *s);
|
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
|
2017-05-22 11:33:42 +00:00
|
|
|
int dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
|
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
|
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-17 11:28:14 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
|
2017-05-22 11:33:42 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
|
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
|
2016-10-04 20:14:24 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
|
2016-10-04 19:56:11 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
size_t *secret_size);
|
2016-11-09 14:06:12 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p);
|
2016-11-08 23:20:31 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
|
2017-02-14 11:48:24 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int send);
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *secret,
|
2016-12-29 17:11:27 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
|
2017-07-05 10:23:16 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
|
2018-12-04 08:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal);
|
2017-02-21 16:39:43 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key,
|
|
|
|
size_t keylen);
|
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv,
|
|
|
|
size_t ivlen);
|
2017-01-13 17:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *secret,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen);
|
|
|
|
int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *prevsecret,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *insecret,
|
|
|
|
size_t insecretlen,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *outsecret);
|
2016-11-08 10:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *insecret,
|
|
|
|
size_t insecretlen);
|
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
|
|
|
|
size_t *secret_size);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
|
|
|
|
int use_context);
|
2017-06-27 13:57:15 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
|
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *context,
|
|
|
|
size_t contextlen, int use_context);
|
2018-02-04 03:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t olen, const char *label,
|
|
|
|
size_t llen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *context,
|
|
|
|
size_t contextlen);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_alert_code(int code);
|
2016-12-30 11:26:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls13_alert_code(int code);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-10 23:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2002-08-09 11:58:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
2017-02-06 16:52:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-22 23:15:34 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id);
|
2018-03-12 17:15:25 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_curves);
|
2017-09-22 22:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch);
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int *curves, size_t ncurves);
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *str);
|
2016-11-25 10:22:02 +00:00
|
|
|
void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
|
|
|
|
size_t *num_formats);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id);
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_group(SSL *s, uint16_t id);
|
2017-09-23 01:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_param_group(uint16_t id);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
2006-03-30 02:44:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op);
|
2017-09-26 14:28:16 +00:00
|
|
|
void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
|
|
|
|
size_t *pgroupslen);
|
2016-11-24 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s);
|
2017-01-20 16:01:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-09 17:22:36 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
|
2017-03-15 17:25:55 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION **ret);
|
2018-05-09 17:22:36 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
|
2017-03-15 17:25:55 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t eticklen,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *sess_id,
|
|
|
|
size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess);
|
2017-01-18 16:28:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-25 10:22:02 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s);
|
2011-05-09 15:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-05 16:14:17 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op);
|
2011-05-09 15:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client);
|
2018-01-17 17:55:29 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
|
|
|
|
int client);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen,
|
|
|
|
int client);
|
2015-03-24 15:10:15 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int idx);
|
2012-06-28 12:45:49 +00:00
|
|
|
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s);
|
2012-06-22 14:03:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
2016-03-07 18:03:34 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2016-03-03 16:19:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2013-12-15 13:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *ex,
|
|
|
|
int vfy);
|
2013-12-15 13:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs);
|
2017-01-31 17:45:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md);
|
2007-06-04 17:04:40 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s);
|
2016-09-05 16:34:04 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
2017-01-25 14:33:55 +00:00
|
|
|
const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen);
|
2017-09-22 15:06:52 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen);
|
Add support for the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
2018-01-11 17:47:12 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert);
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s);
|
2017-02-13 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
|
2017-06-14 15:54:08 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd);
|
2017-01-25 14:33:55 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs);
|
2018-11-12 14:23:07 +00:00
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
2018-10-19 13:01:22 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve);
|
2018-11-12 14:23:07 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
2017-01-30 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
|
2018-02-09 18:03:08 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s);
|
2017-04-12 16:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int echde);
|
2011-11-21 22:52:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-10-03 22:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
|
|
|
|
size_t *hashlen);
|
2015-11-29 16:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx);
|
2015-11-25 18:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s);
|
2015-01-23 02:37:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-20 16:22:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange logs |premaster| to the SSL_CTX associated
|
|
|
|
* with |ssl|, if logging is enabled. It returns one on success and zero on
|
|
|
|
* failure. The entry is identified by the first 8 bytes of
|
|
|
|
* |encrypted_premaster|.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster,
|
|
|
|
size_t encrypted_premaster_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *premaster,
|
|
|
|
size_t premaster_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-31 14:56:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ssl_log_secret logs |secret| to the SSL_CTX associated with |ssl|, if
|
|
|
|
* logging is available. It returns one on success and zero on failure. It tags
|
|
|
|
* the entry with |label|.
|
2017-01-20 16:22:30 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-01-31 14:56:15 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl, const char *label,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MASTER_SECRET_LABEL "CLIENT_RANDOM"
|
2017-02-21 16:39:43 +00:00
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET"
|
2017-01-31 14:56:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"
|
|
|
|
#define SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"
|
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"
|
|
|
|
#define SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"
|
2018-03-21 13:03:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#define EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET"
|
2018-03-20 20:16:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#define EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL "EXPORTER_SECRET"
|
2017-01-20 16:22:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-28 17:31:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* s3_cbc.c */
|
2015-03-05 10:14:40 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
|
2015-11-06 16:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *md_out,
|
|
|
|
size_t *md_out_size,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char header[13],
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *data,
|
|
|
|
size_t data_plus_mac_size,
|
|
|
|
size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *mac_secret,
|
2016-10-03 21:26:59 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-17 03:10:04 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
__owur int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s);
|
2017-11-22 17:18:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s);
|
2014-08-03 20:25:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* statem/statem_srvr.c */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__owur int send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-05 10:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* statem/extensions_cust.c */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-07 10:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts,
|
|
|
|
ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type,
|
|
|
|
size_t *idx);
|
2014-08-10 11:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 13:25:49 +00:00
|
|
|
void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *meths);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-05 10:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int ext_type,
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size,
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
|
2017-04-05 10:59:23 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int context, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x,
|
2017-11-21 17:18:43 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t chainidx, int maxversion);
|
2016-08-05 17:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__owur int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst,
|
|
|
|
const custom_ext_methods *src);
|
2017-05-10 10:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
__owur int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst,
|
|
|
|
const custom_ext_methods *src);
|
2014-08-10 11:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-12 11:20:16 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void);
|
2016-04-04 12:53:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-19 14:01:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ssl_mcnf.c */
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void ssl_ctx_system_config(SSL_CTX *ctx);
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2016-11-19 19:15:35 +00:00
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# else /* OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST */
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2014-07-23 12:18:06 +00:00
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
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# define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
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2013-01-29 14:44:36 +00:00
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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# endif
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2014-07-23 12:18:06 +00:00
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#endif
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