These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
Fix prototype warnings triggered by -Wstrict-prototypes when configuring
with `enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128`
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6556)
The goal is to minimize maintenance burden by eliminating somewhat
obscure platform-specific tweaks that are not viewed as critical for
contemporary applications. This affects Camellia and digest
implementations that rely on md32_common.h, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA256.
SHA256 is the only one that can be viewed as critical, but given
the assembly coverage, the omission is considered appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6508)
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too.
This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC
Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA.
Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is
only removed at the last possible step.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6443)
... to the check OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L, to correspond with
how it's declared.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6470)
Calling the functions rand_pool_add_{additional,nonce}_data()
in crypto/rand/rand_lib.c with no implementation for djgpp/MSDOS
causees unresolved symbols when linking with djgpp.
Reported and fixed by Gisle Vanem
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6421)
848113a30b added mitigation for a
side-channel attack. This commit extends approach to all code
paths for consistency.
[It also removes redundant white spaces introduced in last commit.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6480)
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CVE-2018-0732
Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
This module is used only with odd input lengths, i.e. not used in normal
PKI cases, on contemporary processors. The problem was "illuminated" by
fuzzing tests.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6440)
If built with no-dso, syscall_random remains "blind" to getentropy.
Since it's possible to detect symbol availability on ELF-based systems
without involving DSO module, bypass it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6436)
If built with no-dso, DSO_global_lookup leaves "unsupported" message
in error queue. Since there is a fall-back code, it's unnecessary
distraction.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6436)
Upon a call to CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv, either directly on an OCB_CTX or
indirectly with EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, reset the nonce-dependent
variables in the OCB_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6420)
It's kind of a "brown-bag" bug, as I did recognize the problem and
verified an ad-hoc solution, but failed to follow up with cross-checks
prior filing previous merge request.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6435)
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_get_priv_key() and EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_get_pub_key()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
Only applies to algorithms that support it. Both raw private and public
keys can be obtained for X25519, Ed25519, X448, Ed448. Raw private keys
only can be obtained for HMAC, Poly1305 and SipHash
Fixes#6259
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
There were a large number of error codes that were unused (probably a
copy&paste from somewhere else). Since these have never been made public
we should remove then and rebuild the error codes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6386)
Biggest part, ~7%, of improvement resulted from omitting constants'
table index increment in each round. And minor part from rescheduling
instructions. Apparently POWER9 (and POWER8) manage to dispatch
instructions more efficiently if they are laid down as if they have
no latency...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6406)
This comes at cost of minor 2.5% regression on G4, which is reasonable
trade-off. [Further improve compliance with ABI requirements.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6406)
As it turns out originally published results were skewed by "turbo"
mode. VM apparently remains oblivious to dynamic frequency scaling,
and reports that processor operates at "base" frequency at all times.
While actual frequency gets increased under load.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6406)
OPENSSL_memcmp is a must in GCM decrypt and general-purpose loop takes
quite a portion of execution time for short inputs, more than GHASH for
few-byte inputs according to profiler. Special 16-byte case takes it off
top five list in profiler output.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6312)
On contemporary platforms assembly GHASH processes multiple blocks
faster than one by one. For TLS payloads shorter than 16 bytes, e.g.
alerts, it's possible to reduce hashing operation to single call.
And for block lengths not divisible by 16 - fold two final calls to
one. Improvement is most noticeable with "reptoline", because call to
assembly GHASH is indirect.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6312)
Even though calls can be viewed as styling improvement, they do come
with cost. It's not big cost and shows only on short inputs, but it is
measurable, 2-3% on some platforms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6312)
Only Linux and FreeBSD provide getrandom(), but they both also provide
getentropy() since the same version and we already tried to call that.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6405
This will actually support most OSs, and at least adds support for
Solaris and OSX
Fixes: #6403
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6405
Just because an engine implements algorithm methods, that doesn't mean
it also implements the ASN1 method. Therefore, be careful when looking
for an ASN1 method among all engines, don't try to use one that doesn't
exist.
Fixes#6381
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6383)
(cherry picked from commit 1ac3cd6277)
(cherry picked from commit 13b578ada3)
Found by coverity. This is an artifact left over from the original
decaf import which generated the source code for different curves. For
curve 448 this is dead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6373)
In `aes_wrap_cipher()`, the minimal out buff length is `(inlen - 8)`.
Since it calls `CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad()` underneath, it makes sense to
reduce the minimal out length in `CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad()` to align to
its caller.
Signed-off-by: Yihong Wang <yh.wang@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6266)
The One&Done attack, which is described in a paper to appear in the
USENIX Security'18 conference, uses EM emanations to recover the values
of the bits that are obtained using BN_is_bit_set while constructing
the value of the window in BN_mod_exp_consttime. The EM signal changes
slightly depending on the value of the bit, and since the lookup of a
bit is surrounded by highly regular execution (constant-time Montgomery
multiplications) the attack is able to isolate the (very brief) part of
the signal that changes depending on the bit. Although the change is
slight, the attack recovers it successfully >90% of the time on several
phones and IoT devices (all with ARM processors with clock rates around
1GHz), so after only one RSA decryption more than 90% of the bits in
d_p and d_q are recovered correctly, which enables rapid recovery of
the full RSA key using an algorithm (also described in the paper) that
modifies the branch-and-prune approach for a situation in which the
exponents' bits are recovered with errors, i.e. where we do not know
a priori which bits are correctly recovered.
The mitigation for the attack is relatively simple - all the bits of
the window are obtained at once, along with other bits so that an
entire integer's worth of bits are obtained together using masking and
shifts, without unnecessarily considering each bit in isolation. This
improves performance somewhat (one call to bn_get_bits is faster than
several calls to BN_is_bit_set), so the attacker now gets one signal
snippet per window (rather than one per bit) in which the signal is
affected by all bits in the integer (rather than just the one bit).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6276)
32-bit vector rotate instruction was defined from beginning, it
not being used from the start must be a brain-slip...
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6363)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made the X509_LOOKUP_METHOD structure opaque, so
applications that were previously able to define a custom lookup method
are not able to be ported.
This commit adds getters and setters for each of the current fields of
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, along with getters and setters on several associated
opaque types (such as X509_LOOKUP and X509_OBJECT).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6152)
Return immediately upon discovery of bad message digest.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6298)
This reverts commit a6f5b11634.
The EVP_PKEY_sign() function is intended for pre-hashed input which is
not supported by our EdDSA implementation.
See the discussion in PR 5880
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6284)
We check that the curve name associated with the point is the same as that
for the curve.
Fixes#6302
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6323)
TlsGetValue clears the last error even on success, so that callers may
distinguish it successfully returning NULL or failing. This error-mangling
behavior interferes with the caller's use of GetLastError. In particular
SSL_get_error queries the error queue to determine whether the caller should
look at the OS's errors. To avoid destroying state, save and restore the
Windows error.
Fixes#6299.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6316)
Per SEC 1, the curve coefficients must be padded up to size. See C.2's
definition of Curve, C.1's definition of FieldElement, and 2.3.5's definition
of how to encode the field elements in http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf.
This comes up for P-521, where b needs a leading zero.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6314)
Only check the CN against DNS name contraints if the
`X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT` flag is not set, and either the
certificate has no DNS subject alternative names or the
`X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT` flag is set.
Add pertinent documentation, and touch up some stale text about
name checks and DANE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Don't apply DNS name constraints to the subject CN when there's a
least one DNS-ID subjectAlternativeName.
Don't apply DNS name constraints to subject CN's that are sufficiently
unlike DNS names. Checked name must have at least two labels, with
all labels non-empty, no trailing '.' and all hyphens must be
internal in each label. In addition to the usual LDH characters,
we also allow "_", since some sites use these for hostnames despite
all the standards.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
If the lengths of both names is 0 then don't attempt to do a memcmp.
Issue reported by Simon Friedberger, Robert Merget and Juraj Somorovsky.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6291)
A previous change of this function introduced a fragility when the
destination happens to be the same as the source. Such alias isn't
recommended, but could still happen, for example in this kind of code:
X509_NAME *subject = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
/* ... some code passes ... */
X509_set_issuer_name(x, subject);
Fixes#4710
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6280)
Using the ca application to sign certificates with EdDSA failed because it
is not possible to set the digest to "null". This adds the capability and
updates the documentation accordingly.
Fixes#6201
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6286)
Experiments have shown that the lookup table used by BN_GF2m_mod_arr
introduces sufficient timing signal to recover the private key for an
attacker with access to cache timing information on the victim's host.
This only affects binary curves (which are less frequently used).
No CVE is considered necessary for this issue.
The fix is to replace the lookup table with an on-the-fly calculation of
the value from the table instead, which can be performed in constant time.
Thanks to Youngjoo Shin for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6270)
The Console UI method always set echo on after prompting without
echo. However, echo might not have been on originally, so just
restore the original TTY settings.
Fixes#2373
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6156)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
* EC_POINT_mul is now responsible for constant time point multiplication
(for single fixed or variable point multiplication, when the scalar is
in the range [0,group_order), so we need to strip the nonce padding
from ECDSA.
* Entry added to CHANGES
* Updated EC_POINT_mul documentation
- Integrate existing EC_POINT_mul and EC_POINTs_mul entries in the
manpage to reflect the shift in constant-time expectations when
performing a single fixed or variable point multiplication;
- Add documentation to ec_method_st to reflect the updated "contract"
between callers and implementations of ec_method_st.mul.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6070)
The function CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey() is a "set0" and therefore
memory management passes to OpenSSL. If the same function is called again
then we should ensure that any previous value that was set is freed first
before we set it again.
Fixes#5052
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6142)
When the input length is zero, just return zero early. Otherwise,
there's a small chance that memory allocation is engaged, fails and
returns -1, which is a bit confusing when nothing should be written.
Fixes#4782#4827
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6175)
Stop redefining structures that are already defined in system
headers. This also means we can stop setting the pointer size
globally, because the system structures will have the correct pointer
sizes either way. The only exception is passing the right pointer
size to a function.
Stop trying to twist things around with rand(), that's the job of the
DRBG that we feed.
Stop assuming the location of the JPI$_FINALEXC item, look it up
instead.
Signal an exception if the sys$getjpiw call fails (it means the item
list isn't set up right, so works as an assertion, but using VMS
methodology).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6151)
Calculating BN_mod_inverse where n is 1 (or -1) doesn't make sense. We
should return an error in that case. Instead we were returning a valid
result with value 0.
Fixes#6004
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6119)
No need to buildtest on opensslconf.h
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6149)
Montgomery multiplication post-conditions in some of code paths were
formally non-constant time. Cache access pattern was result-neutral,
but a little bit asymmetric, which might have produced a signal [if
processor reordered load and stores at run-time].
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6141)
which is used for ASN1_STRING_print_ex*() and X509_NAME_print_ex*().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6105)
rand_pool_bytes_needed() was constructed in such a way that the
smallest acceptable entropy factor was 1 entropy bits per 8 bits of
data. At the same time, we have a DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR that allows
weaker source, as small as 1 bit of entropy per 128 bits of data.
The conclusion is that rand_pool_bytes_needed() needs to change to
support weaker entropy sources. We therefore change the input of
entropy per byte to be an entropy factor instead. This entropy factor
expresses how many bits of data it takes (on average) to get 1 bit of
entropy.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6150)
get_last_sys_error() already exists, so there's no need for yet
another macro that fulfills the same purpose.
Fixes#4120
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6088)
That error is already caught by EVP_read_pw_string_min, and causes
this function to return -1, so the code detecting too short passwords
in this function is practically dead.
Fixes#5465
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6080)
Currently, critical bugs prevent using SM2 signatures through the
`EVP_PKEY` interface: any application that managed to satisfy the
requirement of forcing SM3 as the message digest – even if this is
currently not possible transparently through the `EVP_PKEY` interface
and requires manually forcing the MD selection – would crash with a
segmentation fault upon calling the `SM2_sign()` function.
This is easily verified using the OpenSSL CLI to execute this critical
code path under the right conditions:
`openssl dgst -sm3 -hex -sign sm2.eckey /path/to/file/to/sign`
The issue is caused by a double free at the end of `SM2_sign()` in
`crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c` in case of successful signature generation.
In addition, even if the double free was not causing segfaults,
the function returns the wrong return value in case of success (it
would return 0 rather than 1).
This patch fixes both problems.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6066)
The 'tag2nbyte' lookup table maps the tags of ASN1 string types
to their respective character widths. It is used for example by
ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(). This commit adds the tag names as comments.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6062)
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6009)
The X509_STORE_CTX_init() docs explicitly allow a NULL parameter for the
X509_STORE. Therefore we shouldn't crash if we subsequently call
X509_verify_cert() and no X509_STORE has been set.
Fixes#2462
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6001)
Branch to global symbol results in reference to PLT, and when compiling
for THUMB-2 - in a R_ARM_THM_JUMP19 relocation. Some linkers don't
support this relocation (ld.gold), while others can end up truncating
the relocation to fit (ld.bfd).
Convert this branch through PLT into a direct branch that the assembler
can resolve locally.
See https://github.com/android-ndk/ndk/issues/337 for background.
The current workaround is to disable poly1305 optimization assembly,
which is not optimal and can be reverted after this patch:
beab607d2b
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5949)
Old code replaced in favor of a clearer implementation.
Performances are not penalized.
Updated the copyright end date to 2018.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5963)
- drbg_lib.c: Silence coverity warning: the comment preceding the
RAND_DRBG_instantiate() call explicitely states that the error
is ignored and explains the reason why.
- drbgtest: Add checks for the return values of RAND_bytes() and
RAND_priv_bytes() to run_multi_thread_test().
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5976)
The ongoing discussion about casting or not in PR #5626 had me compiling
again with above mentioned flags. Indeed the compiler had to say something
about it and I did these changes to silence it again.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5943)
Fixes#5849
In pull request #5503 a fallback was added which adds a random nonce of
security_strength/2 bits if no nonce callback is provided. This change raised
the entropy requirements form 256 to 384 bit, which can cause problems on some
platforms (e.g. VMS, see issue #5849).
The requirements for the nonce are given in section 8.6.7 of NIST SP 800-90Ar1:
A nonce may be required in the construction of a seed during instantiation
in order to provide a security cushion to block certain attacks.
The nonce shall be either:
a) A value with at least (security_strength/2) bits of entropy, or
b) A value that is expected to repeat no more often than a
(security_strength/2)-bit random string would be expected to repeat.
Each nonce shall be unique to the cryptographic module in which instantiation
is performed, but need not be secret. When used, the nonce shall be considered
to be a critical security parameter.
This commit implements a nonce of type b) in order to lower the entropy
requirements during instantiation back to 256 bits.
The formulation "shall be unique to the cryptographic module" above implies
that the nonce needs to be unique among (with high probability) among all
DRBG instances in "space" and "time". We try to achieve this goal by creating a
nonce of the following form
nonce = app-specific-data || high-resolution-utc-timestamp || counter
Where || denotes concatenation. The application specific data can be something
like the process or group id of the application. A utc timestamp is used because
it increases monotonically, provided the system time is synchronized. This approach
may not be perfect yet for a FIPS evaluation, but it should be good enough for the
moment.
This commit also harmonizes the implementation of the get_nonce() and the
get_additional_data() callbacks and moves the platform specific parts from
rand_lib.c into rand_unix.c, rand_win.c, and rand_vms.c.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5920)
Historically we used to implement standalone base64 code for SRP. This
was replaced by commit 3d3f21aa with the standard base64 processing code.
However, the SRP base64 code was designed to be compatible with other SRP
libraries (notably libsrp, but also others) that use a variant of standard
base64. Specifically a different alphabet is used and no padding '='
characters are used. Instead 0 padding is added to the front of the string.
By changing to standard base64 we change the behaviour of the API which may
impact interoperability. It also means that SRP verifier files created prior
to 1.1.1 would not be readable in 1.1.1 and vice versa.
Instead we expand our standard base64 processing with the capability to be
able to read and generate the SRP base64 variant.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5925)
Previously they were using EVP_EncodeBlock/EVP_DecodeBlock. These are low
level functions that do not handle padding characters. This was causing
the SRP code to fail. One side effect of using EVP_EncodeUpdate is that
it inserts newlines which is not what we need in SRP so we add a flag to
avoid that.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5925)
The warning reads "[cast] may cause misaligned access". Even though
this can be application-supplied pointer, misaligned access shouldn't
happen, because structure type is "encoded" into data itself, and
application would customarily pass correctly aligned pointer. But
there is no harm in resolving the warning...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5894)
Fixes#5778, #5840
The various IS_*() macros did not work correctly for 8-bit ASCII
characters with the high bit set, because the CVT(a) preprocessor
macro and'ed the given ASCII value with 0x7F, effectively folding
the high value range 128-255 over the low value range 0-127.
As a consequence, some of the IS_*() erroneously returned TRUE.
This commit fixes the issue by adding range checks instead of
cutting off high order bits using a mask. In order avoid multiple
evaluation of macro arguments, most of the implementation was moved
from macros into a static function is_keytype().
Thanks to Румен Петров for reporting and analyzing the UTF-8 parsing
issue #5840.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5903)
Adding support for these operations for the EdDSA implementations
makes pkeyutl usable for signing/verifying for these algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5880)
The wrong "set" field was incremented in the wrong place and would
create a new RDN, not a multi-valued RDN.
RDN inserts would happen after not before.
Prepending an entry to an RDN incorrectly created a new RDN
Anything which built up an X509_NAME could get a messed-up structure,
which would then be "wrong" for anyone using that name.
Thanks to Ingo Schwarze for extensive debugging and the initial
fix (documented in GitHub issue #5870).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5882)
There are two undocumented DSA parameter generation options available in
the genpkey command line app:
dsa_paramgen_md and dsa_paramgen_q_bits.
These can also be accessed via the EVP API but only by using
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() directly. There are no
helper macros for these options.
dsa_paramgen_q_bits sets the length of q in bits (default 160 bits).
dsa_paramgen_md sets the digest that is used during the parameter
generation (default SHA1). In particular the output length of the digest
used must be equal to or greater than the number of bits in q because of
this code:
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
goto err;
qsize here is the number of bits in q and evpmd is the digest set via
dsa_paramgen_md. md and buf2 are buffers of length SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH.
buf2 has been filled with qsize bits of random seed data, and md is
uninitialised.
If the output size of evpmd is less than qsize then the line "md[i] ^=
buf2[i]" will be xoring an uninitialised value and the random seed data
together to form the least significant bits of q (and not using the
output of the digest at all for those bits) - which is probably not what
was intended. The same seed is then used as an input to generating p. If
the uninitialised data is actually all zeros (as seems quite likely)
then the least significant bits of q will exactly match the least
significant bits of the seed.
This problem only occurs if you use these undocumented and difficult to
find options and you set the size of q to be greater than the message
digest output size. This is for parameter generation only not key
generation. This scenario is considered highly unlikely and
therefore the security risk of this is considered negligible.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5800)
The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.
Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.
This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.
Fixes#5809
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)
When these two functions returned zero, it could mean:
1. that an error occured. In their case, the error is an overflow of
the pool, i.e. the correct response from the caller would be to
stop trying to fill the pool.
2. that there isn't enought entropy acquired yet, i.e. the correct
response from the caller would be to try and add more entropy to
the pool.
Because of this ambiguity, the returned zero turns out to be useless.
This change makes the returned value more consistent. 1 means the
addition of new entropy was successful, 0 means it wasn't. To know if
the pool has been filled enough, the caller will have to call some
other function, such as rand_pool_entropy_available().
Fixes#5846
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5876)
felem_neg does not produce an output within the tight bounds suitable
for felem_contract. This affects build configurations which set
enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128.
point_double and point_add, in the non-z*_is_zero cases, tolerate and
fix up the wider bounds, so this only affects point_add calls where the
other point is infinity. Thus it only affects the final addition in
arbitrary-point multiplication, giving the wrong y-coordinate. This is a
no-op for ECDH and ECDSA, which only use the x-coordinate of
arbitrary-point operations.
Note: ecp_nistp521.c has the same issue in that the documented
preconditions are violated by the test case. I have not addressed this
in this PR. ecp_nistp521.c does not immediately produce the wrong
answer; felem_contract there appears to be a bit more tolerant than its
documented preconditions. However, I haven't checked the point_add
property above holds. ecp_nistp521.c should either get this same fix, to
be conservative, or have the bounds analysis and comments reworked for
the wider bounds.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5779)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5625)
Fail harshly (in debug builds) when rand_pool_acquire_entropy isn't
delivering the required amount of entropy. In release builds, this
produces an error with details.
We also take the opportunity to modernise the types used.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5857)
Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5790)
It looks like the usage of these functions were removed in
in commit 0a4edb931b ("Unified - adapt
the generation of cpuid, uplink and buildinf to use GENERATE").
This commit removes the import/use of File::Spec::Functions module as it
is no longer needed by crypto/build.info.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5832)
If a nonce is required and the get_nonce callback is NULL, request 50%
more entropy following NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5503
This commit removes the contribution of a user that we cannot
trace to gain their consent for the licence change.
I also cleaned up the return/error-return flow a bit.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5811)
The RAND_DRBG API was added in PR #5462 and modified by PR #5547.
This commit adds the corresponding documention.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5461)
Add some more exposition on why unlocked access to the global rand_fork_count
is safe, and provide a comment for the struct rand_drbg_st fork_count field.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4110)
The VMS C RTL has setbuf() working for short pointers only, probably
the FILE pointer will always be in P0 (the lower 4GB). Fortunately,
this only generates a warning about possible data loss (doesn't apply
in this case) that we can simply turn off.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5789)
... to compute s390x aes function code from keylength.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5250)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5250)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5250)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5250)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5250)
This commit removes the contribution of a user that we cannot trace to
gain their consent for the licence change.
After this commit the various IS_*() macros in the auto-generated file
conf_def.h may incorrectly return true if the supplied character has its
most significant bit set. The IS_*() macros should be able to correctly
handle 8-bit characters. Note that UTF-8 support is not a requirement.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5767)
ts/ts_rsp_sign.c: change to OPENSSL_gmtime.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5720)
Apparently applications rely on RAND_load_file's ability to work with
non-regular files, customarily with /dev/urandom, so that the ban was
not exactly appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5737)
This removes some code because we cannot trace the original contributor
to get their agreement for the licence change (original commit e03ddfae).
After this change there will be numerous failures in the test cases until
someone rewrites the missing code.
All *_free functions should accept a NULL parameter. After this change
the following *_free functions will fail if a NULL parameter is passed:
BIO_ACCEPT_free()
BIO_CONNECT_free()
BN_BLINDING_free()
BN_CTX_free()
BN_MONT_CTX_free()
BN_RECP_CTX_free()
BUF_MEM_free()
COMP_CTX_free()
ERR_STATE_free()
TXT_DB_free()
X509_STORE_free()
ssl3_free()
ssl_cert_free()
SSL_SESSION_free()
SSL_free()
[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757)
If we don't have OID data for an object then we should fail if we
are asked to encode the ASN.1 for that OID.
Fixes#5723
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5725)
Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth.
CVE-2018-0739
Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The macros resulting from the dso_scheme attribute were defined for
libraries only, but there's a test program that uses the macros as
well. The easier way is to move the handling of this macro to
crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h and having the modules that need it
include it.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5733)
Some platforms, cough-DJGPP, fail to compile claiming that requested
alignment is greater than maximum possible. Supposedly original
alignment was result of an attempt to utilize AVX2...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5708)
At earlier point e_os.h was omitted from a number of headers (in order
to emphasize OS neutrality), but this affected o_fopen.c, which is not
OS-neutral, and contains some DJGPP-specific code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5708)
In particular, x and y may be NULL, as used in ecdsa_ossl.c. Make use of
this in ecdh_ossl.c as well, to save an otherwise unnecessary temporary.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5532)
At earlier point e_os.h was omitted from a number of headers (in order
to emphasize OS neutrality), but this affected o_fopen.c and randfile.c
which are not OS-neutral, and contain some Win32-specific code.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5676)
Although it deviates from the actual prototype of DSO_dsobyaddr(), this
is now ISO C compliant and gcc -Wpedantic accepts the code.
Added DATA segment checking to catch ptrgl virtual addresses. Avoid
memleaks with every AIX/dladdr() call. Removed debug-fprintf()s.
Added test case for DSO_dsobyaddr(), which will eventually call dladdr().
Removed unecessary AIX ifdefs again.
The implementation can only lookup function symbols, no data symbols.
Added PIC-flag to aix*-cc build targets.
As AIX is missing a dladdr() implementation it is currently uncertain our
exit()-handlers can still be called when the application exits. After
dlclose() the whole library might have been unloaded already.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kraft <makr@gmx.eu>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5668)
Use shorter names for some defines, so also had to change the .c file
that used them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5669)
Since the public and private DRBG are per thread we don't need one
per ssl object anymore. It could also try to get entropy from a DRBG
that's really from an other thread because the SSL object moved to an
other thread.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
This avoids lock contention.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
Without actually using EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4793)
Current endianness detection is somewhat opportunistic and can fail
in cross-compile scenario. Since we are more likely to cross-compile
for little-endian now, adjust the default accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5613)
Don't pass a pointer to uninitialized processed value
for BIO_CB_READ and BIO_CB_WRITE
Check the correct cmd code in BIO_callback_ctrl
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5516)
There is a requirements of having access to a live entropy source
which we can't do with the default callbacks. If you need prediction
resistance you need to set up your own callbacks that follow the
requirements of NIST SP 800-90C.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5402
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5646)
This commit adds a new api RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() which sets the
default type and flags for new DRBG instances. See also #5576.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5632)
Fixes#4403
This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.
Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
Renamed to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()/EVP_new_raw_public_key() as per
feedback.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
Not all algorithms will support this, since their keys are not a simple
block of data. But many can.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)
With the current mechanism, old cipher strings that used to work in 1.1.0,
may inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites causing connections to
fail. This is confusing for users.
In reality TLSv1.3 are quite different to older ciphers. They are much
simpler and there are only a small number of them so, arguably, they don't
need the same level of control that the older ciphers have.
This change splits the configuration of TLSv1.3 ciphers from older ones.
By default the TLSv1.3 ciphers are on, so you cannot inadvertently disable
them through your existing config.
Fixes#5359
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5392)
Unlike "upstream", Android NDK's arm64 gcc [but not clang] performs
64x64=128-bit multiplications with library calls, which appears to
have devastating impact on performance. [The condition is reduced to
__ANDROID__ [&& !__clang__], because x86_64 has corresponding
assembly module.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5589)
When OPENSSL_DIR_read implemented by LPdir_unix.c gets a Unixy path,
it will return file names like you'd expect them on Unix.
However, if given a path with VMS syntax, such as "[.foo]", it returns
file names with generation numbers, such as "bar.txt;1", which makes
sense for VMS expectations, but can be surprising for OpenSSL.
Our solution is to simply shave off the generation number if
OPENSSL_DIR_read() expects there should be one, and make sure not to
return the same file name twice. Note that VMS filesystems are case
insensitive, so the check for duplicate file names are done without
regard to character case.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5587)
If a mem allocation failed we would ignore it. This commit fixes it to
always check.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5596)
The introduction of thread local public and private DRBG instances (#5547)
makes it very cumbersome to change the reseeding (time) intervals for
those instances. This commit provides a function to set the default
values for all subsequently created DRBG instances.
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
unsigned int master_reseed_interval,
unsigned int slave_reseed_interval,
time_t master_reseed_time_interval,
time_t slave_reseed_time_interval
);
The function is intended only to be used during application initialization,
before any threads are created and before any random bytes are generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5576)
The get_name() helper was using a variable of type size_t to hold the
result of BIO_gets(), but BIO_gets() returns int and makes use of negative
values to indicate error conditions.
Change the type of the local variable to match, and propagate that
through to other places in the file to avoid -Wsign-compare issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5211)
Add functions that will do the work of assigning certificate, privatekey
and chain certs to an SSL or SSL_CTX. If no privatekey is given, use the
publickey. This will permit the keys to pass validation for both ECDSA
and RSA. If a private key has already been set for the certificate, it
is discarded. A real private key can be set later.
This is an all-or-nothing setting of these parameters. Unlike the
SSL/SSL_CTX_use_certificate() and SSL/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() functions,
the existing cert or privatekey is not modified (i.e. parameters copied).
This permits the existing cert/privatekey to be replaced.
It replaces the sequence of:
* SSL_use_certificate()
* SSL_use_privatekey()
* SSL_set1_chain()
And may actually be faster, as multiple checks are consolidated.
The private key can be NULL, if so an ENGINE module needs to contain the
actual private key that is to be used.
Note that ECDH (using the certificate's ECDSA key) ciphers do not work
without the private key being present, based on how the private key is
used in ECDH. ECDH does not offer PFS; ECDHE ciphers should be used instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1130)
With the support of "make variables" comes the possibility for the
user to override them. However, we need to make a difference between
defaults that we use (and that should be overridable by the user) and
flags that are crucial for building OpenSSL (should not be
overridable).
Typically, overridable flags are those setting optimization levels,
warnings levels, that kind of thing, while non-overridable flags are,
for example, macros that indicate aspects of how the config target
should be treated, such as L_ENDIAN and B_ENDIAN.
We do that differentiation by allowing upper case attributes in the
config targets, named exactly like the "make variables" we support,
and reserving the lower case attributes for non-overridable project
flags.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5534)
This patch fixes two issues in the ia32 RDRAND assembly code that result in a
(possibly significant) loss of entropy.
The first, less significant, issue is that, by returning success as 0 from
OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand() and OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed(), a subtle bias was introduced.
Specifically, because the assembly routine copied the remaining number of
retries over the result when RDRAND/RDSEED returned 'successful but zero', a
bias towards values 1-8 (primarily 8) was introduced.
The second, more worrying issue was that, due to a mixup in registers, when a
buffer that was not size 0 or 1 mod 8 was passed to OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes
or OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes, the last (n mod 8) bytes were all the same value.
This issue impacts only the 64-bit variant of the assembly.
This change fixes both issues by first eliminating the only use of
OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand, replacing it with OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes, and fixes the
register mixup in OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes. It also adds a sanity test for
OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes and OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes to help catch problems
of this nature in the future.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5342)
Retain open file handle and previous stat data for the CA index
file, enabling detection and index reload (upcoming commit).
Check requirements before entering accept loop.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When running iOS application from command line it's impossible to
get past the failing capability detection. This is because it's
executed under debugger and iOS debugger is impossible to deal with.
[If Apple implements SHA512 in silicon, it would have to be detected
with sysctlbyname.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5506
Either files or directories of *.cnf or *.conf files
can be included.
Recursive inclusion of directories is not supported.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5351)
Debugging asserts had implicit casts that triggered the warnings.
However, instead of making the casts explicit it's more appropriate
to perform checks that ensure that implicit casts were safe.
ec/curve448/scalar.c: size_t-fy scalar_decode_short.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5494)
This adds all of the relevant EVP plumbing required to make
X448 and Ed448 work.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5481)
Why is it redundant? We're looking at carry from addition of small,
11-bit number to 256-bit one. And carry would mean only one thing,
resulting first limb being small number and remaing ones - zeros.
Hence adding 38 to first limb can't carry.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5476)
Thumb2 addresses are a bit a mess, depending on whether a label is
interpreted as a function pointer value (for use with BX and BLX) or as
a program counter value (for use with PC-relative addressing). Clang's
integrated assembler mis-assembles this code. See
https://crbug.com/124610#c54 for details.
Instead, use the ADR pseudo-instruction which has clear semantics and
should be supported by every assembler that handles the OpenSSL Thumb2
code. (In other files, the ADR vs SUB conditionals are based on
__thumb2__ already. For some reason, this one is based on __APPLE__, I'm
guessing to deal with an older version of clang assembler.)
It's unclear to me which of clang or binutils is "correct" or if this is
even a well-defined notion beyond "whatever binutils does". But I will
note that https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4669 suggests binutils
has also changed behavior around this before.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5431)
Fixes#5405, #1381
The base64 filter BIO reads its input in chunks of B64_BLOCK_SIZE bytes.
When processing input in PEM format it can happen in rare cases that
- the trailing PEM marker crosses the boundary of a chunk, and
- the beginning of the following chunk contains valid base64 encoded data.
This happened in issue #5405, where the PEM marker was split into
"-----END CER" and "TIFICATE-----" at the end of the first chunk.
The decoding of the first chunk terminated correctly at the '-' character,
which is treated as an EOF marker, and b64_read() returned. However,
when called the second time, b64_read() read the next chunk and interpreted
the string "TIFICATE" as valid base64 encoded data, adding 6 extra bytes
'4c 81 48 08 04 c4'.
This patch restores the assignment of the error code to 'ctx->cont', which
was deleted accidentally in commit 5562cfaca4 and which prevents b64_read()
from reading additional data on subsequent calls.
This issue was observed and reported by Annie Yousar.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5422)
Even though mlock(2) was standardized in POSIX.1-2001, vendors did
implement it prior that point.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5460)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5449)
As it turns out gcc -pedantic doesn't seem to consider __uint128_t
as non-standard, unlike __int128 that is.
Fix even MSVC warnings in curve25519.c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5449)
SPARC condition in __SIZEOF_INT128__==16 is rather performance thing
than portability. Even though compiler advertises int128 capability,
corresponding operations are inefficient, because they are not
directly backed by instruction set.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5449)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #5400
X509v3_add_ext: free 'sk' if the memory pointed to by it
was malloc-ed inside this function.
X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk: return an error if X509v3_add_ext() fails.
This prevents use of a freed memory in do_body:sk_X509_EXTENSION_num().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4698)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5161)
Currently it's limited to 64-bit platforms only as minimum radix
expected in assembly is 2^51.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5408)
3 least significant bits of the input scalar are explicitly cleared,
hence swap variable has fixed value [of zero] upon exit from the loop.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5408)
The original curve448 code was templated to allow for a 25519
implementation. We've just imported the 448 stuff - but a remnant of
the original templated approach remained. This just simplifies that.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
We removed various platform specific optimisation files in an earlier
commit. The vector code was related to that and therefore is no longer
required. It may be resurrected at a later point if we reintroduce the
opimtisations.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Instead we should use the standard OpenSSL constant time routines.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
We already have a constant_time_select() function so, to avoid
confusion/clashing we shouldn't have a second one.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Remove all architecture specific files except for the reference arch_32
version. These files provide archicture specific performance optimisation.
However they have not been integrated yet. In order to avoid review issues
they are removed for now. They may be reintroduced at a later time.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Following running openssl-format-source there were a lot of manual tweaks
that were requried.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Some files talk about the MIT license. This code was contributed under
CLA and was relicensed to the OpenSSL licence when imported.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Unlike X448 the key lengths for ED448 are 57 bytes (as opposed to 56)
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
We have fully converted curve448 to use the OpenSSL shake256 implementation
so we can now remove the old one.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Convert the curve448 test to use the OpenSSL implementation of shake256.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Some non-portable includes are left because they are already suitably
guarded.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
OpenSSL does not currently have this concept. It only provides compiler
warnings so just remove it.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Most of these were in point_448.h. While I was at it I spotted some unused
declarations, so I deleted those too.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
This imports selected files from the src directory of this repository:
https://sourceforge.net/p/ed448goldilocks/code/ci/v0.9.4/tree/
This is from the version tagged as "v0.9.4" with commit id 7527e9.
This code was originally writting by Mike Hamburg and the import is done by
kind permission of Rambus and Mike Hamburg under CLA. As this is under CLA
the files are being relicensed under the OpenSSL licence. Subsequent
commits will correct any licence notices in the individual files.
These files should provide complete self-contained support for X448 and
Ed448. They are imported "as is" from the source repository and this
commit does not attempt to integrate them into the OpenSSL build system,
or modify them in any way to fit OpenSSL style guidelines. That will be
done by subsequent commits.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)
Add -bind option to s_client application to allow specification of
local address for connection.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5272)
This function makes it easier to retrieve a reference to the
authority key identifier (akid->keyid) inside a certificate.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5271)
In PR #5295 it was decided that the locking api should remain private
and used only inside libcrypto. However, the locking functions were added
back to `libcrypto.num` by `mkdef.pl`, because the function prototypes
were still listed in `internal/rand.h`. (This header contains functions
which are internal, but shared between libcrypto and libssl.)
This commit moves the prototypes to `rand_lcl.h` and changes the names
to lowercase, following the convention therein. It also corrects an
outdated documenting comment.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5375)
It's a convenient complement to OSSL_STORE_ctrl()
Suggested by Norm Green
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5363)
The make variables LIB_CFLAGS, DSO_CFLAGS and so on were used in
addition to CFLAGS and so on. This works without problem on Unix and
Windows, where options with different purposes (such as -D and -I) can
appear anywhere on the command line and get accumulated as they come.
This is not necessarely so on VMS. For example, macros must all be
collected and given through one /DEFINE, and the same goes for
inclusion directories (/INCLUDE).
So, to harmonize all platforms, we repurpose make variables starting
with LIB_, DSO_ and BIN_ to be all encompassing variables that
collects the corresponding values from CFLAGS, CPPFLAGS, DEFINES,
INCLUDES and so on together with possible config target values
specific for libraries DSOs and programs, and use them instead of the
general ones everywhere.
This will, for example, allow VMS to use the exact same generators for
generated files that go through cpp as all other platforms, something
that has been impossible to do safely before now.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5357)
Commit 42d7d7dd6 turned this function from returning void to
returning an int error code. This instance of calling it was
missed.
Found by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5338)
This is purported to save a few cycles, but makes the code less
obvious and more brittle, and in fact breaks on platforms where for
ABI continuity reasons there is a SHA2 implementation in libc, and
so EVP needs to call those to avoid conflicts.
A sufficiently good optimizer could simply generate the same entry
points for:
foo(...) { ... }
and
bar(...) { return foo(...); }
but, even without that, the different is negligible, with the
"winner" varying from run to run (openssl speed -evp sha384):
Old:
type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes 16384 bytes
sha384 28864.28k 117362.62k 266469.21k 483258.03k 635144.87k 649123.16k
New:
type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes 16384 bytes
sha384 30055.18k 120725.98k 272057.26k 482847.40k 634585.09k 650308.27k
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Without that, output comes one character per line. It's the same
issue as has been observed before, this happens when using write()
on a record oriented stream (possibly unbuffered too).
This also uncovered a bug in BIO_f_linebuffer, where this would cause
an error:
BIO_write(bio, "1\n", 1);
I.e. there's a \n just after the part of the string that we currently
ask to get written.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5352)
.. if avalable. STCK has an artificial delay to ensure uniqueness
which can result in a performance penalty if used heavily
concurrently.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5284)
Output copyright year depends on any input file(s) and the script.
This is not perfect, but better than what we had.
Also run 'make update'
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5350)
If the global DRBGs are allocated on the secure heap, then calling
CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() inside main() will have no effect, unless
OPENSSL_cleanup() has been called explicitely before that, because
otherwise the DRBGs will still be allocated. So it is better to cleanup
the secure heap automatically at the end of OPENSSL_cleanup().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
The NIST standard presents two alternative ways for seeding the
CTR DRBG, depending on whether a derivation function is used or not.
In Section 10.2.1 of NIST SP800-90Ar1 the following is assessed:
The use of the derivation function is optional if either an
approved RBG or an entropy source provides full entropy output
when entropy input is requested by the DRBG mechanism.
Otherwise, the derivation function shall be used.
Since the OpenSSL DRBG supports being reseeded from low entropy random
sources (using RAND_POOL), the use of a derivation function is mandatory.
For that reason we change the default and replace the opt-in flag
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF with an opt-out flag RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
This change simplifies the RAND_DRBG_new() calls.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
The functions drbg_setup() and drbg_cleanup() used to duplicate a lot of
code from RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_free(). This duplication has been
removed, which simplifies drbg_setup() and makes drbg_cleanup() obsolete.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
This commit adds three new accessors to the internal DRBG lock
int RAND_DRBG_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
int RAND_DRBG_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
have locking enabled by default. It is the callers responsibility to
guard access to the shared DRBGs by calls to RAND_DRBG_lock() and
RAND_DRBG_unlock().
All other DRBG instances don't have locking enabled by default, because
they are intendended to be used by a single thread. If it is desired,
locking can be enabled by using RAND_DRBG_enable_locking().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)
when the data block ends with SPACEs or NULs.
The problem is, you can't see if the data ends
with SPACE or NUL or a combination of both.
This can happen for instance with
openssl rsautl -decrypt -hexdump
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5328)
Remove the timer and TSC additional input code and instead provide a single
routine that attempts to use the "best" timer/counter available on the
system. It attempts to use TSC, then various OS dependent resources and
finally several tries to obtain the date. If any of these timer/counters
is successful, the rest are skipped.
No randomness is credited for this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
If such a timer/counter register is not available, the return value is always
zero. This matches the assembly implementations' behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5230)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5230)
The functions RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes() are now both based
on a common implementation using RAND_DRBG_bytes() (if the default
OpenSSL rand method is active). This not only simplifies the code
but also has the advantage that additional input from a high precision
timer is added on every generate call if the timer is available.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
When comparing the implementations of drbg_bytes() and RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
it was noticed that the former split the buffer into chunks when calling
RAND_DRBG_generate() to circumvent the size limitation of the buffer
to outlen <= drb->max_request. This loop was missing in RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
so it was adopted from drbg_bytes().
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
This check not only prevented the automatic reinstantiation of the
DRBG, which is implemented in RAND_DRBG_generate(), but also prevented
an error message from being generated in the case of failure.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)
BN_from_montgomery_word doesn't have a constant memory access pattern.
Replace the pointer trick with a constant-time select. There is, of
course, still the bn_correct_top leak pervasive in BIGNUM itself.
See also https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22904 from BoringSSL.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5228)
The exponent here is one of d, dmp1, or dmq1 for RSA. This value and its
bit length are both secret. The only public upper bound is the bit width
of the corresponding modulus (RSA n, p, and q, respectively).
Although BN_num_bits is constant-time (sort of; see bn_correct_top notes
in preceding patch), this does not fix the root problem, which is that
the windows are based on the minimal bit width, not the upper bound. We
could use BN_num_bits(m), but BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is public API
and may be called with larger exponents. Instead, use all top*BN_BITS2
bits in the BIGNUM. This is still sensitive to the long-standing
bn_correct_top leak, but we need to fix that regardless.
This may cause us to do a handful of extra multiplications for RSA keys
which are just above a whole number of words, but that is not a standard
RSA key size.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154)
(This patch was written by Andy Polyakov. I only wrote the commit
message. Mistakes in the analysis are my fault.)
BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the
most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access
pattern.
BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have
public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This
fully resolves those cases.
There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where the
bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those cases as
we still only look at the top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be
non-zero, but only because of the long-standing bn_correct_top timing
leak. Once that is fixed, a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs
must count bits on each word.
Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. In particular,
BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime uses the exponent bit width to pick windows,
but it should be using the maximum bit width. The next patch will fix
this.
Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu
for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
The behavior of resetting the init_lock value to NULL after
freeing it during OPENSSL_cleanup() was added as part of the
global lock commits that were just reverted, but there is desire
to retain this behavior for clarity.
It is unclear that the library would actually remain usable in
any form after OPENSSL_cleanup(), since the required re-initialization
occurs under a CRYPTO_ONCE check that cannot be reset at cleanup time.
That said, a NULL dereference is probably more friendly behavior
in these treacherous waters than using freed memory would be.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:
Revert "Address feedback"
This reverts commit 75551e07bd.
and
Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"
This reverts commit ed6b2c7938.
But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.
The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions! The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.
However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL. That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:
(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)
For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).
(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock). Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.) If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.
(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()
As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed. The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.
(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()
This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion. However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions. Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation. So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().
In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)
They aren't needed if all they do is set bio->init = 1 and zero other
fields that are already zeroed
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5223)
Without this, every BIO implementation is forced to have a create
method, just to set bio->init = 1.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5223)
Some older glibc versions require the `-lrt` linker option for
resolving the reference to `clock_gettime'. Since it is not desired
to add new library dependencies in version 1.1.1, the call to
clock_gettime() is replaced by a call to gettimeofday() for the
moment. It will be added back in version 1.2.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5199)
C preprocessor flags get separated from C flags, which has the
advantage that we don't get loads of macro definitions and inclusion
directory specs when linking shared libraries, DSOs and programs.
This is a step to add support for "make variables" when configuring.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5177)
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Correct error return value in OCSP_basic_sign().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4190)
Add a -rsigopt option to the ocsp command that allows signature parameters to be provided for the signing of OCSP responses. The parameters that may be provided to -rsigopt are the same as may be provided to -sigopt in the ca, req, and x509 commands.
This PR also defines a OCSP_basic_sign_ctx() function, which functions in the same way as OCSP_basic_sign(), except that it accepts a EVP_MD_CTX rather than a key and digest. The OCSP_basic_sign_ctx() function is used to implement the -rsigopt option in the ocsp command.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4190)
This just adds the various extension functions. More changes will be
required to actually use them.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
Support added for these two digests, available only via the EVP interface.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5093)
EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() would search through standard asn1 methods
first, then those added by the application, which EVP_PKEY_asn1_find()
worked the other way around. Also, EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() didn't
handle aliases.
This change brings EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() closer to EVP_PKEY_asn1_find().
Fixes#5086
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5137)
Because OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN will keep OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX defined, there's
no point having checks of this form:
#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN))
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5060)
Commit 9f9442918a changed the semantics of BN_copy() to additionally
copy the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag if it is set. This turns out to be
ill advised as it has unintended consequences. For example calling
BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() can sometimes return a result with the flag
set and sometimes not as a result. This can lead to later failures if we
go down code branches that do not support constant time, but check for
the presence of the flag.
The original commit was made due to an issue in BN_MOD_CTX_set(). The
original PR fixed the problem in that function, but it was changed in
review to fix it in BN_copy() instead. The solution seems to be to revert
the BN_copy() change and go back to the originally proposed way.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5080)
Fixes#5076
Since do_rand_drbg_init() allocates three locks, it needs to ensure
that OPENSSL_init_crypto() is called, otherwise these resources are
not cleaned up properly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5083)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4958)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5000)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4634)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4634)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4634)
SPARC ISA doesn't have provisions to back up 128-bit multiplications
and additions. And so multiplications are done with library calls
and carries with comparisons and conditional moves. As result base
2^51 code is >40% slower...
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This is based on RT#3810, which added dedicated modular inversion.
ECDSA verify results improves as well, but not as much.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5001)
The DRGB concept described in NIST SP 800-90A provides for having different
algorithms to generate random output. In fact, the FIPS object module used to
implement three of them, CTR DRBG, HASH DRBG and HMAC DRBG.
When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, two of the three algorithms
were dropped, and together with those the entire code that made RAND_DRBG
generic was removed, since only one concrete implementation was left.
This commit restores the original generic implementation of the DRBG, making it
possible again to add additional implementations using different algorithms
(like RAND_DRBG_CHACHA20) in the future.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
The generic part of the FIPS DRBG was implemented in fips_drbg_lib.c and the
algorithm specific parts in fips_drbg_<alg>.c for <alg> in {ctr, hash, hmac}.
Additionally, there was the module fips_drbg_rand.c which contained 'gluing'
code between the RAND_METHOD api and the FIPS DRBG.
When the FIPS code was ported to master in #4019, for some reason the ctr-drbg
implementation from fips_drbg_ctr.c ended up in drbg_rand.c instead of drbg_ctr.c.
This commit renames the module drbg_rand.c back to drbg_ctr.c, thereby restoring
a simple relationship between the original fips modules and the drbg modules
in master:
fips_drbg_lib.c => drbg_lib.c /* generic part of implementation */
fips_drbg_<alg>.c => drbg_<alg>.c /* algorithm specific implementations */
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4998)
Similar to commit 17b602802114d53017ff7894319498934a580b17(
"Remove extra `the` in SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod"), this commit removes
typos where additional 'the' have been added.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4999)
"Double" is in quotes because improvement coefficient varies
significantly depending on platform and compiler. You're likely
to measure ~2x improvement on popular desktop and server processors,
but not so much on mobile ones, even minor regression on ARM
Cortex series. Latter is because they have rather "weak" umulh
instruction. On low-end x86_64 problem is that contemporary gcc
and clang tend to opt for double-precision shift for >>51, which
can be devastatingly slow on some processors.
Just in case for reference, trick is to use 2^51 radix [currently
only for DH].
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Hardware used for benchmarking courtesy of Atos, experiments run by
Romain Dolbeau <romain.dolbeau@atos.net>. Kudos!
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4855)
Previously, the RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate() call was not exactly inverse to
RAND_DRBG_instantiate(), because some important member values of the
drbg->ctr member where cleared. Now these values are restored internally.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
Every DRBG now supports automatic reseeding not only after a given
number of generate requests, but also after a specified time interval.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
A third shared DRBG is added, the so called master DRBG. Its sole purpose
is to reseed the two other shared DRBGs, the public and the private DRBG.
The randomness for the master DRBG is either pulled from the os entropy
sources, or added by the application using the RAND_add() call.
The master DRBG reseeds itself automatically after a given number of generate
requests, but can also be reseeded using RAND_seed() or RAND_add().
A reseeding of the master DRBG is automatically propagated to the public
and private DRBG. This construction fixes the problem, that up to now
the randomness provided by RAND_add() was added only to the public and
not to the private DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4402)
This commit adds comments to bio_method_st definitions where the
function pointers are defined as NULL. Most of the structs have comments
but some where missing and not all consitent.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4881)
The new ServerHello format is essentially now the same as the old TLSv1.2
one, but it must additionally include supported_versions. The version
field is fixed at TLSv1.2, and the version negotiation happens solely via
supported_versions.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
Reduce RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM to 5.
Remove no longer used RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE.
Make rsa_multip_cap honor RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4905)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4916)
If OPENSSL_init_crypto() hasn't been called yet when ERR_get_state()
is called, it need to be called early, so the base initialization is
done. On some platforms (those who support DSO functionality and
don't define OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE), that includes a call of
ERR_set_mark(), which calls this function again.
Furthermore, we know that ossl_init_thread_start(), which is called
later in ERR_get_state(), calls OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL), except
that's too late.
Here's what happens without an early call of OPENSSL_init_crypto():
=> ERR_get_state():
=> CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local():
<= NULL;
# no state is found, so it gets allocated.
=> ossl_init_thread_start():
=> OPENSSL_init_crypto():
# Here, base_inited is set to 1
# before ERR_set_mark() call
=> ERR_set_mark():
=> ERR_get_state():
=> CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local():
<= NULL;
# no state is found, so it gets allocated!!!!!
=> ossl_init_thread_start():
=> OPENSSL_init_crypto():
# base_inited is 1,
# so no more init to be done
<= 1
<=
=> CRYPTO_thread_set_local():
<=
<=
<=
<= 1
<=
=> CRYPTO_thread_set_local() # previous value removed!
<=
Result: double allocation, and we have a leak.
By calling the base OPENSSL_init_crypto() early, we get this instead:
=> ERR_get_state():
=> OPENSSL_init_crypto():
# Here, base_inited is set to 1
# before ERR_set_mark() call
=> ERR_set_mark():
=> ERR_get_state():
=> OPENSSL_init_crypto():
# base_inited is 1,
# so no more init to be done
<= 1
=> CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local():
<= NULL;
# no state is found, so it gets allocated
# let's assume we got 0xDEADBEEF
=> ossl_init_thread_start():
=> OPENSSL_init_crypto():
# base_inited is 1,
# so no more init to be done
<= 1
<= 1
=> CRYPTO_thread_set_local():
<=
<=
<=
<= 1
=> CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local():
<= 0xDEADBEEF
<= 0xDEADBEEF
Result: no leak.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4913)
As per documentation, the RSA keys should not be smaller than 64bit (the
documentation mentions something about a quirk in the prime generation
algorithm). I am adding check into the code which used to be 16 for some
reason.
My primary motivation is to get rid of the last sentence in the
documentation which suggest that typical keys have 1024 bits (instead
updating it to the now default 2048).
I *assume* that keys less than the 2048 bits (say 512) are used for
education purposes.
The 512 bits as the minimum have been suggested by Bernd Edlinger.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4547)
I noticed that some of the BIO_METHOD structs are placing the name on
the same line as the type and some don't. This commit places the name
on a separate line for consistency (which looks like what the majority
do)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4878)
Expression '...' is always true.
The 'b->init' variable is assigned values twice successively
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4753)
Pointer 'o' is set inside a local buffer, so it can't be NULL.
Also fix coding style and add comments
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4754)
256-bit AVX512VL was estimated to deliver ~50% improvement over AVX2
and it did live up to the expectations.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4838)
It was observed that AVX512 code paths can negatively affect overall
Skylake-X system performance. But we are talking specifically about
512-bit code, while AVX512VL, 256-bit variant of AVX512F instructions,
is supposed to fly as smooth as AVX2. Which is why it remains unmasked.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4838)
This line will allow use private keys, which created by Crypto Pro, to
sign with OpenSSL.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4836)
This initial commit is unoptimized reference version that handles
input lengths divisible by 4 blocks.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4830)
Follow up from the conversion to use SSLfatal() in the state machine to
clean things up a bit more.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
Sometimes at the top level of the state machine code we know we are
supposed to be in a fatal error condition. This commit adds some sanity
checks to ensure that SSLfatal() has been called.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)
